中文版
A Quick Housekeeping Note on “Likes” 
Proposal NotebookLM (Ask AI)
Ongoing Q&A Updates (As of Sep 5)
Ongoing Q&A Updates (As of Sep 6)
Update & Path Forward (As of Sept 11)
Update & Path Forward (Sept 12): Community Review Month Begins!
Community Review Month Plan
Update (Oct 15)
Update and AMA#2
Changelog (Oct 18, 2025):
- Improved: Replaced the milestone inaction clauses with a new, automated milestone delay review process (within Section 3.3.2), removing the potential of Steward discretion and guaranteeing the community to directly decide on how to handle project delays.
- Improved: Added a clarification to the “Fixed USDI Amount” funding option (within Section 3.2.2), which requires proposers to disclose the equivalent CKB value at submission time to ensure a predictable voting threshold.
Changelog (Oct 15, 2025):
- Added: A “Milestone Deadline & Project Stalls” clause to the governance process (Section 3.3.2). Based on feedback from @knmo and the community, this empowers the DAO Stewards to initiate a review if a project stalls, closing a potential governance loophole:
“Each milestone in a proposal must have a publicly stated, estimated deadline. If a project team fails to deliver a milestone within 30 days of its stated deadline, the DAO Stewards are empowered to directly initiate the ‘Project Full Review, Final Ruling, and Termination (Crisis Management)’ process.”- Added: A requirement for the DAO Stewards to create and maintain an “Operational Handbook” (Section 3.1.4). Based on feedback from AMA #1, this will separate high-level meta-rules from day-to-day operational procedures, enhancing transparency and adaptability:
“One of the core responsibilities of the first Stewards team will be to compile and publish the first version of the “DAO Stewards Operational Handbook.” This document will detail the day-to-day procedures for implementing the governance rules. Each subsequent team, upon election, will be responsible for revising and updating this handbook to reflect lessons learned and adapt to community needs.”- Removed: The “Fixed USD Value (Paid in CKB)” funding option (Section 3.2.2). Based on feedback from AMA #1 regarding its operational complexity, we have simplified the funding policy to focus on the more straightforward “Fixed CKB” and “Fixed USDI” options.
Changelog (Updated Sept 10, 2025):
Changed: Reclassified the proposal from a “Budget Request” to a “Meta-Rule Change” based on constructive feedback to ensure procedural integrity. (Section 1 Statement on the Nature of the Proposal)
Added: Incorporated the option for USD / USDI denominated funding based on community feedback, and detailed its operational flow within the two-tier treasury system. (Section 3.2 Budget Denomination and Payment Currency)
1. Background and Objectives (Why)
CKB Community Fund DAO (hereinafter referred to as the DAO) v1.0 was a successful experiment in community governance, providing us with valuable experience. However, as the ecosystem has evolved, its minimalist rules and fragmented governance tools/platforms have revealed challenges in operational efficiency, project oversight, and community participation experience.
The current governance process of DAO v1.0 heavily relies on the spontaneous actions of community members, as illustrated below:
By analyzing this process and communicating with former operational contributors, we have identified five major structural challenges at the procedural level in DAO v1.0:
- Lack of Institutionalized Operational Processes: The DAO’s treasury is managed by a 2/3 multi-sig treasury committee (Jan, Terry, Cipher), but key operational roles and processes are ambiguous. Who supervises project progress? Who verifies milestone deliverables? Who formally notifies the multi-sig holders to make payments? How is treasury usage disclosed? In the past, some responsibilities (like checking for 30 likes on Nervos Talk proposals, verifying non-technical milestones, and notifying multi-sig holders for payments) were informally and voluntarily handled by community member Jacky, but this was not an institutional arrangement. This reliance on individuals rather than a structured system is fragile and unsustainable.
- Misaligned Oversight Roles and Bottlenecks: In the DAO v1.0 process, once a proposal is approved and the initial budget is allocated, the DAO is completely absent from the subsequent milestone oversight and decision-making. Milestone verification is informally handled by a single member, making it difficult to conduct a comprehensive factual review and disclosure for diverse project deliverables (technical, marketing, design, etc.). This leads to two problems: first, oversight can become a mere formality; second, and more critically, the DAO, as the ultimate decision-maker, is absent from the continuous supervision of the project execution process.
- Fragmented Governance Tools and High Barriers to Entry: The current governance process spans multiple platforms: proposals and discussions on Nervos Talk, followed by formal voting on Metaforo. This fragmented experience not only increases the participation cost and cognitive load for community members but also leads to scattered information and loss of context, which is a major reason for low governance participation.
- Lack of Information Dissemination Channels: During community discussion and voting, the dissemination of proposals relies on personal forwarding by the project team or active community members, lacking an official, neutral channel for information outreach. This results in information asymmetry, where core discussions fail to reach as many community members as possible in a timely manner, affecting the breadth and depth of decision-making. Similarly, after a project concludes, the lack of information channels restricts the community’s and the public’s understanding of and participation in the latest ecosystem developments.
- Gaps in Key Processes: Projects lack a formal completion report and process, which prevents the accumulation of experience and the reuse of knowledge. The DAO cannot learn and grow from past funding. This process gap means that each new project starts from scratch, unable to build upon a systematic project management and knowledge accumulation mechanism.
These issues collectively point to a core dilemma: DAO v1.0 has a democratic decision-making mechanism but severely lacks the professional, continuous procedural services required to support the effective implementation of these decisions.
This proposal aims to address this dilemma. We propose, while preserving the core democratic spirit of v1.0 (e.g., voting weight based on Nervos DAO deposits), to conduct a upgrade to the DAO’s operational rules and supporting infrastructure by introducing two core components:
- A professional operational team serving the DAO: the DAO Stewards, complemented by clear treasury management and governance processes.
- A brand-new Web5-based governance platform to replace the current fragmented tools and enhance the overall governance experience.
Statement on the Nature of the Proposal (Updated Sept 9, 2025)
Following extensive, rigorous, and valuable discussions with community members, a consensus has been reached that to uphold the highest standard of procedural integrity, this proposal should be classified as a Meta-Rule Change Proposal.
Our team agrees with this assessment and is grateful for the community’s engagement in this foundational debate. Therefore, if this proposal proceeds to a formal vote, it will be subject to the more stringent conditions required for a meta-rule change.
To ensure the absolute clarity of this vote, we hereby commit that:
This proposal will be voted on as a single, indivisible package. If the proposal does not meet the passing threshold for a meta-rule change, it will be considered entirely rejected. In that event, our team will not seek DAO funding for any portion of it, we will also not unilaterally implement within the DAO any of the procedural changes contained herein, nor act in the capacity of any new roles defined in this proposal (such as the DAO Stewards) within the DAO.
We believe this is the most responsible path forward and honors the community’s desire for rigorous oversight.
2. The Team (Who)
This proposal is initiated by a group of community contributors with the support of the CKB Eco Fund. We are a diverse team that blends community passion, development expertise, and ecosystem strategic vision, dedicated to building a truly usable public infrastructure for DAO v1.1, enabling the community’s democratic decisions to be more smoothly translated into ecosystem development results.
2.1 Team Members
- Baiyu (Team Advisor): Partner at the CKB Eco Fund. Baiyu will serve as the advisor to this proposal, providing strategic guidance and ecosystem resources to ensure the project remains aligned with the long-term development of the CKB ecosystem and DAO.
- Yixiu (Project Manager / Test Lead): An OG member and long-term contributor to the CKB community with extensive experience in developer communities. Yixiu will be responsible for the overall project management, coordinating resources, and leading the community testing phase to ensure the final product meets the community’s genuine needs.
- Zhouzhou (Operations Lead): Research Lead at the CKB Eco Fund. Zhouzhou has in-depth knowledge of decentralized governance and excels at translating complex concepts into actionable operational strategies. His experience in operating the CKB Eco Fund Spark Program will also be brought to DAO v1.1. He will be responsible for designing and initially executing the operational framework for the DAO Stewards team.
- David (Development Lead): A seasoned community developer, the creator of Solo Mining Pool for CKB, and core developer of the first Web5 App, xjdao.xyz. David possesses a deep understanding of CKB’s underlying technology and Web5, he has consistently been committed to creating value for the community through code. He will lead the overall technical architecture and development of the governance platform.
2.2 Collaboration Model
This proposal aims to establish a healthy collaboration model within the CKB ecosystem: community members identify genuine problems, propose solutions, receive support from the Eco Fund, submit proposals to the Community Fund DAO, and upon receiving DAO approval and funding, ultimately deliver results to the community and be subject to DAO oversight.
The role of the CKB Eco Fund is strictly limited to the early incubation and support of this proposal. Should this proposal be approved by the DAO, the operation of v1.1 (including the formation of the Stewards team and platform maintenance) will function as a completely independent, community-funded project, accountable only to the DAO, with no subordinate or reporting relationship to the CKB Eco Fund.
Through this project, we hope to set an example for more community members with great ideas and capabilities: as long as your idea is solid and you are willing to put in the effort to build, the Eco Fund is more than willing to provide the necessary support to help you submit a proposal to the Community Fund DAO, and together, we can build a more prosperous CKB ecosystem.
3. Deliverables (What)
A. Service Delivery
3.1 DAO Stewards
3.1.1 Defining “Stewards”
In everyday language, the term “Steward” is often misunderstood as a manager with ambiguous power boundaries in a residential community, sometimes even perceived as a “ruler” within a specific social organization (especially in the Chinese context) due to various real-world issues. However, from a political and sociological perspective, the work of steward is precisely a purely procedural service created to solve the collective action problem.
Modern communities, born from private property rights, have numerous public facilities (like elevators, roads) and public order. Theoretically, these public affairs should be decided upon and maintained by all property owners collectively. In practice, however, it is unrealistic to expect all owners to invest their energy in handling these tedious matters, which is known as the “collective action problem.” The emergence of steward, through neutral and professional services, liberates owners from complex public affairs, allowing them to focus on core issues while ensuring the community’s normal operation. Its essence is to be entrusted by all owners to provide professional services, without ever interfering with the owners’ sovereignty.
In the context of a DAO, this model is a perfect fit. CKB stakers are the “owners” of the DAO, possessing the ultimate decision-making power over DAO governance matters such as the use of funds. But it is equally unrealistic to expect everyone to participate in procedural tasks like following up on project progress, verifying code deliverables, and organizing community meetings. The DAO Stewards proposed here are essentially a professional procedural team serving all “owners,” equipped with diverse skills (technical, marketing, research), acting as a neutral service provider to support the daily operations of DAO v1.1.
3.1.2 Positioning and Mission
- Team Positioning: The DAO Stewards are a procedural service and facilitation team trusted by the community, funded by the DAO, and accountable to all voters.
- Core Mission: As neutral service providers and process facilitators, to provide high-quality operational, oversight, and technical support for community governance.
- Scope of Authority: DAO Stewards do not have the power to approve proposals or make any voting decisions. The objective of all their actions is to ensure the fairness, transparency, and efficiency of the governance process and to present the most complete and neutral information to the community decision-makers.
- No Decision-Making Power: The DAO Stewards team does not have the authority to approve proposals, nor does it have any voting decision-making power. They are “servants” of community decision-making and governance, not “approvers.”
- No Interpretive Power: The DAO Stewards team has no authority to interpret or arbitrate rule disputes; they can only execute procedures strictly according to the written rules approved by the community.
- Financial Responsibility: The Stewards team has no autonomous financial authority. Their responsibilities related to funds are limited to:
- After the community votes to approve a project, notifying the main treasury multi-sig holders to transfer the total project budget to the corresponding project execution wallet.
- As multi-sig holders of the project execution wallet, fulfilling the procedural obligation of signing for payment after each milestone is confirmed by a community vote, along with other multi-sig holders.
- As community members, Stewards retain the right to exercise their personal vote on all proposals based on their voting weight.
3.1.3 Core Responsibilities
In line with their positioning and mission, the core responsibilities of the DAO Stewards revolve around their procedural authority.
- Proposal Lifecycle Management:
- Proposal Coaching and Standardization: Provide clear proposal templates and assist applicants in refining their proposals.
- Organizing Community Q&A: Responsible for organizing community AMAs or public debates before a proposal goes to a vote.
- Oversight and Reporting:
- Milestone Verification: For proposals that have received funding, responsible for verifying their milestone deliverables.
- Publishing Verification Reports: Publicly release verification reports to the community at each milestone.
- Transparency and Communication:
- Treasury Asset Transparency: Responsible for operating and maintaining an asset dashboard based on the UTXO Global multi-sig wallet.
- Information Outreach: Ensure that all important governance information effectively reaches community members.
3.1.4 Team Formation and Rotation:
- Initial Formation: To ensure an efficient and stable launch, the formation of the first DAO Stewards team will be guided by the proposal team. Meanwhile, we will open to the entire CKB community to find the best candidates for the core professional roles within the Stewards.
- Subsequent Elections: After the DAO Stewards team has been operational for one year, fully community-based elections will be initiated. Each term for the Stewards team will be one year.
3.1.5 Operational Funding:
- During the initial formation phase, the operational funds for the DAO Stewards team are proposed within this proposal.
- After community-based elections begin, the operational budget for the DAO Stewards team (such as member salaries, tool development fees) should also be applied for from the DAO every year in the form of an independent proposal.
3.1.6 Performance Evaluation and Accountability:
- The DAO Stewards will publish a quarterly work report to the community, detailing their work content, service effectiveness, and budget usage.
- The community has the right to initiate a vote of no confidence in the Stewards team at any time, or to vote on whether to renew their service at the end of their term.
3.2 Treasury Management and Financial Policies
3.2.1 Two-Tier Treasury System
To balance asset security, execution efficiency, and community oversight, we propose a clear two-tier treasury system. The balance and all transfer operations of both tiers of the treasury should be publicly displayed on the DAO governance platform.
- Tier 1: DAO Main Treasury
- Positioning: The core asset pool of the entire DAO, which is the current Community Fund DAO treasury.
- Management: Continues to be managed by the existing fund management committee according to v1.0 rules and multi-sig methods.
- Responsibility: After a proposal on the v1.1 platform is approved by vote, and upon notification from the DAO Stewards team, the total budget for that project is transferred to a newly created project execution wallet for that project.
- Tier 2: Project Execution Wallet
- Positioning: A temporary multi-sig wallet created independently for each approved project, used exclusively for that project’s milestone funding.
- Management: Managed by a 2/3 multi-sig, with signers composed of:
- DAO Steward Representatives x 2: provide neutral and professional services.
- Community Observer x 1: Invited and publicly announced by the DAO Stewards from community members who actively participated in the discussion of the proposal.
- Responsibilities:
- Receive the total project budget transferred from the main treasury.
- Pay the start-up funds and each milestone payment to the project team according to the process.
- Upon project completion, either pay the outstanding funds to the project party or return any surplus funds in the wallet to the main treasury.
- Upon project termination, return all remaining funds in the wallet to the main treasury.
3.2.2 Budget Denomination and Payment Currency
In response to community concerns about CKB price volatility and to provide greater flexibility and financial certainty for all future proposers, this proposal introduces multiple options for budget denomination. Proposers may choose one of the following methods:
- Fixed CKB Amount: Propose a fixed amount of CKB, and disclose the equivalent USD value in the proposal based on the CKB/USD exchange rate at the time of submission.
- Fixed USDI Amount: Propose a fixed amount of the ecosystem stablecoin, USDI, and disclose the equivalent CKB amount in the proposal based on the CKB/USD exchange rate at the time of submission.
Fund Flow Process Description
Suppose project a applies for a budget equivalent to 50,000 USD. The following examples illustrate the fund flow using Scenario A: Fixed CKB Amount and Scenario B: Fixed USDI Amount.
Proposal Approval: The community votes to approve project a’s total budget on the governance platform:
- Scenario A: 10,000,000 CKB (equivalent to $50,000 USD at the rate of 0.005 CKB/USD at the time of submission).
- Scenario B: 50,000 USDI (pegged 1:1 to USD).
Project Budget Allocation: The DAO Stewards notifies the main treasury multi-sig holders about the project establishment. The holders execute the multi-sig to transfer from the main treasury:
- Scenario A: 10,000,000 CKB
- Scenario B: 10,000,000 CKB converted to 50,000 USDI
These funds are transferred to a newly established execution wallet for project a. The three holders of project a’s execution wallet (2 property representatives and 1 community observer) execute a 2/3 multi-sig to pay 20% of the total budget to the project team’s wallet as startup funding:
- Scenario A: 2,000,000 CKB
- Scenario B: 10,000 USDI
Milestone Completion: Project a completes its first milestone. The DAO Stewards team publishes a verification report for the community quick poll.
Milestone Payment: (For passes the vote) The three holders of project a’s execution wallet (2 Steward reps, 1 community observer) execute a 2/3 multi-sig to pay the milestone funds (for example, 20%):
- Scenario A: 2,000,000 CKB
- Scenario B: 10,000 USDI
to the project team.
Project Completion: If project a’s execution wallet has remaining funds upon project completion:
- Scenario A: The execution wallet holders sign to transfer all remaining funds to the project team’s wallet
- Scenario B: Same as Scenario A
Project Termination: If the project is terminated for any reason and there are remaining funds in the Project a execution wallet, the holders of the execution wallet sign to return the full remaining amount to the main treasury.
3.3. Governance Rules and Process
To achieve the above objectives, we propose a new suite of governance rules and processes. It builds upon v1.0 by integrating the role of the DAO Stewards and optimizing the entire lifecycle from proposal deliberation to execution oversight. All processes will be completed on the new Web5 governance platform.
3.3.1 Scope of Governance
Same as DAO v1.0, governing two types of matters:
- Making decisions on budget requests for ecosystem development projects.
- Making decisions on modifying the meta-rules of the DAO.
3.3.2 Proposal Lifecycle
- Phase 1: Community Review - 30 days
- Proposers submit proposals using a standardized template on the Web5 governance platform.
- Upon submission, the proposal automatically enters a 30-day public community review period. During this time, all community members can discuss it under the proposal.
- The DAO Stewards must facilitate broad coverage of project information and community discussion during this period:
- Organize at least 2 public Q&A sessions for the community. If multiple projects apply concurrently, sessions can be combined and ordered by proposal submission time.
- Summarize community discussions, questions, and proposer responses weekly and sync them on the Nervos Talk Community Fund DAO section and various CKB community social media platforms.
- During the community review period, the proposer can continuously refine the proposal content.
- Condition for Passing: There is no threshold in this phase. After the 30-day review period, the proposer can choose whether to proceed to the next phase.
- Phase 2: Approval Vote - 7 days
- Initiation Condition: The proposer must hold at least 100,000 CKB in the Nervos DAO to initiate a vote on the Web5 governance platform.
- Voting Mechanism: Voting power is based entirely on the user’s CKB deposits in the Nervos DAO, continuing the direct weighted voting model of v1.0.
- Condition for Passing: Follows the core logic of v1.0.
- Budget Proposal: “For” votes ≥ 51%, and the total CKB voted must be at least 3 times the requested budget.
- Meta-Rule Change Proposal: “For” votes ≥ 67%, and the total CKB voted must be at least 185,000,000 CKB.
- Phase 3: Execution Oversight
- Project Start-up: After the proposal passes, the DAO Treasury and the project execution wallet will disburse the initial funding.
- Milestone Oversight:
- All proposals involving fund usage will be paid in stages. Initial funding will be limited to 20% of the total budget, with a maximum cap of $10,000 USD.
- Proposals with a total budget exceeding $10,000 USD must have clear milestones, with payments made per milestone.
- Each milestone in a proposal must have a publicly stated, estimated deadline.
- After each milestone is delivered, the DAO Stewards must publish a verification report within 7 days.
- If a project team fails to deliver a milestone within 30 days of its stated deadline, this review process is automatically triggered.
- Once triggered, the DAO Stewards must communicate with the project team and, within 7 days, publish a delay status report. This report must include: the team’s explanation for the delay, current progress, and a revised milestone plan with a new, reassessed deadline proposed by the project team.
- After the report is published, subsequent funding requires a quick confirmation vote from the community before it can be executed.
- Quick Confirmation Vote Description: To balance governance efficiency with community oversight and avoid voter fatigue and formalism, the quick vote uses an “optimistic governance” model of “default pass with a community veto right”:
- Voting Period: 3 days
- Voting Options: Confirm VS Veto (The specific meaning of “Confirm” depends on the report: for a delivered milestone, it means “Confirm Funding”; for a delayed milestone, it means “Accept New Plan”.)
- Minimum Turnout:
- No less than the requested budget for the project (for budget proposals).
- No less than 185,000,000 / 3 = 62,000,000 CKB (for meta-rule change proposals).
- This minimum turnout is 1/3 of the initial approval turnout, considering the objective fact that community attention naturally declines during project execution. This allows DAO members who remain engaged to act as “whistleblowers” to pause the process and draw community attention for further review.
- Decision Threshold and Outcome: Provided the minimum turnout is met, if Veto Funding votes are ≥ 51% (for budget proposals) or ≥ 67% (for meta-rule change proposals), the funding is vetoed. Otherwise, the funding is automatically approved.
- If a project has no milestones, the final report and payment will be handled as a milestone.
- Project Full Review, Final Ruling, and Termination (Crisis Management):
- Process for handling a funding veto during milestone oversight:
- Once funding is vetoed, the milestone is paused, and this and all subsequent milestone funds are immediately frozen.
- The DAO Stewards must organize an emergency community meeting within 48 hours to facilitate a public dialogue between the project team and the veto voters to clarify the issues.
- After the dialogue, the DAO Stewards will summarize the meeting minutes and submit them for a community full review vote.
- Voting Period: 7 days
- Voting Options: Terminate Project and Reclaim Funds VS Resolve Issues and Continue
- Minimum Turnout: Same as for the initial proposal approval.
- At least 3 times the total requested budget (for budget proposals).
- At least 185,000,000 CKB (for meta-rule change proposals).
- Decision Threshold and Outcome:
- Provided the minimum turnout is met:
- If “Terminate Project and Reclaim Funds” wins (≥ 51% for budget proposals, ≥ 67% for meta-rule changes), the project is formally terminated, and all remaining funds are returned to the DAO v1.0 main treasury. The DAO Stewards will issue a project termination report.
- If “Resolve Issues and Continue” wins, the project returns to normal status, and the frozen milestone payment is disbursed.
- If the vote fails to meet quorum (e.g., insufficient turnout), this indicates the community has not reached a consensus on immediate termination. To respect the veto from the milestone oversight, the milestone funds remain frozen, and the project enters a 30-day rectification period, during which a detailed rectification plan must be submitted. After this period, the community will hold a final ruling vote.
- Provided the minimum turnout is met:
- After the 30-day rectification period, the DAO Stewards will organize a final ruling vote. To balance governance efficiency with community oversight, this vote uses a “pessimistic governance” model of “default reject with a community approval right”, requiring the project team to proactively regain the community’s trust:
- Voting Period: 7 days
- Voting Options: Approve Rectification Plan VS Reject Rectification Plan
- Minimum Turnout:
- At least 3 times the total requested budget (for budget proposals).
- At least 185,000,000 CKB (for meta-rule change proposals).
- Decision Threshold and Outcome:
- Provided the minimum turnout is met:
- If “Approve Rectification Plan” wins (≥ 51% for budget proposals, ≥ 67% for meta-rule changes), the project is considered “resolved and continued.” The previously frozen milestone payment will be immediately disbursed, and the project returns to normal status.
- If “Reject Rectification Plan” wins, the project is formally terminated as per “Terminate Project and Reclaim Funds.”
- If the vote fails to meet quorum, the project is also automatically and formally terminated as per “Terminate Project and Reclaim Funds.”
- Provided the minimum turnout is met:
- Process for handling a funding veto during milestone oversight:
- Project Completion: The project is successfully completed, and funds are disbursed according to the treasury management plan. The Stewards team creates a completion report based on the deliverables and project implementation process.
- Status Updates: The Stewards team is responsible for continuously updating the project status and funding records on a public dashboard.
3.3.3 General Rules
- No Proxy Proposals: All proposals must be submitted by the project lead using their
did:ckbidentity. - No Vote Incentivization: Any form of airdrop or asset incentive in exchange for votes is prohibited.
B. Tool Delivery
3.4 Web5 Governance Platform
We will develop a one-stop Web5 governance platform to host all v1.1 governance processes. This platform is not just a tool upgrade but an implementation of a DAO governance philosophy.
Platform MVP Demo
CN v0-dao-v11.vercel.app
EN https://v0-dao-v11-en.vercel.app/
Visual Effects Demonstration
3.4.1 Core Design Philosophy
- Unified Experience: End the fragmented Nervos Talk + Metaforo + Multisig Wallet model. We will seamlessly integrate the entire process of proposal discussion, voting, oversight, and funding into a single platform, significantly reducing the community’s participation cost and cognitive load.
- Process Transparency: Every core aspect of the platform will be maximally transparent. From every transaction in the treasury to every report from the Stewards team, all governance data will be public, traceable, and immutable.
- User Sovereignty: The platform will use
did:ckbas its core identity, returning ownership of governance identity and related data to community members, laying the foundation for a more open and composable governance ecosystem in the future.
3.4.2 Core Platform Modules
Module 1: Governance Homepage
As the platform’s entry point, it provides a global information overview for all users. It features a two-column layout, with a dynamic proposal feed on the left and a fixed personal dashboard on the right, ensuring core personal information is always visible.
- Proposal Dashboard:
- Displays all proposals as a stream of cards, clearly marking their current status (
Community Review,Voting in Progress,Milestone Delivery,Project Review,Completed,Terminated). - Each card intuitively shows the proposal title, proposer, requested budget, and key progress (e.g., voting percentage, milestone completion).
- Features: Provides keyword search and status filtering functions, allowing users to quickly locate specific proposals.
- Displays all proposals as a stream of cards, clearly marking their current status (
- Personal Dashboard (Fixed Right Column):
- My Governance: Displays the current user’s DID, real-time CKB voting power read from the Nervos DAO, and highlights pending actions (e.g., proposals to vote on).
- Treasury Overview: Concisely displays the main treasury’s core financial data and provides a one-click link to the treasury details page.
Module 2: Proposal Details Page
This is the core page for deep interaction with a single proposal.
- Top Information Bar: Contains the proposal title, proposer’s DID, total requested budget, and a prominent dynamic status timeline.
- Main Content Area (Tabbed):
- Proposal Details: Displays the full proposal content in a standardized, structured format (background, goals, budget breakdown, team introduction, etc.).
- Community Discussion: An integrated, threaded comment system strongly linked to the proposal, where all community members can conduct public inquiries and discussions.
- Governance Action Area (Right Column):
- Dynamic Panel: Displays different action modules based on the proposal’s status:
- Voting Period: Shows a “For/Against” voting panel, including real-time vote percentages, total votes cast, and a progress bar towards the minimum turnout.
- Execution Period: Shows a “Milestone Tracker” module, clearly listing all milestone goals and their current status, and providing a “Quick Confirmation Vote” entry point for pending milestones.
- Stewards’ Timeline: An official record wall published by the DAO Stewards for announcements like AMAs, meeting minutes, and milestone verification reports. Some records can be clicked to navigate to the corresponding report details page.
Module 3: Personal Profile (Web5 Identity Center)
The user’s hub for managing personal identity, assets, and activity records. The top of the page uses a three-column layout to display the user’s three most core types of information side-by-side, with detailed activity records below.
- Core Information Area (Three Columns):
- Basic Info: Users can edit their username and link social accounts like Nervos Talk, Twitter, and Telegram.
- Web5 Identity: Displays the user’s decentralized identity (DID) and personal data storage (PDS) address in the platform’s unified visual style, and shows the status of privacy controls like data encryption and anonymous browsing.
- Wallet & Nervos DAO: Shows the user’s connected CKB wallet address, the CKB balance in the wallet, and the amount of CKB deposited and being withdrawn from the Nervos DAO, with quick action buttons to the NervosDAO.
- Activity Records Area (Tabbed):
- Proposal History: A list of all proposals initiated by the user.
- Voting History: All votes the user has participated in and their choices.
- Discussion History: All comments posted by the user.
- Activity Statistics: Used to track the user’s governance contributions.
Module 4: Create Proposal Page
- Function: Provides a structured form that guides users to fill out the proposal’s various sections according to the official template, including title, background, goals, team, budget breakdown, milestone planning, etc.
- Goal: Ensure that all proposals submitted for community review have complete and standardized information, improving governance efficiency.
Module 5: Treasury Page
Achieves full transparency in the display of DAO assets.
- Main Treasury Dashboard: Graphically displays the main treasury’s total assets, allocated funds, and available funds. It also publicizes the main treasury’s multi-sig address and all signer DIDs, providing on-chain verification links.
- Project Wallet List: A table showing all approved project execution wallets, their current balances, the 2/3 multi-sig composition (Steward DIDs + Community Observer DID), and links to the associated proposals.
Module 6: Stewards Page
This page serves both as a public announcement board and an internal management tool.
- Stewards Team Display (Public Section): Shows all visitors the member information of the current DAO Stewards team, including names and DIDs, reflecting governance transparency.
- Stewards Management Backend (Requires Authentication):
- This section is only visible after a Steward connects their wallet and verifies their identity.
- It displays a to-do list of tasks requiring Steward action (e.g., standardizing new proposals, organizing community AMAs, verifying milestone deliverables, publishing verification reports) and provides corresponding action entry points.
Module 7: Report Details Page
Used to display various official documents published by the Stewards.
- Function: As a standalone page, it fully presents the various reports linked from the “Stewards’ Timeline,” such as “Community AMA Meeting Minutes” and “Milestone Verification Reports,” ensuring information integrity and traceability.
4. Project Plan & Budget Request (How & The Ask)
This section details the implementation path, key milestones, budget composition, and funding schedule for the DAO v1.1 optimization project.
4.1 Milestone Plan and Deliverables
We have divided the project’s execution path into four distinct milestones.
- Milestone 0: Project Kick-off
- Estimated Timeline: 1 month (August 2025)
- Core Objective: To complete all preliminary project preparations, establishing a solid foundation for the development phase.
- Key Deliverables:
- Finalization of the core team.
- A complete technical architecture design document.
- The final product prototype and partial UI/UX design drafts.
- Milestone 1: MVP Development and Launch
- Estimated Timeline: 2 months (September - late October 2025)
- Core Objective: To develop an MVP with core functionalities and launch it before CKCon 2025 for initial community testing and feedback.
- Key Deliverables:
- An account system supporting Web5
did:ckbregistration, QR code login, and account import. - Implementation of core governance features: proposal submission, detailed view, community discussion (comments), and voting.
- A user profile center that supports binding a Nervos DAO address.
- A homepage with a proposal list, treasury information display, and basic multi-language support.
- An account system supporting Web5
- Milestone 2: Mainnet Launch and Trial Operation
- Estimated Timeline: 2 months (November 2025 - mid-January 2026)
- Core Objective: To complete the development of all planned features, deploy the platform to the mainnet, and begin the community trial operation period.
- Key Deliverables:
- A feature-complete platform stably deployed in the mainnet production environment.
- Launch of the milestone-based proposal governance feature.
- Enhancement of homepage functionality, including a data overview dashboard, proposal search, and status filtering.
- Completion of the Stewards Team and Governance Rules information pages.
- The first round of bug fixes and UI/UX optimizations based on community feedback.
- Milestone 3: Formal Operation by Stewards Team
- Estimated Timeline: 12 months (commencing after the completion of Milestone 2)
- Core Objective: For the DAO Stewards team to formally take over the platform’s daily operations and provide continuous, professional governance services to the community.
- Key Deliverables:
- Assembly of a professional and neutral Stewards team to manage the full lifecycle of all proposals.
- Provision of ongoing system maintenance, optimization, and community support.
4.2 Budget Request and Allocation Plan
To accomplish the project plan outlined above, we are requesting a total of $100,000 USD equivalent in CKB from the Community Fund DAO. Based on the CKB/USD price of 0.005, this is equivalent to approximately 20,000,000 CKB.
4.2.1 Milestone-Based Funding Schedule
The total budget will be disbursed in four tranches, strictly tied to the completion of each milestone:
- Milestone 0 (Project Kick-off): 2,000,000 CKB (10% of total budget)
- Payment Trigger: Upon the approval of this proposal by the community.
- Milestone 1 (MVP Development and Launch): 10,400,000 CKB (52% of total budget)
- Payment Trigger: Upon the completion and community verification of all Milestone 1 deliverables.
- Milestone 2 (Mainnet Launch and Trial Operation): 4,000,000 CKB (20% of total budget)
- Payment Trigger: Upon the completion and community verification of all Milestone 2 deliverables.
- Milestone 3 (Formal Operation by Stewards Team): 3,600,000 CKB (18% of total budget)
- Payment Trigger: Upon the commencement of Milestone 3, when the Stewards team formally takes over operations.
4.2.2 Budget Breakdown
The total budget of $100,000 USD is composed of the following three parts (a, b, and c):
a. Development Budget: $72,000 USD
- By Role Composition:
| Role | Headcount | Avg. Monthly Salary (USD) | Duration (Months) | Total (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UI/UX Designer | 1 | 3,000 | 2 | 6,000 |
| Senior Frontend Engineer | 1 | 3,000 | 4 | 12,000 |
| Senior Backend Engineer | 2 | 4,000 | 4 | 32,000 |
| Senior Smart Contract Engineer | 1 | 6,000 | 1 | 6,000 |
| Product/Project/QA Manager | 1 | 4,000 | 4 | 16,000 |
| Total | 6 | 72,000 |
Note: 1. Some roles require high-intensity work over 1-2 months, but all members will provide support until the project is fully delivered. 2. The average day rate is approximately $136 USD.
- By Functional Module:
| Feature | Key Considerations | Development Cost (USD) |
|---|---|---|
| UI/UX | Multiple pages, complex details | 6,000 |
| web5did-indexer | Sync on-chain data to a database, provide API access | 3,000 |
| web5did Registration/Login | Account availability check, tx construction, PDS update, multi-device sync | 2,500 |
| User Profile Center | Wallet info, QR code, DID backup, role-based dashboards | 2,000 |
| web5did-dao-indexer | Design binding protocol, construct on-chain txs, update weights | 4,500 |
| DID & Nervos DAO Weight Binding | Integrate indexer, handle binding/unbinding, validation, tx submission | 3,500 |
| Proposal Submission | Database schema, API design, on-chain data structure and storage, indexing | 6,000 |
| Voting Contract Dev & Test | Smart contract development and testing | 8,000 |
| Voting on Proposals | Whitelist, create voting Cells, construct/send txs, result processing, weight calc | 12,000 |
| Multi-language Support | Support for EN/CN across many pages | 3,000 |
| Responsive Layout Support | Complex layouts on some pages | 2,500 |
| Treasury Management | Database, APIs, data entry and query, transaction logging | 2,400 |
| Proposal List | Database schema for different statuses, API design, filtering/search | 2,000 |
| Proposal Overview Dashboard | Database, APIs, data aggregation and statistics | 800 |
| Proposal Detail Page | Database/API design, dynamic display based on status | 1,000 |
| Community Discussion | Markdown/image support, threaded replies, PDS storage, linking discussions | 2,400 |
| Voting Panel | Real-time weight statistics, API, result updates | 800 |
| Milestone Panel | Milestone data storage and retrieval, status display | 800 |
| Stewards’ Timeline Panel | Log proposal lifecycle, state transitions, report submission/retrieval | 2,000 |
| Milestone Funding Vote | Similar to proposal voting but with different data sets | 3,000 |
| Stewards Team Display | Stewards admin backend, configurable info management, API access | 3,000 |
| Governance Rules Page | Multiple static pages | 800 |
| Total | 72,000 |
b. DAO Stewards Operational Budget (12 months): $18,000 USD
| Role | Monthly Salary (USD) | Total (USD) |
|---|---|---|
| Strategic & General Lead | 500 | 6,000 |
| Technical Specialist | 500 | 6,000 |
| Marketing & Community Specialist | 500 | 6,000 |
| Total | 1,500 | 18,000 |
c. Infrastructure Budget: $10,000 USD
| Item | Term | Cost (USD) |
|---|---|---|
| Voting Contract Deployment | - | 900 |
| Testing Environment - Application Server | 1 Year | 1,500 |
| Testing Environment - Database Server | 1 Year | 1,500 |
| Testing Environment - PDS Server | 1 Year | 1,500 |
| Production Environment - Application Server | 1 Year | 1,500 |
| Production Environment - Database Server | 1 Year | 1,500 |
| Production Environment - PDS Server | 1 Year | 1,500 |
| Domain Name | 2 Years | 100 |
| Total | 10,000 |
5. Conclusion
This proposal focuses on solving the most pressing operational and tooling issues of DAO v1.0, offering a low-risk, high-reward optimization plan. It concentrates on providing tangible services and value that can immediately enhance the DAO’s governance capabilities. We believe this is a pragmatic and efficient step forward in promoting the small, rapid, and continuous evolution of Nervos community governance.
We eagerly await your valuable feedback and look forward to building a more prosperous ecosystem together.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
舟舟
On behalf of the v1.1 Proposal Team (Yixiu, David, and Baiyu)
FAQ
We anticipate that the community may have questions about certain aspects of this proposal. We are addressing them proactively here.
1. The spirit of DAO v1.0 was “keep everything simple” to encourage spontaneous community exploration. Doesn’t this proposal, with its professional “Stewards” team and complex processes, contradict that spirit and add bureaucracy?
A: We fully agree with and respect the original spirit of v1.0. However, as practice over the past two years has shown (and as noted in Jan’s reflection), over-reliance on pure spontaneity has led to stagnation in the DAO’s evolution. The core purpose of v1.1 is not to add bureaucracy, but to reduce the hidden costs of participation by providing professional procedural services.
The “Stewards team” acts as “servants” hired by the community, not “gatekeepers.” They handle burdensome procedural tasks (like organizing meetings and verifying deliverables) so that proposers can focus on building and voters can focus on judging the value of proposals. Our goal is to clear obstacles and provide support for true bottom-up innovation, not to replace it.
2. The initial “Stewards team” will be formed by the Eco Fund and the proposal team. How will you ensure its neutrality and prevent it from becoming a new center of power or having conflicts of interest?
A: This is a crucial question. We have designed multiple mechanisms to ensure fairness and neutrality:
- Bootstrapping Necessity: The initial support of the Eco Fund is to leverage its existing project management experience to ensure a smooth launch for v1.1, effectively “bootstrapping” this service system. This is a temporary, service-oriented arrangement.
- Checks and Balances: The Stewards team has no voting or decision-making power. Their most significant function—verifying milestones—results in a report that is fully public and subject to the community’s final verdict via the “milestone vote.” The community holds the ultimate veto power to halt any payment.
- Community Oversight: Our “two-tier treasury” design includes a “Community Observer” invited from active community members to co-manage the project execution wallet’s multi-sig.
- Limited Term: The first Stewards team has a clear one-year term, after which a fully community-based election will be held, returning power completely to the community.
3. The requested budget of $100,000 is quite high. Why is an “internal governance system” worth more than many “external ecosystem projects”? What is the Return on Investment (ROI)?
A: The ROI for this budget must be understood on three levels. Firstly, we are delivering not just a software platform, but a robust risk management and due diligence system composed of three integrated parts: the governance processes, the Stewards team, and the technology platform. Its value is:
- Risk Mitigation (Insurance): The DAO treasury manages assets worth millions of CKB. The lack of oversight in v1.0 could lead to inefficient fund allocation or waste. This complete system provides a powerful risk management framework for all future DAO expenditures. It is essentially an “insurance policy” for the entire treasury, preventing potentially larger future losses.
- Ecosystem Catalyst (Leverage): A professional, efficient, and transparent governance process will attract more and higher-quality builders to apply for funding in the CKB ecosystem. It acts as a multiplier effect that can unlock the entire ecosystem’s innovative potential, a value far exceeding the platform’s development cost.
- Public Infrastructure (Lighthouse): This platform is itself a flagship application and open-source public good built on
did:ckband the Web5 philosophy. While serving the DAO, it also explores and validates cutting-edge technology for the CKB ecosystem, providing reusable examples and standards for future projects. We are investing in building the ecosystem’s “highways,” not just a single “car.”4. Does the “optimistic vote” mechanism for milestones lower the bar for oversight and sacrifice accountability?
A: On the contrary, we believe this activates and strengthens effective accountability. The problem with v1.0 is that the community theoretically has power, but the cost of exercising that power (requiring constant attention and voting on every step) is too high, leading to oversight being largely dormant.
The “optimistic vote” design solves this by drastically lowering the barrier for “whistleblowers” to exercise their oversight power. It no longer requires a majority to “actively approve” every time, but instead empowers a smaller, engaged minority to easily “actively oppose.” If a contentious milestone is vetoed, the system immediately triggers a more stringent, “pessimistic” crisis management process. It is an intelligent, tiered risk-response system that addresses “voter fatigue” while making oversight more feasible and a more credible deterrent.
5. Why build a technically complex Web5 platform from day one? What are the technical risks, and why not solve the problem with simpler technology first?
A: Because the mission of this proposal is not just to solve an administrative efficiency problem. It is a flagship project to practice what we preach and demonstrate the practical application and value of the CKB and Web5 narrative to the entire ecosystem.
- Building a Benchmark Application: The CKB ecosystem needs a Type A application (totally decentralized) as a benchmark to showcase the core advantages of Web5. Our core developer, David, has already successfully launched a Type C application (There are certain compromises for large-scale applications),
xjdao.xyz, gaining valuable Web5 development experience. We will now leverage this expertise to build a more foundational piece of infrastructure that the entire ecosystem can reuse.- Accumulating Sovereign Data: By adopting a Web5 architecture, all generated governance data (proposals, discussions, voting records) becomes a valuable, sovereign, and composable asset owned by the users themselves. This high-quality on-chain behavioral data can serve as a trusted source for other ecosystem applications in the future (e.g., reputation systems, community credentials), an advantage that traditional centralized tools cannot match.
- Controllable Risk: Technically, our team is experienced, and the milestone-based funding mechanism is itself an effective way to manage technical risk. Subsequent funding is only released after key technical deliverables are met.
In contrast, a traditional centralized tool would not fulfill our vision nor contribute truly valuable public infrastructure and sovereign data to the CKB ecosystem.