更新日志，持续问答，及团队透明度/独立性说明（2025.10.23）
大家好，
随着我们社区审议月临近尾声，我们的目标是在进入投票前，以完全的透明度，回应所有悬而未决的社区问题。
更新日志 (2025年10月23日):
- 调整： 将社区审议期缩短为21天，AMA调整为至少1场 (3.3.2节)。
- 调整： 由DAO物业团队管理的项目执行钱包的多签方案实现方式将不再指定，转由未来的《运营手册》详细规定 (3.1.3节 & 3.2.1节)。
变更理由说明
1. 关于缩短社区审议期 (30天 → 21天):
在 AMA#2 中，社区提出了一个中肯的观点，即我们需要在“充分讨论”和“保持势头”之间找到更好的平衡。我们认为将审议期缩短为21天是一个合理的折中。这个时长依然能为深度讨论和至少一场 AMA 提供充足的时间，同时也让整个治理流程变得更加敏捷。
2. 关于项目执行钱包多签方案的调整：
我们最初的提案为“项目执行钱包”指定了UTXO Global的方案，这引起了社区成员对安全性的担忧，提出是否能同样使用Neuron。然而，经过测试，我们发现Neuron在 UDT 支持上存在一定的技术局限，其多签目前仅直接支持 CKB。若要满足对USDI的多签，需要额外开发或者需要联系外部技术人员构造交易，这一定程度上超出了DAO v1.1提案和物业团队的范围。
为了平衡安全性和效率，并保证未来的可扩展性，我们从元规则中移除了项目执行钱包特定多签方案的指定。具体的实现方案，将交由物业团队在《运营手册》中根据实际情况设置和及时调整。这赋予了 DAO 灵活性，可以始终选择当下最合适的技术方案，而无需再次修改元规则。
具体来说，如果v1.1通过，现阶段的项目执行钱包可能会完全采用UTXO Global，或者对 “固定 CKB 数额”的项目使用 Neuron，为“固定 USDI 数额”的项目采用UTXO Global。
DAO 主金库钱包方案由其委员会决定，不受此变更影响。
持续问答更新
问：DAO v1.1 提案是否应该包含一个‘日落条款’——即在一年后进行一次强制投票，以决定是否恢复到 v1.0？
答： 这是一个极具战略性的构想，我们也对此进行了严肃的思考。设置该日落条款无疑能增强社区对v1.1的信心。然而，我们最终决定不在提案中增加“日落条款”，这是基于一项我们认为必须捍卫的 DAO 治理核心原则。
理由如下：
我们认为，一个预设的、强制性的“日落”投票，会损害所有 DAO 成员的一项基本权利：在任何时候发起元规则修改的权利。 改变规则的权力应该始终掌握在社区手中，按照他们自己的节奏，而不是由一个预设的时钟来决定。
这次讨论帮助我们厘清了一个至关重要的区别：
- 对框架 (规则) 的问责： 元规则是 DAO 的宪法，应该是持久的，直到社区自己通过下一个提案来改变它。
- 对团队 (物业) 的问责： 团队必须被问责。我们的提案已有强力机制：物业团队为期一年的任期，以及社区在任何时候可以罢免DAO物业团队的权利。
关于团队透明度/独立性的说明
1. 我们的身份：独立的社区贡献者
提案团队成员均在生态某部分担任职务： Baiyu (CKB Eco Fund 合伙人)、Yixiu (CKB Eco Fund DevRel) 、David (App5 团队成员) 、舟舟 (CKB Eco Fund 研究负责人)。但我们均是以独立的社区成员身份参与此次提案，而非各自组织的官方代表。
2. 资助的性质：一个独立的社区项目
DAO v1.1 提案向 Community Fund DAO 申请资助。重要的是，Community Fund DAO 与 Nervos 基金会是两个独立的实体。App5 团队受基金会委托，负责开发和维护生态系统内的数个公共产品，Eco Fund 也有其独立的预算。因此，不存在一个已受 DAO 资助的实体或该实体成员，为其他目的再次申请资金的利益冲突。
3. 关于承诺与报酬
本提案申请的预算，旨在为个人贡献者在这个特定的社区项目上付出的、专注的、专业的劳动（平台开发及后续物业团队运营）提供合理且必要报酬。交付成果的质量及其对应的生态价值是我们遵循的标准，同时也全面接受DAO 的监督。
感谢每一位参与本次审议月的朋友。你们的反馈让这个提案变得更加强大。我们相信，它现在已经准备好，可以交付给社区进行最终的决策。
Updates, Q&A, and a Note on Transparency (Oct 23, 2025)
Hello everyone,
As our Community Review Month comes to a close, our goal is to address all remaining community questions with full transparency before we move towards a vote.
Changelog (Oct 23, 2025):
- Adjusted: Shortened the Community Review Period to 21 days, and the AMA requirement has been adjusted to at least 1 session (Section 3.3.2).
- Adjusted: The multi-sig implementation for the Project Execution Wallet, managed by the DAO Stewards, will no longer be specified and will instead be detailed in the future “Operational Handbook” (Sections 3.1.3 & 3.2.1).
Rationale Behind the Changes
1. On Shortening the Community Review Period (30 → 21 Days):
During AMA #2, the community raised a valid point about finding the right balance between thorough discussion and maintaining momentum. We recognize shortening the review period to 21 days is a reasonable compromise. This duration still provides ample time for deep discussion and at least one AMA, while making the entire governance process more agile.
2. On the Adjustment of the Project Execution Wallet’s Multi-sig Solution:
Our initial proposal specified the UTXO Global solution for the “Project Execution Wallet,” which raised community concerns about security, with suggestions to use Neuron instead. However, after testing, we found that Neuron has certain technical limitations regarding UDT support, as its multi-sig currently only directly supports CKB. To fulfill the multi-sig requirements for USDI, it would require additional development or the need to engage external technical personnel to construct the transactions, which, to some extent, falls beyond the scope of the DAO v1.1 proposal and the Stewards team.
To balance security with efficiency and ensure future scalability, we have removed the specification of a particular multi-sig solution from the proposal. The specific implementation will be determined by the Stewards in the “Operational Handbook” based on the situation at the time. This gives the DAO the flexibility to always choose the most appropriate technical solution without needing another meta-rule change.
Specifically, if v1.1 is approved, the Project Execution Wallet might initially use UTXO Global exclusively, or use Neuron for “Fixed CKB Amount” projects and UTXO Global for “Fixed USDI Amount” projects.
The main DAO treasury’s wallet solution is determined by its committee and is not affected by this change.
Ongoing Q&A Update
Q: Should the DAO v1.1 proposal include a ‘sunset clause’—a mandatory vote after one year to decide whether to revert to v1.0?
A: This is a brilliant strategic idea, and we gave it serious consideration. A sunset clause would undoubtedly enhance community confidence in v1.1. However, we have decided not to add a sunset clause to the proposal, based on a core principle of DAO governance that we believe must be defended.
The Rationale:
We believe a scheduled, mandatory “sunset” vote would undermine a fundamental right of all DAO members: the right to propose a meta-rule change at any time. The power to change the rules should always lie with the community, on their own schedule, not on a pre-determined clock.
This discussion helped us clarify a crucial distinction:
- Accountability of the Framework (The Rules): The meta-rules are the DAO’s constitution. They should be durable until the community itself decides to change them again through another proposal.
- Accountability of the Team (The Stewards): The team must be held accountable. Our proposal already has strong mechanisms for this: a one-year term for the Stewards, and the community’s right to impeach the DAO Stewards at any time.
A Note on Team Transparency & Independence
1. Who We Are: Individual Community Contributors
The proposal team members each hold roles within the ecosystem: Baiyu (Partner at CKB Eco Fund), Yixiu (DevRel at CKB Eco Fund), David (member of the App5 team), and Zhouzhou (Research Lead at CKB Eco Fund). However, we are all participating in this proposal as individual community members, not as official representatives of our respective organizations.
2. The Nature of the Grant: An Independent Community Project
The DAO v1.1 proposal is applying for a grant from the Community Fund DAO. It is important to note that the Community Fund DAO and the Nervos Foundation are two separate entities. The App5 team is commissioned by the Foundation to develop and maintain several public products within the ecosystem, and the Eco Fund also has its own independent budget. Therefore, no conflict of interest exists in the sense of a DAO-funded entity or its members applying for more funds for other purposes.
3. On Commitment and Compensation
The budget requested in this proposal is to provide reasonable and necessary compensation for the dedicated, professional work that individuals will contribute to this specific community project (platform development and subsequent Steward team operations). The quality of the deliverables and their corresponding ecosystem value are the standards we will adhere to, and we will be fully accountable to the DAO’s oversight.
Thank you to every community member who participated in this review month. Your feedback has made this proposal significantly stronger. We believe it is now ready to be presented to the community for a final decision.