Personal Opinion on DAO governance

[_magicsheep]

This Post Only Represents Me

I’d like to offer some of my personal opinions on DAO management; these opinions do not represent the steward team I worked for or the DAO v1.1 proposal team. It represents me (LinkedIn) (GitHub) as a person who’s spent many years in Polkadot - the largest community-managed DAO in the world - building projects, getting funding, and participating in governance.

Fully Onchain Governance

Polkadot has the most sophisticated (technically) system I’ve seen in on-chain governance; everything is voted on and executed automatically if the vote passes, including fund disbursement and chain upgrade. Sounds exciting, right?

Some questions, though, how do you keep accountability if everything is on-chain? Do you do KYC? Would that compromise the ethos of Web3? Let’s say there is a perfect solution of privacy-enforced KYC, how can you ensure voters are not colluding, especially when you are using token amounts to denominate voting power? (In reality, this resulted in 5-6 big voting groups, and one of them is known for voting nay on everything to force proposers pitching to them directly before they change vote)

Do you also need a product to do voter and voting analysis? Actually, there is one, and I’ve worked on the team for a couple of months, then left because all I can see are people who want power over the community operating under the disguise of “governance”.

Governance is fundamentally rooted in politics, and politics is about people; it’s never about the technology. The US can have technologies to recycle rockets, but it still struggles to implement a voter ID system. It’s never about the technology.

Fun fact: The Web3 Foundation (parent company of Polkadot) has taken back the majority voting power after years of inefficiencies and fund misuse in on-chain governance.

Below is a picture I made detailing the actual governance structure of Polkadot, I hope it provides some warnings for the CKB community:

The Ugly Part

No one wants to talk about politics in Web3; people like to hide behind the word “community”, but who has the decision-making power, or influencing power, in this so-called community? Is it the project builders or the one who can get the most attention? People like to say “the community can decide”, but through what methods, how to handle disputes, and if the community gets into a deadlock, who holds the final deciding power? How to elect these people?

We can argue about almost any minor details throughout the lifecycle of a proposal, but what would raise our blood pressure would not be the technical details; it would be about how we collaborate and make things happen. It’s about politics. But at least each political system has clear rules specifying who has what power at each stage, and it has clear leaders willing to make the tough calls and take the heat.

No matter the decision, some people will get upset, but indecisiveness will eventually kill the community. I just hope whoever is in charge can realize that, through the current DAO 1.1 disputes, the most important thing that needs to come out is a clear rule to handle future disputes for other proposals:

1. What does it mean after a proposal passes the voting stage? Does it serve as a legally binding contract?

2. How to verify milestones? Let’s take bug fixing as an example; software is known for having bugs, Microsoft is still releasing fixes, so who holds the final deciding power to say “okay, we know it might have some bugs, but it’s good to go.”

3. Who represents the “community”? If only 10 people expressed their opinions, can we say “the community wants it”? Or should it be 100, 1000?

I believe in democracy, but democracy is not about voters debating endlessly; it’s about the leaders listening to all voices and then making a decision. Otherwise, it will gradually descend into chaos.

Haoyang Li - A concerned individual

[matt_ckb]

Hi Haoyang, appreciate you taking the time to prepare your thoughts like this and share with everyone.

What is a DAO?

I think first and foremost, we must set expectations: DAO = “Decentralized Autonomous Organization” While Ethereum may have popularized the concept, it is my belief that Bitcoin is the best example of what a decentralized autonomous organization can look like.

Bitcoin relies on “rough consensus and running code," meaning there is a rough idea shared across the community, of which there will always be disagreement, this is where “running code” comes in.

Code is opinionated and deterministic. It is a series of rules that is executed exactly the same by everyone running the same code. It is this lack of ambiguity that leads to the newfound ability (with Bitcoin) to scale coordination in a decentralized digital system. It is inherently a rules-based approach, not controlled by human judgement or “those in charge.”

Your sentiment “it’s about the leaders listening to all voices and then making a decision” is simply not a fit for a “decentralized autonomous organization,” but something else is.

What about the CKB Community Fund DAO?

DAO v1.1 made meta-rule changes regarding acceptance of a milestone, I’ve included them below. I do believe that they address most of the substance of your 3 questions.

Quick Confirmation Vote Description: To balance governance efficiency with community oversight and avoid voter fatigue and formalism, the quick vote uses an “optimistic governance” model of “default pass with a community veto right”:

• Voting Period: 3 days

• Voting Options: Confirm VS Veto (The specific meaning of “Confirm” depends on the report: for a delivered milestone, it means “Confirm Funding”; for a delayed milestone, it means “Accept New Plan”.)

• Minimum Turnout:

  • No less than the requested budget for the project (for budget proposals).

  • No less than 185,000,000 / 3 = 62,000,000 CKB (for meta-rule change proposals).

  • This minimum turnout is 1/3 of the initial approval turnout, considering the objective fact that community attention naturally declines during project execution. This allows DAO members who remain engaged to act as “whistleblowers” to pause the process and draw community attention for further review.

• Decision Threshold and Outcome: Provided the minimum turnout is met, if Veto Funding votes are ≥ 51% (for budget proposals) or ≥ 67% (for meta-rule change proposals), the funding is vetoed. Otherwise, the funding is automatically approved.

The current situation with DAO v1.1

The DAO v1.1 proposal stated the following:

DAO v1.0 has a democratic decision-making mechanism but severely lacks the professional, continuous procedural services required to support the effective implementation of these decisions.

Based on the current implementation situation and these appeals from a DAO Steward to an unknown power structure to “do something,” I believe it is reasonable to question if this statement still holds true following the passage of DAO v1.1

I do believe that this procedural execution question is an entirely different topic to consider. It is likely more deserving of scrutiny than the technical questions being raised.

Governance is hard, your words are quite meaningful and your work is definitely appreciated and worthwhile, I just sincerely wish this situation was playing out differently.

[ebdalezyz_aljhny]

Very nice, I completely agree with you.

[president_tin]

我认可楼主的观察，人间清醒，而且我想把问题说得更直接一点：我并不了解 DAO 1.1 的具体技术细节，我也不替DAO 1.1背书。不过看到这两天的讨论，做了些研究，尤其看到一边在强调 DAO 应该是 rules-based、要靠 “rough consensus and running code”，另一边又把 DAO v1.1 的争议重点引到 “procedural execution question” 上，我立刻想起了去年我质疑过的 Rosen Bridge。

我的感受很简单：双标。

我为什么会想到 Rosen Bridge？因为它当时同样，甚至更应该被用高标准追问。提案自己就写了：Watchers 是 permissionless staking，但 Guards 是 federated set；Sōnami 会进入这个 federated Guard set，而且初期只有一个 Guard slot，未来新增 Guard 还要再通过治理去决定哪些团队“有资格”承担这个关键角色。官方 ErgoDocs 也写得更直接：Guards 是管理 Rosen 核心的 federated group，成为 Guard 是 permission-based； Guards - ErgoDocs

；
而 Watcher 虽然名义上 anyone can be a watcher，但每个实例需要 800 ERG 和 30,000 RSN 作为 collateral，报告事件还要额外 3,000 RSN 的 permits，最后触发后的关键执行仍要交给 Guards 完成。 Ergo Rosen Bridge Watcher Setup - ErgoDocs

所以，如果现在有人批评 DAO 1.1 “不是谁都能轻松验证和参与”，那 Rosen Bridge 更不是。它不只是门槛高，而是关键权力本身就建立在 permission-based Guard 的控制之上。

更关键的是，这样一个项目当时不仅通过了，投票期间还出现了以基金会岗位身份公开站台的情况。Vegayp 当时写得很清楚：“From the perspective of Ecosystem and Business Development at the Foundation, my position is to support this proposal.”
[DIS] CKB Integration for Rosen Bridge - #105 by Vegayp 这已经不是普通社区成员在表达个人偏好，而是把基金会身份直接带进了投票语境。
可后来的讨论里，Hanssen 又明确说过：投票是 Community Fund DAO 最重要、最神圣的部分，不应该显性或隐性地帮助社区成员更“简单”或“无脑”投票，而“借用权威组织的名义”正是这种行为。既然后来的原则已经讲得这么清楚。
Some questions about the recent proposal vote - #48 by Hanssen
那基金会是不是应该正面解释一下：为什么 Rosen Bridge 投票期间会发生这种事？如果 DAO 1.1 今天要被高标准审查，那 Rosen Bridge 当时为什么没有被同样审查？如果现在又要讲规则优先、程序优先，那基金会到底是谁在负责、怎么负责、又由谁来承担这种不一致的后果？

最后我还是想追问，在现有的基金会的治理下，是不是有人对生态的发展负责，还是说可以随心所欲的用一个双重标准来使用受众的权力，而不用承担生态分崩离析的后果。
关于 roadmap、责任边界与增发必要性的几个直接问题 - #5 by president_tin 我相信如果能有个明确的答复，也都不纠结了。

[matt_ckb]

@president_tin

Vegayp clearly stated at the time: “From the perspective of Ecosystem and Business Development at the Foundation, my position is to support this proposal.”

Want to clarify that this was an improper statement to make from Vegayp’s position.

With lessons learned from this experience we created a guidance document to help foundation members engage more responsibly with DAO procedures.

It was an oversight not having this in place beforehand.

[matt_ckb]

@president_tin

Therefore, if some people criticize DAO 1.1 for “not being easily verifiable and accessible to everyone,” then Rosen Bridge is even less so.

While I can appreciate the concerns you are raising , I don’t think you are making fair comparisons. There seem to be a number of technical details with both of these projects that you may need some time to understand to make accurate comparisons.

All in all, participating in bridge operation that is from another ecosystem is not comparable with voting in the Community Fund DAO.

Your question seems to be about the scrutiny from the foundation, which seems to be just me (Phroi is independent).

I’ve tried to keep my criticisms consistent in terms of examining options and trade-offs, obviously this is a challenge to keep 100% in conversations that have been more personal rather than professional.

The goal has been to have a conversation, which I can see now was never going to be possible from the start. Lesson learned.

I have not advocated for any specific change. The scope of these changes are unclear, it would be irresponsible to push for any specific change.

[Vegayp]

Since my name was dropped here, I’d like to clarify: My comment came from my profesional perspective (I made the mistake to throw the foundation name as a point of reference).

That been said, that comment came from a place where I lacked any kind of updated documentation, same documentation that I stated was needed in order to organise ourselves, but what I do find improper is to call me out as if:

1. No disagreement was shared internally regarding that publication nor guidance to abstain from commenting on it.
2. The lack of procedures is only at fault from the hierarchy above, I can only work with what was given.

I am glad new mechanisms are in place for this kind of confusion to not happen again. And even as a non-member of the foundation, my position to this day remains similar: the DAO needed that infra, but since there is very little technical perspectives from the BD and partnerships side in this ecosystem, there should be some flexibility that the recommendations that a subject matter expert provides, aren’t to provide favouritism over a proposal in specific, but to signal what is better for the ecosystem, regardless of their job title or role, otherwise the concept of a “DAO” becomes illegitimate.

[president_tin]

1. DAO 1.1 和 Rosen Bridge 在 Community Fund DAO 里没有本质区别。

   它们都只是同一套 DAO 规则下的具体项目而已。今天可以有 DAO 1.2、1.3，明天也可以有Lily Bridge、Sunny Bridge。项目方向不同、预算不同、技术路径不同，都不构成治理标准不同的理由。
   这套规则并没有为某一类项目单独设立更高或更低的标准。

   2. 非管理委员会成员无权对 DAO 项目作出仲裁

   任何基金会成员当然都可以表达个人观点，但只能是个人观点，不能被默许为制度判断，更不能替代正式仲裁。Matt，你当然可以说你的看法，但你的身份决定了，你的发言客观上不可能和普通社区成员完全等价。社区天然会把它理解为更接近基金会立场，甚至误以为那已经接近委员会立场。问题就在这里：在 DAO 项目里，你和我都可以发言，但你我都没有仲裁权；真正可以作出仲裁的，只有委员会。 既然如此，你现在对 DAO 1.1 所作的这类程序性质判断，不应被当成对项目的正式裁定。

   3. Rosen Bridge 的问题，不是“事后修正一下流程”就可以翻页，而是要审查投票过程是否受到了不正常干扰。

   我进一步检索到的公开资料显示：在投票开始到最后阶段，项目反对票数一直遥遥领先，在投票还剩约 12 小时时，Rosen Bridge 仍处于明显落后状态，赞成约 45.46%，而反对达到64.54%；

随后在同一天，出现了带有明确基金会身份标签的公开站台内容，

X 上对 Eduardo 的采访，我不确定这是不是论坛中的Vegayp，但是从照片上看是同一个人，

身份是 “Business Development for the Nervos Foundation”，https://x.com/realsixfig/status/2011866854273192157 （这个视频采访的站台可以说是很强力了），不到12小时后，官方最终结果显示，该提案最终以 64.11% 赞成率通过。
这就是为什么我认为，Rosen Bridge 的问题不应被简化成“某位基金会员工是不是过失发言”。这不是应该由 Matt 来解释、也不是应该由当事人自己解释成“失言”还是“无心之失”的事情。真正应该被审查的是：在活跃投票期间出现带有基金会身份加成的公开站台后，这次投票是否因此受到了不正常干扰；这种干扰是否足以影响投票结果的独立性；如果足以产生合理怀疑，DAO 应该启动什么救济机制。 这是委员会需要回答的问题，不是当事人自证清白就能结束的问题。

如果同一个 DAO 体系里，一类问题可以被上升到程序正义和治理原则，另一类问题却只剩下“流程以后改进一下”，那社区看到的就不是统一标准，而是双重标准。

[phroi]

Just a question @president_tin: where are your Comments about this?

Long ago, right after vote, Community reached some kind of consensus about this: Some questions about the recent proposal vote

Are you using Rosen Bridge to mount a personal attack on my (unofficial) role as reviewer of DAO v1.1?

Phroi

[matt_ckb]

@president_tin

Therefore, your current procedural judgment regarding DAO 1.1 should not be considered a formal ruling on the project

Yes, I don’t see why it would be interpreted otherwise, unless convenient to the person interpreting it this way.

[phroi]

@president_tin

The problem with Rosen Bridge isn’t something that can be solved by “correcting the process afterward”; it requires an investigation into whether the voting process was subjected to undue interference.

Another detail, following the very same line of thoughts, Mod hack would require an investigation on how it influenced DAO v1.1 vote. One might easily argue that without Mod Hack more No voters could have easily emerged:

Mod Hack effectively gave No voters a clear false victory signal on DAO V1.1

Phroi

[phroi]

PS: Take note how my audit is trying hard to avoid another Mod Hack on DAO v1.1, possibly already prevented another one DAO v1.1 Public Testing Report - #12 by phroi

[president_tin]

我对 Rosen Bridge 本身没兴趣，对 DAO 1.1 本身也没兴趣。

楼主提出的是治理问题，我回应的也是治理问题。两个项目在技术、方向、预算上当然可以完全不同，但既然都处在同一个 Community Fund DAO / DAO 治理框架之下，就不应该一边把某类争议上升到“程序执行、治理原则、rules-based”，另一边遇到另一类争议时，又把它降格成“个人发言”“社区自己讨论过了”“以后流程修正一下就好”。

把治理质疑重新包装成个人攻击，我针对的是同一套 DAO 治理里是否在使用双重标准。把这个问题转成“你是不是在借 Rosen Bridge 攻击我个人”，本身就是在回避原本应讨论的治理问题。

你发的这个帖子我完整的看了，对相关争议，最后也只是被压回到“expressing his personal opinion”这种表述，并没有真正回答“带有基金会身份加成的公开站台，是否会影响投票独立性”这个核心问题。说的那种“community reached some kind of consensus”。当时帖里的实际情况是：有人明确对“使用基金会名义或身份为提案站台”表达失望和担忧；也有人说“it’s impossible for us to know if there was other motives behind it”，只能先给 benefit of doubt；这叫分歧、搁置、模糊处理，不叫共识，更不构成任何治理上的正式结论。我关注的是，如果可能影响，谁来审查，如何救济，既没有过程，也没有结果。

回到最终，我的看法一直很简单：

项目可以不同，但治理标准不应不同。

如果 DAO 1.1 需要在 rules-based 的标准下被审视，那么在同一 DAO 框架内出现争议的其他案例，也应当被放在同样的标准下讨论。
基金会成员不应该充当仲裁和站台角色，如果是DAO 治理委员会身份除外；
不然双重标准会一直出现。

[phroi]

@president_tin

If DAO 1.1 needs to be examined under rules-based standards, then other controversial cases within the same DAO framework should also be discussed under the same standards.

By all means, feel free to propose a meta-rule change

[matt_ckb]

@president_tin

If DAO 1.1 needs to be examined under rules-based standards,

there is absolutely a misunderstanding here.

The DAO v1.1 proposal laid out processes for milestone approval. These are the rule-based standards I refer to.

The DAO v1.1 team was created and funded to facilitate DAO activities. DAO activities are not being facilitated by the v1.1 team, but rather we have here an appeal to someone else to “do something” to stop legitimate questions about the effort and exercise power outside of the rules of the DAO.

There is absolutely nothing stopping the DAO v1.1 team from following the procedures they laid out (and some of us spent hours discussing) regarding milestone approval.

This conflict significantly escalated following a premature “mainnet launch” post, which seemingly disregards DAO rules established in v1.1 regarding milestone approval.

Baiyu has graciously tried to navigate the conflict by delaying, however, members of the v1.1 team are not following this lead. The community is in turn being divided and the door is being opened for long standing tension (like what you are expressing) to come to the surface.

I apologize for any misunderstandings you have encountered due to translation issues, however it would benefit all of us to presume the best of intentions in each other.

[president_tin]

我不认为这里是我“理解错了”，也不认为这只是翻译问题。

这两天我特地调研了一下，我看到的情况恰恰相反：DAO v1.1 提案本来已经写了 milestone approval 的流程，Stewards 的角色也被明确定义为程序服务与促进团队——他们没有 proposal approval 权，没有 voting decision-making power，也没有解释或仲裁规则争议的权力；milestone 验收机制本来就是 Stewards 出 verification report，再交给社区 quick poll。(Nervos Talk)

因此，我的问题从来不是“要不要谁在规则外做点什么”，而是：为什么一个本来应按既有提案流程推进的事情，在现实讨论中不断被叠加新的技术和治理要求，结果流程事实上卡住了，却又没有一个明确主体出来收口和决策。 这才是我所说的治理问题。(Nervos Talk)

更何况，v1.1 团队自己在公开回复里反复强调，dao1.1 的目标是不动元规则，只做技术重构，甚至明确说“没有改变任何投票和计票的流程和规则”。但与此同时，从提案阶段开始将其理解为带有 meta-rule changes，并在最近讨论中继续提出额外的设计与安全要求。对外呈现出来的结果，就是：同一个项目，一边被要求按原提案流程负责推进，一边又不断被拉去满足更高一层、且并未在原提案中收敛完毕的标准。 (Nervos Talk)

我反而认为 DAO v1.1 团队这段时间已经相当克制，也一遍遍在公开讨论里回应。但事情到现在仍然僵在这里，外部观感就是：问题被不断讨论，却没有人真正负责作出治理上的收口判断。

我的出发点当然是善意的。我这两天花了很多时间在 CKB 社区，不是为了纠缠过程，而是因为我仍然对 CKB 这个项目抱有敬意，也希望它能及时调整。可如果讨论长期只剩下过程，没有答案，没有决策，也没有责任边界，那么最终消耗掉的不是某一个团队，而是整个社区继续关心这些问题的意愿。

顺便说一句，这也是为什么我真心建议管理团队考虑做一些调整：让适合技术讨论的人继续坚持技术，让更适合管理和对外处理公共争议的人承担相应职责。这不是另起一个攻击议题，而是我基于这次讨论过程所得出的治理感受。

[matt_ckb]

@president_tin

But the matter is still at a standstill

it is your position that someone is stopping the v1.1 team from proceeding?

[yifenzi]

你需要做的是回答问题不是提问题，需要被回答的不是什么鸡毛蒜皮的问题，是核心问题

如果作为普通的社区一份子我不会如此要求你，或者说这样的要求是互相的

但你在那个应该被问责被提问的位置

如果你有足够的觉悟和能力就应该在别人提问之前主动说明，随便说一句这也是一个优秀组织者的特质之一

但显然你不具备，好我们退而求其次，作为一个普通的合格组织者的要求，社区提问你答，结果很显而易见，到目前为止你不仅做不到还各种岔开试图拖延过去

这就是你展示出来的东西，不是评判，只是基本事实

[_magicsheep]

Hi Matt,

This is a bit confusing. DAO v1.1 rules can only be executed after their official launch. Now, the launch is stalled. What rules are we binding to?

More specifically, during this transition period, are we using DAO v1.0 rules or DAO v1.1 rules? You said, “There’s nothing stopping the DAO v1.1 team from following the procedures they laid out.” Well, the proposal requires community members to vote on the milestone via the DAO v1.1 platform.

Again, the platform has not been launched, so should the team launch the platform and vote on itself? Just asking as a member of the steward team.

Also, your statement “appeal to someone else to do something to stop legitimate questions”, I’m not sure how this can be interpreted as stopping legitimate questions. We (as the steward team) and the proposal team didn’t delete or shut down any threads; quite the contrary, it’s you and Terry who shut down two threads. I understand you guys have your reasons as a moderator role to step in, but if anything can be considered as “stopping”, I would consider shutting down a post as one.

If DAO activities are not being facilitated by the v1.1 team, we won’t sit/standing here discussing these things. This statement is contradicted by its own existence.

Regarding intentions, I agree with you on this, and I hope this message reaches whoever is involved in the current discussion: We don’t need to like each other to be productive.

But recently, the discussion has spiraled down into something like a fight between spouses; everyone is making sense, but they are discussing different issues.

So let me appeal to the mysterious power again here, so we can at least settle things one by one: What are the rules the DAO v1.1 team should follow regarding milestone verification, DAO 1.0, or DAO 1.1?

Sincerely,
Haoyang

[matt_ckb]

@_magicsheep

More specifically, during this transition period, are we using DAO v1.0 rules or DAO v1.1 rules? You said, “There’s nothing stopping the DAO v1.1 team from following the procedures they laid out.” Well, the proposal requires community members to vote on the milestone via the DAO v1.1 platform.

Why not just conduct the vote on Metaforo and get things over with? What is the sense in all of this posturing on Talk?

@_magicsheep

Also, your statement “appeal to someone else to do something to stop legitimate questions”, I’m not sure how this can be interpreted as stopping legitimate questions

its kind of the content of your OP, “leaders need to make a decision”. I don’t think the shutting down of the threads stopped any conversation, but appreciate you bringing everyone’s attention to it.

@_magicsheep

If DAO activities are not being facilitated by the v1.1 team, we won’t sit/standing here discussing these things.

but this exactly what the last 5 weeks has been

@_magicsheep

So let me appeal to the mysterious power again here, so we can at least settle things one by one: What are the rules the DAO v1.1 team should follow regarding milestone verification, DAO 1.0, or DAO 1.1?

suggest you work with the rest of your team to clarify with the DAO committee. The problem statement of DAO v1.1 was that 1.0 lacked procedures and a team to move things along.

We now have a team to move things along and procedures, why would we continue to go in circles when we have all put so much effort into progress?