即使社区投票通过了,如果后续发现设计本身存在明显偏差,作为 DAO 的物业管理/治理执行方,难道不应该具备纠偏、撤项、终止或者变更的机制与能力吗?
在现实项目管理中,项目终止、撤项、需求变更,本来就是非常常见的事情。
如果一个 Community DAO 连面对明显争议设计时的纠偏能力都没有,那我反而会担心: 这个治理体系到底是在服务社区,还是在把已经启动的方案僵化到底。
所以对我来说,问题不只是“DAO1.1 能不能做出来”,而是:
voter list 的权力边界是否已经被充分约束;
投票资格边界是否已经被充分论证;
当设计出现偏差时,社区和治理执行方是否还保有纠偏能力。
如果这些问题都还没有被回答清楚,那我仍然很难对这套系统建立足够信任。
If indexer / database administrators can still influence the voter list at the implementation level, then the critical path that determines who gets to vote has not actually been removed from backend control.
For me, making the result easier to audit does not automatically mean that the eligibility boundary itself is sufficiently fair.
I have always believed that power without clear constraints and supervision is itself a risk.
If the current system still leaves room for rewriting or influencing the voter list (whitelist / eligibility list), then the first thing that should be addressed is how that power is constrained and checked — rather than only emphasizing that the result may be auditable afterward.
DAO 1.1 and DAO 1.0 are not the same, and I already explained the difference earlier:
That is exactly why I do not think this is merely a “technical refactor.”
It is really a question of how the boundary of voting eligibility is being defined.
There is also a very practical point here:
before the original vote took place, I did not know that the “whitelist / voter list” mechanism would take the form it has now. Nor do I think this part of the design was fully and carefully debated in advance. It was pushed forward more as a conceptual proposal than as a thoroughly argued governance design.
So from that perspective, I actually agree with your following statement:
Given that, I would actually ask a more practical question:
Even if the community vote passed, if the design later turns out to have significant flaws, shouldn’t the DAO’s steward / governance execution side still have the ability and mechanism to correct it, pause it, terminate it, or change it?
In real project management, project termination, cancellation, and scope changes are extremely common.
If a Community DAO does not even have the ability to correct course when a major design controversy becomes obvious, then I would worry that:
is this governance system really serving the community, or is it just rigidly pushing forward whatever has already been started?
So for me, the issue is not only whether DAO1.1 can be built.
The more important questions are:
whether the power around the voter list has actually been sufficiently constrained;
whether the voting eligibility boundary has actually been sufficiently justified;
whether, when the design turns out to be flawed, the community and the governance operators still retain the ability to correct course.
If these questions still have not been clearly answered, then I still find it difficult to place enough trust in this system.
反过来看 DAO1.1,直到现在连基础界面都还能看到明显问题,模块测试、全流程测试以及验收标准也都还没有被充分说明清楚。
在这种前提下,我并不觉得它已经好到足以替代旧流程。
如果一个系统连自身的基本质量和验证路径都还没有建立起足够信任,那我很难相信它已经准备好承接整个 Community DAO 的治理流程。
In my view, Metaforo has at least gone through multiple real voting scenarios. It is a third-party platform that the community has actually used, and whose problems have also already been exposed in practice.
Of course it is not perfect, and of course it still has centralization issues, but at least it is not a newly introduced system designed, implemented, and interpreted by parties with current internal conflicts of interest.
By contrast, DAO1.1 still shows visible issues even at the basic interface level, and its module testing, end-to-end testing, and acceptance criteria have still not been sufficiently clarified.
Under these circumstances, I do not think it has yet proven itself to be good enough to replace the old process.
If a system has not even established sufficient trust in its own basic quality and verification path, then I find it difficult to believe that it is ready to take over the governance process of the entire Community DAO.
It is fortunate to see your position shift from a decentralized voter registry being deemed impossible to theoretically possible, I’ll include a design in a new post.
I personally am very willing to discuss new technologies related to voting. However, from the perspective of the DAO 1.1 proposal, I’m not sure whether this solution counts as modifying the meta-rules?
This thread had some good discussion in the beginning, but gradually lost focus. Continuing it would likely only bring more emotion without leading to any meaningful conclusions, so we’re temporarily closing it.
We’ve since organized and summarized the key points, and will open a new thread for a more focused discussion.