Statement on DAO V1.1 Platform Launch

你们说的很多议题应该在dao2.0或者在dao3.0议题下讨论。

补充一下背景,dao2.0其实比dao1.1更早就开始了,但是因为元规则变动太大,社区争议很大,迟迟没有落地。

而大家对现有的dao1.0(metaforo)又非常不满,所以才有dao1.1提案的出现。

dao1.1的目标就是在不动元规则(吸取dao2.0的教训)的情况下,在技术上实现公开,透明,可验证。


说白了dao1.1就是dao1.0的一个纯技术重构版本。

你说理论上应不应该做dao1.1?我个人也觉得没必要做。

我上一个回帖也说了,我个人建议是直接做个polymarket。

你说现实中需不需要dao1.1?我觉得dao1.1提案投票能通过就已经说明问题了。

如果 indexer / 数据库管理员 在实现层面仍然可以改写 voter list,那么“谁能投票”的关键路径就仍然没有真正脱离后台控制。
对我来说,更容易审计结果,不等于资格边界本身已经足够公正。

我一直认为,没有受到清晰约束和监督的权力,本身就是风险。
如果当前系统里确实存在改写 voter list(白名单/资格名单)的可能,那么首先应该解决的,就是如何约束和制衡这种权力,而不是只在结果层面强调“以后可以审计”。

DAO 1.1 和 DAO 1.0 当然不是完全一样的,它们的差别我前面也已经说过:

也正因为如此,我才一直觉得,这不只是“技术重构”这么简单,而是投票资格边界被如何定义的问题。

更现实的一点是:
在当初投票前,我并不知道设置“白名单 / voter list”的规则会是现在这种形式;相关设计也没有经过充分、细致的前置论证,更多还是以概念项目的方式申报和推进。
所以从这个角度看,我其实同意你下面这句话:

既然如此,那我反而会进一步问一个很实际的问题:

即使社区投票通过了,如果后续发现设计本身存在明显偏差,作为 DAO 的物业管理/治理执行方,难道不应该具备纠偏、撤项、终止或者变更的机制与能力吗?

在现实项目管理中,项目终止、撤项、需求变更,本来就是非常常见的事情。
如果一个 Community DAO 连面对明显争议设计时的纠偏能力都没有,那我反而会担心:
这个治理体系到底是在服务社区,还是在把已经启动的方案僵化到底。

所以对我来说,问题不只是“DAO1.1 能不能做出来”,而是:

  1. voter list 的权力边界是否已经被充分约束;
  2. 投票资格边界是否已经被充分论证;
  3. 当设计出现偏差时,社区和治理执行方是否还保有纠偏能力。

如果这些问题都还没有被回答清楚,那我仍然很难对这套系统建立足够信任。

If indexer / database administrators can still influence the voter list at the implementation level, then the critical path that determines who gets to vote has not actually been removed from backend control.
For me, making the result easier to audit does not automatically mean that the eligibility boundary itself is sufficiently fair.

I have always believed that power without clear constraints and supervision is itself a risk.
If the current system still leaves room for rewriting or influencing the voter list (whitelist / eligibility list), then the first thing that should be addressed is how that power is constrained and checked — rather than only emphasizing that the result may be auditable afterward.

DAO 1.1 and DAO 1.0 are not the same, and I already explained the difference earlier:

That is exactly why I do not think this is merely a “technical refactor.”
It is really a question of how the boundary of voting eligibility is being defined.

There is also a very practical point here:
before the original vote took place, I did not know that the “whitelist / voter list” mechanism would take the form it has now. Nor do I think this part of the design was fully and carefully debated in advance. It was pushed forward more as a conceptual proposal than as a thoroughly argued governance design.

So from that perspective, I actually agree with your following statement:

Given that, I would actually ask a more practical question:

Even if the community vote passed, if the design later turns out to have significant flaws, shouldn’t the DAO’s steward / governance execution side still have the ability and mechanism to correct it, pause it, terminate it, or change it?

In real project management, project termination, cancellation, and scope changes are extremely common.
If a Community DAO does not even have the ability to correct course when a major design controversy becomes obvious, then I would worry that:

is this governance system really serving the community, or is it just rigidly pushing forward whatever has already been started?

So for me, the issue is not only whether DAO1.1 can be built.
The more important questions are:

  1. whether the power around the voter list has actually been sufficiently constrained;
  2. whether the voting eligibility boundary has actually been sufficiently justified;
  3. whether, when the design turns out to be flawed, the community and the governance operators still retain the ability to correct course.

If these questions still have not been clearly answered, then I still find it difficult to place enough trust in this system.

补充一下相关的技术背景,metaforo是一个完全中心化的系统,它的权重是从浏览器的api获取的,它的投票是记录在自己的数据库里的。

所谓的事后审计,其实就是由一个有公信力,有足够权限的人,从数据库和浏览器获取数据,把计票重新统计一遍。

而且浏览器的接口不能获取某个历史时间点的权重,我看到有一次,事后审计投票结果的时候,有一个投票用户的权重变了,然后是审计人人工去判断了一下,权重变化发生在投票之后,是正常的。

说白了,跟《九品芝麻官》里进京告御状,然后感动了皇帝,案件发还三堂重审性质是一样的。

如果这都能接受,我就真的无话可说了。


dao1.1才实现了任何一个人,不依赖任何中心化系统的API,都可以完成重新计票。

那你理解错了。

dao1.1没有改变任何投票和计票的流程和规则。仅仅是把dao1.0只能由zhouzhou或者hanssen这样的钦差大臣来审计,改成了任何一个人都可以完成审计。

DAO1.1 也没有试图解决“只靠事后人工剔除重复票”的问题。

dao1.1也没有改变投票资格边界。

  1. dao1.0 中只有在nervosdao中由质押的人才有投票权重。dao1.1与此保持一致。
  2. dao1.0中可以通过地址绑定,把neuron钱包的质押绑定到一个投票地址上。dao1.1与此保持一致,并做了更详细的权重重复计算的检查。
  3. dao1.0 需要登录metaforo才能投票。dao1.1需要注册did才能投票。我认为这块儿是等价的,并没有改变投票资格边界。而且我前面回帖中也说了,metaforo是中心化的系统,服务器挂了用户就没法登录了。但是did是链上身份系统,有钱包就可以注册,跟dao1.1系统没有任何关系。.
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在我看来,Metaforo 至少经历过多次真实投票,是一个社区已经实际使用过、也已经暴露过自身问题的第三方平台。
它当然并不完美,也当然存在中心化问题,但至少它不是一套由当前内部关联利益方主导设计、实现和解释的新系统。

反过来看 DAO1.1,直到现在连基础界面都还能看到明显问题,模块测试、全流程测试以及验收标准也都还没有被充分说明清楚。
在这种前提下,我并不觉得它已经好到足以替代旧流程。
如果一个系统连自身的基本质量和验证路径都还没有建立起足够信任,那我很难相信它已经准备好承接整个 Community DAO 的治理流程。

In my view, Metaforo has at least gone through multiple real voting scenarios. It is a third-party platform that the community has actually used, and whose problems have also already been exposed in practice.
Of course it is not perfect, and of course it still has centralization issues, but at least it is not a newly introduced system designed, implemented, and interpreted by parties with current internal conflicts of interest.

By contrast, DAO1.1 still shows visible issues even at the basic interface level, and its module testing, end-to-end testing, and acceptance criteria have still not been sufficiently clarified.
Under these circumstances, I do not think it has yet proven itself to be good enough to replace the old process.
If a system has not even established sufficient trust in its own basic quality and verification path, then I find it difficult to believe that it is ready to take over the governance process of the entire Community DAO.

@_magicsheep 我现在发现问题的关键点是大家对dao1.1的定位和目标是错位的。

dao1.1中才解决的问题,很多人以为dao1.0已经是这样了,所以他们觉得dao1.1跟dao1.0没差别。

然后他们认为dao1.1项目要做的事情,其实应该安排在dao2.0甚至dao3.0 中。

我觉得 @zz_tovarishch 作为metaforo投票后审计的实际执行者,也可以具体说一下现在dao1.0有多不好用。

dao1.0

dao1.1

这就是dao1.0和dao1.1唯一的区别。

It is fortunate to see your position shift from a decentralized voter registry being deemed impossible to theoretically possible, I’ll include a design in a new post.

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I personally am very willing to discuss new technologies related to voting. However, from the perspective of the DAO 1.1 proposal, I’m not sure whether this solution counts as modifying the meta-rules?

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Can you cite the section?

这里的理解可能是有问题的,目前这个提案不仅要投票通过,还要完整通过验收,物业团队的权责才会按照提案内容而生效。目前成立的物业团队更像是预备成立的,还是提案团队内部成员,没有实际权力。提案团队不能自己去撤自己的项目,除非就是项目不做了,然后退款

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这个第三方平台可能随时不维护停止服务了,其次上次投票作弊事件就是只能靠三人委员会的威望才能验证从metaforo拿出来的日志数据没有问题。目前系统既能投票时候重复绑定作弊,验证还需要第三方声誉担保。而新系统虽然运营方可能会不按照链上数据生成vote list,但是这是任何人都可以去链上抓数据自己来验证的。新旧两个系统的 中心化 是完全不一样的,不能随便等同

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什么叫内部利益关联方?我们是一个社区的提案团队,按照1.0规则去立项,交付,以及之后执行物业团队责任,这是清清楚楚的。

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1.0的责任恰恰是不清楚的,请问上次作弊事情发生以后,谁来负责?

如果服务器运行方内部作弊,或者被第三方攻击,当然是运营方的责任。

我理解你把整个DAO的治理任务都交给1.1提案团队是不合理的。目前有元规则,还有三人委员会,有提案系统。这些都是DAO合法性的来源,他们对整个治理体系负责。提案团队没有权力做提案内容以外的事情,我们主要完成提案内容交付。

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This thread had some good discussion in the beginning, but gradually lost focus. Continuing it would likely only bring more emotion without leading to any meaningful conclusions, so we’re temporarily closing it.

We’ve since organized and summarized the key points, and will open a new thread for a more focused discussion.

这个帖子在开始阶段有一些不错的讨论,但后来逐步失去了焦点,继续下去除了更多的情绪,我们无法得出任何有意义的结论,所以我们暂时关掉这个这个 threads.

之后我们梳理和总结了核心观点,我们新开贴更聚焦的讨论。

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