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- Three examples of cryptoeconomics 加密经济的三种例子
There are at least three different kinds of systems being designed today that could be called “cryptoeconomic”.
目前至少有三种不同的系统被称为“加密经济”。
Example 1: Consensus protocols
例1: 共识协议
Blockchains are able to reach reliable consensus without having to rely on a central trusted party — a product of cryptoeconomic design. Bitcoin’s solution, which we surveyed above, is called “proof-of-work” consensus because miners must commit work — in the form of hardware and electricity — in order to participate in the network and receive mining rewards.
区块链不必依赖于中心化的权威机构就能形成可信的共识——这就是加密经济设计的产物。我们之前讨论的比特币的解决方案，被称为“工作量证明”共识，因为矿工必须以硬件和电力的形式证明他的工作，以便参与到网络中并获得采矿奖励。
Improving proof-of-work systems and designing alternatives to them is one active area of cryptoeconomic research and design. Ethereum’s current proof-of-work consensus mechanism includes many variations and improvements on the original design, enabling faster block times 1 and being more resistant to the mining centralization that can result from ASICs 1.
改进工作量证明系统并设计替代方案是加密经济研究和设计的重要方向。以太坊目前的工作量证明共识机制对原始设计做了许多变化和改进，实现了更快的出块时间 1并且更能够阻止可能由ASIC产生的挖矿中心化 1。
In the near future, ethereum plans to migrate to a “proof-of-stake” consensus protocol called Casper. This is an alternative to proof-of-work that does not require “mining” in the usual sense: there is no need for specialized mining hardware or huge expenditures of electricity.
在不久的将来，以太坊预计会转移到名为Casper的“POS”共识协议上。这是工作量证明的替代方案，不需要通常意义上的“挖矿”：也就不需要专门的挖矿硬件或巨额的电力支出。
Remember that the whole point of requiring miners to buy hardware and spend electricity is to impose a cost on miners, as a way of raising the cumulative cost of attempting a 51 percent attack sufficiently high that it becomes too expensive. The idea behind proof-of-stake systems is to use deposits of cryptocurrency to create the same disincentive, rather than real-world investments like hardware and electricity.
请记住，要求矿工购买硬件和用电的主要原因是要给矿工带来一定成本，这是一种提高51％攻击累积成本的方法，因为这种情况下的攻击代价太大了。POS系统背后的理念是使用加密货币的存储来创造相同的抑制因素，而不是硬件和电力等现实世界的投资。
In order to mine in a proof-of-stake system, you must commit a certain amount of ether into a smart contract “bond.” Just like in proof-of-work, this raises the cost of a 51 percent attack — an attacker would have to commit a very large amount of ether to successfully attack the network, which they would then lose forever.
为了在POS系统中进行挖掘，你必须提交一定数量的以太币作为写入智能合约的押金。就像工作量证明一样，这会增加51％攻击的成本——攻击者为了完成攻击网络将不得不提交大量的以太币，并且一旦被发现这些以太币将永远无法取回。
Casper is being designed by Vlad Zamfir, Vitalik Buterin, and others at the Ethereum Foundation. You can read more about the history of Casper’s designin this series of posts by Zamfir or hear him talk about it on a recent podcast. Buterin wrote a long post about Casper’s design philosophy here, and there is a useful FAQ on the ethereum GitHub wiki here.
Casper由Vlad Zamfir，Vitalik Buterin以及以太坊基金会的其他人设计。您可以在Zamfir的这一系列文章中阅读更多关于Casper设计的历史信息或听他在最近的播客中的发言。Buterin在这个链接里也发表过一篇关于Casper设计理念的长文，以及在GitHub这个链接里面有很多有用的关于以太坊的常见问题解答。
Example 2: Cryptoeconomic application design
例2: 加密经济应用的设计
Once we have solved the fundamental problem of blockchain consensus, we are able to build applications that sit “on top” of a blockchain like ethereum. The underlying blockchain gives us (1) a unit of value that can be used to create incentives and penalties, and (2) a toolkit with which we can design conditional logic in the form of “smart contract code.” The applications we build with these tools can also be a product of cryptoeconomic design.
一旦我们解决了区块链共识的根本问题，我们就能构建区块链上的应用程序，就像现有以太坊之上的应用程序一样。底层区块链为我们提供了(1)可用于创建经济激励和经济惩罚的价值单元，(2)一个工具包：通过这个工具包我们可以用智能合约代码的形式设计条件逻辑。“我们使用这些工具构建的应用程序也是加密经济设计的产品。
For instance, the prediction market Augur requires cryptoeconomic mechanisms in order to function. Using its native token REP, Augur creates asystem of incentives that rewards users for reporting the “truth” to the application, which is then used to settle bets in the prediction market. This is the innovation that makes a decentralized prediction market possible. Another prediction market, Gnosis 1, uses a similar method, though also lets users specify other mechanisms for determining true outcomes (commonly called “oracles”).
例如，预测市场Augur需要加密经济机制才能运行。使用其原生代币REP，Augur创建了一个激励系统，奖励用户向应用程序报告“真相” ，然后用于结算预测市场中的赌注。这是一种创新，它让去中心化预测市场成为可能。另一个预测市场Gnosis 1也使用了类似的方法，但也允许用户指定其他机制来确定真实结果(通常称为“预言机”)。
Cryptoeconomics is also applied to design token sales or ICOs. Gnosis, for instance, used a “Dutch auction” 1 as a model for its token auction, on the theory that this would result in a more fair distribution (an experiment that had mixed results). We mentioned earlier that one area where mechanism design has been applied is in the design of auctions, and token sales gives us a new opportunity to apply some of that theory.
加密经济也适用于设计代币销售模式或ICO。例如，Gnosis 使用“荷兰式拍卖” 1作为其代币拍卖的模型，理论上这将促进更公平的分配(一个有多种混合结果)的实验。我们之前提到，机制设计应用的领域之一是拍卖设计，代币销售则为我们提供了应用加密经济中某些理论的新机会。
These are a different kind of problem than building the underlying consensus protocols, but they share enough similarities that both can be fairly seen as cryptoeconomic. Building these applications requires an understanding of how incentives shape users’ behaviour and careful design of economic mechanisms that can reliably produce a certain result. They also require an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the underlying blockchain on which the application is built.
这些问题与构建底层共识协议的问题是不同的，但它们有很多相似之处，两者都可以被视为加密经济学。构建这些应用程序需要理解经济激励如何塑造用户的行为，以及精心设计能可靠地产生特定结果的经济机制。同时，还要求了解构建应用程序的底层区块链的功能和相应限制。
Many blockchain applications are not necessarily products of cryptoeconomics; for instance, applications like Status and MetaMask — wallets or platforms that let users interact with the ethereum blockchain. These do not involve any additional cryptoeconomic mechanisms beyond those that are already part of the underlying blockchain.
许多区块链应用程序不一定是加密经济学的产物;例如，Status和MetaMask等应用程序——允许用户与以太坊区块链交互的钱包或平台。除了那些已经成为底层区块链一部分的加密经济机制之外，这些机制并不涉及任何其他的加密经济机制。
Example 3: State channels
Example 3: 状态通道
Cryptoeconomics also includes the practice of designing much smaller sets of interactions between individuals. The most notable of these are state channels. State channels are not an application but a valuable technique that can be used by most blockchain applications to become more efficient.
加密经济还包括设计个人之间更小的互动交集的实践。其中最值得注意的是状态通道。状态通道不是应用程序，而是一种很有价值的能更高效使用大多数区块链应用程序的技术。
A fundamental limitation of blockchain applications is that blockchains are expensive. Sending transactions requires fees, and using ethereum to run smart-contract code is comparatively costly to other kinds of computation. The idea behind state channels is that we can make blockchains more efficient by moving many processes off-chain, while still retaining a blockchain’s characteristic trustworthiness, through the use of cryptoeconomic design.
区块链应用的一个根本限制是区块链太过昂贵。发送交易需要费用，而且和其他的计算相比，使用以太坊运行智能合约代码相当昂贵。状态通道背后的理念是：通过使用加密经济设计，我们可以将很多流程线下化，不仅能让区块链更高效，同时仍能保留区块链的可信化特征。
Imagine Alice and Bob want to exchange a large number of small payments of cryptocurrency. The normal way for them to do this would be to send transactions to the blockchain. This is inefficient — it requires paying transaction fees and waiting for the confirmation of new blocks.
想象一下，爱丽丝和鲍勃希望交换大量的小额加密货币。正常来说，他们会将交易发送到区块链，但这很低效——它需要支付交易费用并等待新区块的确认。
Instead, imagine that Alice and Bob sign transactions that could be submitted to the blockchain, but are not. They pass these back and forth between one another, as fast as they want — there are no fees at this point, because nothing is actually hitting the blockchain yet. Each update “trumps” the last one, updating the balance between the parties.
相反，想象一下Alice和Bob约定了某些可提交给区块链但实际并未提交的交易。他们以自己想要的速度来回传递这些交易——在这种情况下没有任何费用，因为实际上并没有任何东西攻击区块链。每次更新都“胜过”上一次，维持着各方之间的平衡。
When Alice and Bob have finished exchanging small payments, they “close out” the channel by submitting the final state (i.e. the most recent signed transaction) to the blockchain, paying only a single transaction fee for an unlimited number of transactions between themselves. They can trust this process because both Alice and Bob know that each update passed between them could be sent to the blockchain. If the channel is properly designed, there is no way to cheat — say, by trying to submit a previous update as though it were the most recent — since recourse to the blockchain is always available.
当Alice和Bob完成小额交易时，他们通过向区块链提交最终状态(即最近签署的交易)来“关闭”该通道，他们之间的这些无限数量的交易只需要支付单笔交易费用。他们可以信任这个过程，因为Alice和Bob都知道他们之间传递的每个更新都会被发送到区块链。如果通道设计得当，就没有办法作弊——比如，通过尝试提交先前的更新，就好像它是最新的一样——因为区块链总是可以使用的。
For illustrative purposes, you can think of this as similar to how we interact with other trusted sources, like a legal system. When two parties sign a contract, most of the time they never need to take that contract to court and ask a judge to interpret and enforce it. If the contract is properly designed, both parties simply do what they promised to do, and never interact with the courts at all. The fact that either party could go to the court and have the contract enforced is enough to make the contract useful.
出于说明目的，你可以把这种方式类比为：我们如何与其他可信来源(如法律系统)进行交互。当双方签订合同时，大多数时候他们不需要对簿公堂、要求法官解释合同并执行合同。只要合同设计得当，双方都会按照承诺实施动作，他们根本不需要跟法院打交道。任何一方都可以去法院并要求合同执行的这一事实足以使合同生效。
This technique is not just useful for payments, but for any update to the state of an ethereum program — hence the more general term “state channel” rather than the narrow “payment channel.” Instead of sending payments back and forth, we can send updates to a smart contract back and forth. We can even send entire ethereum smart contracts that, if needed, will be sent to the blockchain and executed. These programs never have to be executed to be useful. All that is needed is a sufficiently high guarantee that they could be executed if necessary.
这种技术不仅对支付环节有用，对于以太坊的任何状态的更新都是有用的——因此更通用的术语是“状态通道”，而不是狭隘的概念“支付通道”。我们不仅仅可以反复发送支付信息，还可以反复更新智能合约。如果有需要的话，我们甚至可以发送整个以太坊智能合约，它们将被发送到区块链并按照合约执行。其实这些程序永远不必执行使用。我们所需要的只是一个足够高的保证，就是它们必要时是绝对可以执行的。
In the future, most blockchain applications will use state channels in some form. It is almost always a strict improvement to require less on-chain operation, and many things done on-chain today can be moved into state channels while still preserving a sufficiently high guarantee to be useful.
将来，大多数区块链应用程序都将以某种形式使用状态通道。想要改进较少的链上操作几乎总是很苛刻，但今天在链上完成的许多事情可以转移到状态通道上，同时仍然有足够高的可用性保证。
The description above skips over many important details and nuances of how state channels work. For a more detailed description, Ledger Labs built a toy implementation last summer 1 that demonstrates the basic concept.
上面的描述略过了许多关于状态通道如何运作的重要细节和细微差别。想要了解更详细的描述，Ledger Labs 在去年夏天制作的一个实现模型 1中演示了其基本概念。
Liam Horne and Jeff Coleman recently announced they are developing generalized state channels under the banner Counterfactual, with support form L4 and Vitalik Buterin.
Liam Horne和Jeff Coleman最近宣布，他们在L4和Vitalik Buterin的支持下，在旗下的Counterfactual开发通用的状态通道。
Conclusion
结论
Thinking about the blockchain space through the lens of cryptoeconomics is helpful. Once you understand the idea, it helps to clarify many of the controversies and debates in our industry.
用加密经济的角度思考区块链发展空间是很有帮助的。 一旦你理解了这个想法，这有助于理清我们行业中的许多争议和争论。
For instance, “permissioned” blockchains that are centrally managed and do not use proof-of-work have been a source of constant controversy since they were first proposed. This area of work is often referred to as “distributed ledger technology” and is focused on financial and enterprise use cases. Many partisans of blockchain technology dislike them — they may be blockchains in the literal sense, but there is something about them that feels wrong. They seem to reject the thing that many people see as the whole point of blockchain technology: being able to produce consensus without relying on a central party or traditional financial systems.
例如，中心化管理且不使用工作量证明的“许可”区块链自首次提出以来一直备受争议。这个领域通常被称为“分布式账本技术”，专注于财务和企业用例。 许多区块链技术的支持者不喜欢这种许可链——这种区块链可能只是字面意义上的区块链，但总有些感觉不对劲。它们似乎排斥许多人认同的区块链技术该有的重点：能够在不依赖中心化机构或传统金融体系的情况下达成共识。
A cleaner way to make this distinction is between blockchains that are products of cryptoeconomics and blockchains that are not. Blockchains that are simply distributed ledgers and do not rely on cryptoeconomic design to produce consensus or align incentives might be useful for some applications. But they are distinct from blockchains whose whole purpose is to use cryptography and economic incentives to produce consensus that could not exist before, like bitcoin and ethereum. These are two different technologies, and the clearest way of distinguishing between them is whether or not they are products of cryptoeconomics.
区分这两种区块链的简单方法是：区分使用加密经济的区块链和不使用加密经济的区块链。 简单的分布式账本、不依赖于加密经济学设计来产生共识或调整激励的区块链技术对某些应用可能是有用的。但它们与使用密码学和经济激励来产生以前不存在的共识为目的的区块链不同，比如比特币和以太坊。这是两种不同的技术，区分它们的最明确方式就是看它们是不是加密经济的产物。
Secondly, we should expect that there will be cryptoeconomic consensus protocols that do not rely on a literal chain of blocks. Obviously, such a technology would have something in common with blockchain technology as we call it today, but labelling them blockchains would be inaccurate. Again,the relevant organizing concept is whether such a protocol is the product of cryptoeconomics, not whether it is a blockchain.
其次，我们应该期望存在着不仅仅是字面意义上区块的链的加密经济共识协议。很显然，这种技术与我们今天所称的区块链技术有一些共同点，但直接将它标签化为区块链是不准确的。同样，相关的组织概念应该是指：这样的协议是否是加密经济的产物，而不是它是否是区块链。
The ICO craze has also focused attention on this distinction, though few have articulated it clearly. Many people independently identified that one of the strongest signs of a token’s value is whether it forms a necessary component of the application to which it is connected. To put this in clearer terms, the question should be: is the token part of a necessary cryptoeconomic mechanism in the application? Understanding the mechanism design of a project holding an ICO is an essential tool in determining that token’s utility and likely value.
ICO热潮也很关注这种区别，尽管他们中也很少有人能理清楚。 很多人都各自认定决定代币价值大小的最有力标志是：它是否构成了它所连接的应用程序的必要组件。更明确地说，问题在于：代币是否是各种应用中加密经济机制的必要部分？理解持有ICO项目的机制设计是确定代币的功能和可能价值的重要工具。
In the past years, we’ve moved from thinking about this new field solely through the lens of one application (bitcoin), to thinking about it in terms of one underlying technology (blockchains). What needs to happen now is to step back once again and view this industry in terms of a unifying approach to solving problems: cryptoeconomics.
在过去几年中，我们从仅仅通过一个应用程序(比特币)的视角思考这个新领域，转变到从底层技术(区块链)的角度去重新看待它。现在我们需要做的是再退后一步，从解决问题的统一方法来看待这个行业：加密经济。