Opinions on CKB Community DAO v1

You mentioned that teams may “face legal consequences” — but I’d like to follow up with a practical question:

In a decentralized funding system, if a team disappears or refuses to deliver, who exactly enforces the legal responsibility? Under which jurisdiction? Does the DAO actually have any enforcement capability?

If this “legal threat” is merely theoretical, with no realistic pathway for execution, then it’s not really a law — it’s just a comforting illusion. Meanwhile, the DAO’s capital remains at risk of misuse.

That’s why I believe we should not rely on vague legal threats to cover for structural gaps.
Instead of counting on post-failure punishment, we should build a system that includes clear exit triggers and automated stop-loss protections.

你提到“可能面临法律后果”,但我想进一步请教:

在一个去中心化的资助体系里,如果项目方跑路或拒不履约,所谓的“法律责任”具体是谁来执行?由哪个司法管辖区?DAO 是否有实际的追责能力?

如果这个“法律”只是理论上的震慑,却没有任何实际落地的执行通道,那它就不是法律,而只是一个心理安慰。而 DAO 的资金就可能持续被滥用或浪费。

因此,我认为我们不应该用“可能承担法律责任”来掩盖机制上的缺位。与其寄希望于事后追责,不如在机制上预设清晰的退出流程与自动化止损机制。

If a project intends to receive funding through the DAO, then it must follow the principles of openness and transparency. There should be no more “under the table” operations or off-chain negotiations.

When explanations repeatedly rely on phrases like “they have good intentions,” “we’ve been in regular contact,” or “they’ve done a lot behind the scenes” — that, in itself, is the problem.

If real discussions, real decisions, and real progress tracking all happen off-chain or in private chats, then what is the point of having a public DAO process at all?

The credibility of a proposal should not depend on trust behind closed doors or personal relationships. It should depend on transparent processes, clear accountability, and verifiable delivery milestones.

In my opinion, the continued defense of backchannel dealings, and the reluctance to surface issues publicly, is one of the biggest problems facing the DAO today.
If we can’t protect the most basic standard of transparency, then this isn’t decentralization — it’s simply shifting power from one center to another.

如果一个项目希望走 DAO 的公共资助流程,那它就必须遵守 DAO 的公开透明原则,不能再出现任何“under the table”(内部利益输送)的行为。

一再强调项目方“有意愿”“我们一直保持沟通”“做了很多但没公开”——这些话本身就是问题的体现。如果所有实际沟通、实际安排、实际判断都只存在于“私下渠道”,那 DAO 的治理流程、社区参与、资金问责还有什么意义?

项目进度是否真实、承诺是否兑现,不应该靠“台下信任”和“熟人推荐”来维系,而应该靠公开的流程、清晰的责任、可验证的交付来达成。

我认为,“维护台下交易、不推动问题公开化”已经成为当前 DAO 最大的问题之一。如果 DAO 连基本的公开透明都守不住,那这不是去中心化,是权力下沉给另一个中心。

You used the words “we” and “assign” when referring to how reviewers will be selected — and to me, that reflects a power structure in itself.

Even in traditional corporate governance, review committees are often randomly selected from a pool of certified experts, precisely to avoid bias and ensure fairness — similar to a jury selection system. If centralized companies can recognize this need for randomness to ensure impartiality, how can we justify manual reviewer assignments in a platform that claims to be decentralized?

In decentralized systems, randomness is not chaos — it is fairness.
When you say “we will assign reviewers,” the immediate question is: who is ‘we’? On what basis? Who oversees the overseers?

If governance roles can decide who reviews what, then we are no longer talking about community-driven review. We’re talking about delegated authority with no built-in checks and balances — and that’s how centralized capture begins.

你在回应中使用了“我们”和“指派”这样的措辞——对我来说,这本身就已经是一种权力结构的体现

哪怕是在传统的公司制度中,为了避免评审过程中的偏见和暗箱操作,评标专家往往也是从专家库中“随机抽取”的,就像陪审团制度一样,随机性是为了保障程序的公平与独立。

如果一个强调去中心化的项目平台,在涉及项目审核这样的关键环节时,却由某个“我们”来直接“指派”评审人员,那就必须问:

“这个‘我们’是谁?他们如何产生?他们的权力是否受到监督?他们代表谁?”

在真正的去中心化系统里,“随机”不是混乱,而是公平的手段。

一旦审核权掌握在个别人或小团队手里,失去了制度上的制衡和透明的操作规则,那 DAO 所宣称的“社区驱动”,就变成了“集中式决策的包装”。


Decentralized governance is inherently more difficult than centralized systems, precisely because anyone can submit a proposal. That’s why it’s critical to design strong checks and balances between project proposers, reviewers, and voters.

To prevent systemic corruption, DAO processes should prioritize restrictions and transparency, not arbitrary openness. Otherwise, we will inevitably fall into a tragedy of the commons.

If there are truly exceptional proposals that must be handled confidentially — due to strategic, legal, or sensitive contexts — they should go through a separate “special-case funding track,” not the public governance pipeline.

Otherwise, we face the following pattern:

Proposer submits → Reviewer protects → No real delivery → Voters left blind → DAO becomes a cash-out tool for internal alliances.

Palmyra is already a warning sign. If a project can ignore the rules and still receive protection from those in power, then governance becomes performative — and the rule of law is replaced by the rule of influence.

在去中心化项目中,治理本就比中心化系统更难。因为谁都可以发起项目,所以更需要设计强有力的制衡机制,在“项目发起人、审核人、投票人”之间形成彼此制约的关系。

为了防止出现系统性腐败,DAO 的每一个中间环节都应该趋于限制、强调透明,而不是被任意开放,否则就会走向“公地悲剧”。

如果确实有一些需要“特事特办”的项目,比如涉及战略、合规、或其他不适合公开披露的背景信息,那应该走独立的特殊资金通道,而不是伪装成普通项目混入公开审核体系

否则,就会出现如下情形:

项目执行人不履约 → 项目发起人和审核人提供庇护 → 投票人无法判断 → DAO 沦为内部关系的提款机。

Palmyra 项目就是一个典型警示。如果一个项目可以不遵守规则,还能被长期包庇,那么所谓的治理就只是形式,“制度”也将再次被“权力”践踏

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Because nearly everything in crypto is just ‘decentralization theatre’, even using the word DAO at this stage is pretty ridiculous when you think about it- Decentralized Autonomous Organisation.

We should really just call it the CKB Community Fund and forget about the larping.

And this isn’t even a criticism, it’s impossible to run something like this as a real DAO, we still need someone to steer the ship at this stage.

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I don’t think we should underestimate what the CKB Community Fund DAO represents.

Just like Bitcoin introduced the revolutionary concept of randomized validators through PoW, the CKB DAO opens up something equally powerful — a structure where ordinary community members can participate in project evaluation and governance.
Isn’t that a remarkable innovation in the Web3 world?

Of course, the DAO still has many flaws — and that’s exactly why I put forward improvement suggestions.
They’re not complaints for the sake of complaining, but based on actual lessons from past project failures, with the hope of helping build something better.

When I worked as a full-time IT budget controller in a Fortune 500 company, every project I approved was audited by both an internal audit department and an external accounting firm.
But in the DAO — who’s responsible for supervision?
Who ensures funds are used properly?
Who validates whether a proposal is worth funding?

I don’t want to keep pointing out problems in individual proposals. What I truly want is a more decentralized and structured review mechanism.
But realistically — how many people will take a proposal seriously if it doesn’t directly affect them?

Take this proposal for example:

At the very least, it brings original ideas and independent thinking. But how many have seriously engaged with it?

The future of the DAO should not be built on preserving voices of power, but on building mechanisms that continuously improve and distribute responsibility.
The core problem isn’t the mechanism — it’s the arrogance and bias shown by some early insiders.

We should not let the CKB DAO become a one-voice system like the Ethereum Foundation.
To make this DAO truly trustworthy, fair, and effective, we must rely on institutional safeguards, not individual influence — mechanisms that constrain power, not entrench it.

我不认为我们应该低估 CKB Community Fund DAO 所代表的意义。

就像比特币通过 PoW 创造性地引入“随机验证人”的制度一样,CKB DAO 同样也开创了一种新的可能性 —— 普通社区成员也可以参与到项目监督与治理中来。这难道不是 Web3 世界中真正值得肯定的一次制度创新吗?

也正是因为 DAO 还有很多不完善的地方,所以我才会提出这些建设性的改进建议 —— 不是为了批评而批评,而是基于过去失败的经验总结,希望能推动这个机制真正变好。

我在专职 IT 预算工作中,我所审核和管理的每一个项目,背后都有内部审计部和外部审计的监督。而在 DAO 里呢?谁负责监督资金的使用?谁对项目交付结果负责?谁来判断这些提案是否值得花钱?

我并不希望每次都对个别提案提出意见。我真正希望的,是建立起一个更去中心化、结构化的审核机制。
但现实是,有多少人会认真对待一个“与自己无关”的提案?

比如这个提案:

它至少有创意和独立思考的价值,但真正参与讨论、认真评估的人又有多少?

DAO 的未来,不是靠维持话语权,而是靠持续完善的机制来推动。
问题不在机制本身,而在于部分内部元老所展现出的“傲慢”与“偏见”。

我们不能让 CKB DAO 变成另一个 ETH 基金会那样的“一言堂”。
要让 DAO 真正走向可信、公正、高效,就必须通过清晰的制度与流程去约束权力、打破固化,而不是放任其依赖个人声望运行。

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Firstly, I appreciate your considered reply and the general principles you mention are ones that we are in agreement with.

An ETA is exactly that: an estimate. From experience, which I’m sure you can relate to, project development can be delayed - sometimes substantially - when there are multiple fronts to work on and the business is growing. There are many examples of this within the CKB ecosystem historically and currently. This is different to a situation where a team takes money and disappears.

The crux of the matter is not that delays can happen, it’s that communication on the forum should be more regular to advise accordingly, especially to benefit people who are not regularly on social media platforms. Here I agree with you that there are important lessons to take forward.

In William’s case, he determined that he could not action the proposal, and therefore returned the funds. This is different to a project that is experiencing delays but committed to fulfilling its obligations.

The bigger issue in my view, which has been touched on, is how longer roadmaps can be adversely affected by coin volatility. There should be some scope to re-appraise projects with ongoing projects in cases where it may be necessary to adjust the grant amount in CKB terms. But I also like the idea of a community-initiated re-appraisal of the entire grant if concerns arise.

Context is important, as we have discussed.

I would like to avoid reiterating myself, but as mentioned earlier, helping projects through the process does not need to compromise any of the important aspects you mentioned. A project should naturally be heavily involved in authoring a proposal and interacting directly with the community, but may need help in ensuring it meets the standards set by the DAO, or may need help in the technicalities of DAO participation. A project can submit a proposal and still fall into the same issues raised, so we should not mistake correlation for causation. Palmyra has communicated with the community on various platforms; not doing so on this forum is an omission but not a systemic failure to communicate.

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Thanks for your thoughtful reply.

Let me be clear: The DAO is a platform of public accountability.
Once a project is approved and funded, it’s no longer just a set of casual promises made in private — it becomes a commitment to the entire community. Delays are understandable, but there must be a formal change request, with justification, and approval before the timeline can be altered.

In my professional experience managing large-scale IT projects, delays do happen — but I’ve never seen a case where a project could remain unstarted for this long without triggering escalation or formal change control.
In serious project governance, “taking the money” doesn’t equate to “permission to delay indefinitely.”

Regarding your point — “being supported is not the same as being represented” — I understand your intention to empower teams through guidance. But in reality, when the proposal is submitted by a third party, and the early communication, presentation, and even responses depend heavily on someone else, responsibility becomes dangerously diluted. That’s a long-term governance risk.

That said, I do support your idea of a more dynamic milestone evaluation mechanism. But the process must be transparent, time-bound, and publicly visible — otherwise, it risks becoming a license for indefinite delays.

Let me close with a concrete suggestion:
Why not lock the unused funds back into the DAO until the project is truly ready to start?
If this really is a delay and not a dead-end, I’m sure the team won’t object to such a reasonable arrangement.

Let me leave you with a final thought:

If this money had come out of the your own pocket, would you treat nearly a year of delay with such casual acceptance?

The truth is — because it’s DAO money, and no one’s asking, no one’s watching, and no one’s accountable, the urgency disappears. The mindset becomes: delay is acceptable, because no one really feels the cost.

This is precisely how a tragedy of the commons begins within a DAO.
Without clear exit mechanisms, real accountability, and proper incentive structures, DAO funding risks becoming a pool of wasted capital — instead of a force that builds real ecosystem value.


感谢你的认真回应。

我想强调的是:DAO 是一个公开承诺的平台,项目一旦获得批准,就不只是私下答应社区成员几个承诺这么简单,而是代表着一种“对整个社区的交付契约”。延期可以接受,但必须要有变更申请、说明和报批流程。这在任何严肃的项目管理体系中都是最基本的规范。

我自己在做企业级项目管理时,确实也遇到过项目延迟,但没有哪一个项目能像这样毫无启动迹象地拖延这么久还“理所当然”。项目如果延迟,必须提交书面变更说明,走审批流程,而不是拿了首付款就默认拥有了无限延期权利。

关于你提到的“帮助申报 ≠ 代理申报”,我理解你希望赋能更多项目走进 DAO 流程。但现实中,当项目执行方不是直接申报人,且前期沟通、路演、响应都依赖第三方时,一旦出现问题,责任链就变得极度模糊,这对 DAO 的长远治理是一个隐患。

我支持你提到的“支持灵活拨款机制”的建议,但前提是机制必须公开、透明、有明确时限,而不是成为项目方无限期拖延的工具。

最后我想提出一个具体建议:是否可以考虑将未使用的资金锁回 DAO 合约,等项目真正启动后再释放?
如果真的只是延迟而非烂尾,我相信他们不会反对这种安排。

最后我还想提出一个反问:

如果这笔钱来自你自己的腰包,你还会如此轻描淡写地面对将近一年的延迟吗?

正因为这笔钱来自 DAO,没人问,没人看,没人负责,所以才会有人觉得拖延是理所当然的。

这正是我们要避免的 “DAO 版公地悲剧”
如果没有明确的退出机制、激励机制与问责机制,DAO 的资金最终只会变成一种资源浪费 —— 而不是生态建设的推动力。

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I think it is sufficient for a project to advise on delays and their cause, and if there is enough consternation the community can vote to take action (e.g. withold any further funds until the matter is resolved). I think it is a good idea for the new DAO rules to have clauses for a) raising concerns, b) dispute resolution and c) termination.

That’s not the framing that applies to Palmyra. But in a scenario where the team is not heavily involved with constructing the proposal, setting deliverables, and engaging with the community, I agree this would be a risk.

In hypothetical terms, there should be some protocol in place if a project needs to delay its start. I don’t think Palmyra would object at all, I just think it’s better to seek clarification as to a new expected timeframe for implementation.

Anyone familiar with crypto projects knows to anticipate delays, yet they still invest if they think it’s worthwhile. Ultimately it’s up to whether a person believes in what the project is doing.

Palmyra is making significant progress within the last year in the RWA sector as they have shared with the CKB community, which is why personally I am more accepting of delays, because we can verify publicly the work they’re doing and their participation in the CKB community (just not as much on this forum). If it were a project doing absolutely nothing overall, I would have a different perspective.

Lastly, I would recommend this thread is not derailed into a discussion about Palmyra any further. There is a thread to ask questions and you can also tag the team directly for answers.

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It’s not theoretical. Charges can be filed in the necessary juristictions, but this typically requires an entity to deal with it. There are legal firms that will take on cases like this on a contigent basis. The challenge procuring these firms in different jurisdictions.

Milestone and review requirements already prevent large losses. I’m not opposed to adding additional rules and agreements for grant recipients.

Small decisions like these are made by representatives of the community, which are ultimately held accountable through liquid democracy.

I understand the basis for randomization, and it is unrealistic for the time being. It adds too much inefficiency and bureaucracy to the process. It is something that should be reconsidered in the future. However, the pool of experts in our ecosystem is too small for a process like this for the foreseeable future.

Your obsession over Palmyra is, quite frankly, damaging to our ecosystem. This is a project that is behind schedule, nothing more. If you want to die on this hill, I’m not going to stop you from doing so.

I have also dealt with IBM in the past with similar experience. They demand a very large price tag for anything. There are some projects where their rate is unavoidable; usually when they are the only company that can take on a particular project of scale. However, similar to your experience, I believe in many cases they are simply a bad option to use. In the software industry, I’ve heard many anecdotal cases when dealing with large companies like IBM and Oracle.

I think your experience may be a part of the reason for some of our differences in opinion. I worked for 20 years as a software developer before joining the Nervos Foundation. I worked primarily with startup companies during this time, but I also worked in larger corporations and spent several years working with Fortune 500 companies.

My interaction with Fortune 500 companies comes from a different perspective. My team was hired to come in and rescue projects where the development team was failing. Usually, the projects were over budget and way behind schedule.

In about half of the cases, the developers themselves were underqualified and unable to handle the complexity of the project. The other half of the cases was interesting because developer incompetence wasn’t the problem at all. Instead, the problem was due to poor management or bureaucracy.

Having too much process can impede progress to a standstill. We must continuously fight to ensure our processes remain unburdensome. As the ecosystem progresses and gets larger, additional practices will inevitably find their place. However, the ecosystem is still small today. Let’s not give up the luxury of simplicity and efficiency so easily.

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You’re defending Palmyra — and that’s fine.
But I want to be clear: I’m not criticizing a project. I’m calling out the structural risks of a DAO system where accountability is fragmented and oversight is minimal.

:bulb: This funding was requested by you, Neon, and the DAO funds were sent to the wallet address you provided.
Now you’re telling me to chase Palmyra for updates?
This is exactly why I strongly oppose proxy-based proposal submissions.

If you’re the applicant and recipient, you should be responsible for delivery.
If you’re only assisting, then you shouldn’t be the one receiving DAO funds.

This isn’t about “support ≠ representation” — it’s about a governance architecture breakdown.
DAOs are supposed to enforce accountability through mechanisms, not informal trust arrangements between intermediaries.

You said this thread shouldn’t become about Palmyra — but frankly, that sounds like an attempt to divert the conversation away from the real issue: the DAO process itself.

We’re watching a closed loop: insiders submit proposals, vote, receive funds, execute, and then defend one another.
There is no meaningful external oversight.

:white_check_mark: That’s why someone outside the loop needs to speak up.
If this DAO wants to be credible, it must be able to withstand questions from those who hold no power, especially when those questions aren’t about “who to blame,” but how to fix what’s broken.

你在为 Palmyra 辩护,这我没问题。
但我要强调的是:我批评的不是某一个项目,而是整个 DAO 当前在“责任链断裂”与“监督缺失”上的制度风险。

:bulb: 这笔钱是 你 Neon 申请的,DAO 的资金也是打到了 你提供的钱包地址
但现在你却让我去联系 Palmyra 了解进展?
这正是我坚决反对代理人提交提案的核心原因。

如果你是申请人、收款人,那你就要对交付结果负责;
如果你说你只是协助,那你就 不应该拿钱

这不是“支持 ≠ 代表”的语义游戏,而是治理结构本身的 逻辑断裂点
DAO 应该通过机制来保障授权与监督,而不是靠一方信任另一方来“模糊责任”。

你说不要把这个帖子变成讨论 Palmyra 的场所,但我认为这是在试图转移话题、逃避 DAO 本身治理机制的根本问题。

我们看到一个闭环结构:由内部人员完成提案、审核、投票、执行,然后再由内部人员出来为其辩护。
外部几乎没有监督空间。

:white_check_mark: 所以我这个“无利益相关者”必须说话。
如果 DAO 想要持续下去,它必须容得下来自局外者的监督声音,必须接受“不是为了反对谁,而是为了拯救体系”的质询。

Thanks for your thoughtful reply.

First, I don’t disagree that “legal deterrence” might exist in theory — but that’s exactly why I raised this issue:
We should not rely on vague and barely enforceable threats to cover governance loopholes.
The entire purpose of a DAO is to replace traditional centralized trust with design-driven mechanisms — protection should be built into the system, not outsourced to legal hope.

You mentioned the current milestone structure is “working.”
But in reality, there have already been several cases where funds were released with no meaningful follow-up.
Palmyra is not the only example — just the most recent and visible one.

To me, a funding structure that allows proposals to get funded but lacks recovery, correction, exit, audit, or blacklist mechanisms, is not a governance system — it’s just a one-way faucet.

Regarding your point about “representatives” making decisions and the shortage of experts — I understand the current practical constraints.
But that’s precisely the concern: if auditors are selected by internal power groups rather than via transparent or randomized processes, then DAO governance becomes increasingly opaque and closed.

It’s not about creating bureaucracy — it’s about enforcing checks and balances.

Lastly, in response to your point about “obsession”:

I’m not fixated on Palmyra. I’m focused on whether this DAO can create a structure where every proposal is treated equally, where accountability applies regardless of who is behind the project.
Today it’s Palmyra. Tomorrow it’ll be someone else.
If we let the rules blur once, they’ll stay blurred.

You may see me as a meddler.
But if a DAO can’t tolerate voices that “meddle,” then it’s already leaning toward centralization.

谢谢你的认真回应。

首先,我并不反对你说的“法律威慑可能存在”,但这正是我想强调的地方 —— 我们不能依赖模糊且不可执行的威慑机制来填补制度空白。DAO 是为了替代传统中心化信任结构而生的,应该优先通过机制设计来防范风险,而不是把希望寄托在跨国追责上。

你提到现有的里程碑机制已经“起到了作用”。但现实是:DAO 已经发生了多起资金拨付后无后续追踪的情况,Palmyra 并不是唯一一个。
在我看来,一个资金体系如果只有放款动作而没有收回、纠错、退出、审计、黑名单等机制,就只是单向开放的资源分发,而不是完整的治理闭环

至于你提到的“代表做决策”和“专家有限”,我理解你的现实考量。
但这也正是问题所在:如果审核人是被“权力群体指派”的,而不是通过透明或随机机制参与的,那 DAO 的权力边界就是模糊的、向内闭合的。
这并不是多了官僚,而是缺了制衡。

最后回应你说的“执念”:
我不是执着于 Palmyra,我执着的是 DAO 是否能建立起一个对所有项目一视同仁、可问责、可修复的制度逻辑。
今天是 Palmyra,明天还会有别的项目。如果我们无法在一个问题上坚持清晰的原则,那所有原则都会被模糊掉。

你可以认为我多管闲事,
DAO 如果不能容忍多管闲事的人发声,那它距离中心化就已经不远了。

Thanks for your response — I respect your experience working on the frontlines of software delivery.
But allow me to offer a broader perspective.

What you described — being called in to “put out fires” on failing projects — is something I completely understand and have also experienced. But let’s be clear: those problems are often symptoms at the tail-end of execution, not the root cause.

I wasn’t just someone approving budgets — I was deeply involved in building entire frameworks for IT governance from the ground up. My responsibilities included:

  • Drafting, reviewing, and implementing enterprise-wide IT budgeting and project control policies;
  • Conducting policy rollout and cross-functional training;
  • Coordinating internal audits, supporting investigations by the National Audit Office and Big Four firms like PwC;
  • Ensuring full compliance with SOX 404 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) for U.S.-listed operations at a localized level.

This wasn’t just “process setting.” It was a full-cycle governance model — blending structure, supervision, and adaptive correction.

We build process not to create bureaucracy, but to prevent chaos and abuse at the edge.
If a project stalls under too much process, that’s a design failure — not a reason to abandon structured oversight altogether.

What you’re seeing is a car crashing without brakes — but that doesn’t mean brakes are the problem. It means someone forgot to install them properly.

DAO governance today lacks both brakes and steering.

:white_check_mark: Insert:
Mature governance doesn’t wait for things to go wrong — it prevents things from going wrong in the first place.
A DAO should be proactive: transparent, rule-driven, and self-correcting.
If our only response to failure is patching things up after the fact, we’re just stuck in a loop of “reactive damage control.”

In early-stage ecosystems, structure isn’t a burden — it’s a protective shell.
And in the absence of mechanisms, we’re not decentralized — we’re just unstructured and vulnerable.

谢谢你的回应,我尊重你在开发一线的实战经验。但请允许我也澄清几点。

你所描述的那些“被叫去救火”的经历,我完全理解,而且我也亲历过。但你描述的问题,其实只是复杂系统在 “执行末端”暴露的症状 ,而非根源。

我想说明,我并不仅仅是从“使用方”视角谈论项目管理,而是深度参与了从预算制度设计到全面审计管理的一整套流程建设。包括:

  • 起草、评审和发布企业级 IT 项目预算与进度控制管理办法;
  • 执行制度宣贯、跨部门培训;
  • 联动公司内部审计、配合国家审计署、普华永道等事务所的外部合规审计;
  • 并完成与 美国上市公司 SOX404(萨班斯-奥克斯利法案) 在本地业务中的落地与执行。

这不仅仅是流程的“设置”,而是 流程 + 监督 + 纠偏机制的协同构建
我们建立机制,不是为了增加官僚,而是为了防止一线混乱和滥用。没有制度做底,靠人治的治理永远走不远。

你所说的“流程造成的停滞”,恰恰说明流程没有设计好、没有配合问责,而不是流程本身有罪。
我们不能因为看到一辆没有刹车系统的车撞墙,就说“车不该有刹车”。

DAO 今天的问题,就是还没有建立清晰的“刹车”和“转向”机制。

:white_check_mark: 补充:
真正成熟的治理,从来不是在“出问题之后去补锅”,而是提前把“出问题的路径”关掉。
DAO 的使命是透明、自动、可追责 —— 而不是“问题发生后大家看谁来善后”。
如果我们总是在失控之后才补规则,那我们永远走不出“亡羊补牢”的循环。

而在一个资源有限、早期尚未成型的社区里,越是小生态,越不能用“人情与信任”代替机制与标准

I’ve personally written and implemented enterprise-level budgeting and project control policies,
so I know very well: those who write the rules often understand exactly where the loopholes are — and how those loopholes will eventually be exploited.

But today, no one even bothers to summarize the failed projects of the past.
Instead, the burden of reflection and reform is pushed onto ordinary investors — as if it’s our job to clean up the mess.
This kind of governance isn’t accountable — it’s opportunistic: enjoy the benefits, dodge the responsibility.

Much of the resistance to governance reform doesn’t come from critics — it comes from within.
The hardest part of reform has never been the complexity of the system — it’s the unwillingness of insiders to be held accountable.

Who’s even reading this thread?
Aside from those on payroll, those getting real-world benefits from the ecosystem — is there anyone else left?
Maybe just someone like me, a so-called “bagholder,” still trying to figure out how this system could actually work better.

I’m tired of wasting my time fighting against a closed structure that doesn’t listen and can’t self-correct.
If an ecosystem that claims to be “decentralized” can’t even tolerate dissent or support basic mechanisms for feedback and improvement — then what’s the point of continuing to be involved?


我曾亲手撰写并推动过企业级的预算与项目控制管理办法,
所以我非常清楚:写规则的人,往往最清楚规则的漏洞在哪里,也最知道这些漏洞将如何被利用。

但现在的问题是,连过去失败的项目都没有人去总结反思
最终却把责任推给普通投资者,要我们来提出问题、整理清单、推动改革。
这种治理模式,本质上就是“只拿好处、不承担责任”。

很多治理上的阻力,并不是来自批评者,而是来自系统内部。
改革最困难的地方,从来都不是机制太复杂,而是内部不愿意被监督。

这个帖子,有谁在看?除了拿工资的、从生态中获得现实好处的,还有谁?
可能就只有我这样一个被讽为“臭炒币”的人,还在认真思考这个系统如何才能更好。

我已经不想继续浪费时间,去挑战这样一个听不到声音、也缺乏自我修复能力的封闭体系了。
如果一个打着“去中心化”旗号运转的系统,连最基本的异议接纳与治理反思机制都没有——那么,我参与它还有什么意义?

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Hi Woodbury, there is already a plan for something like what you asking for and I’m assuming you would be welcome to apply for this role, I would most likely vote for you.

I think you have nothing but the best intentions for CKB, but I also think you might be too harsh and expect too much from some of these teams that could apply for funding, who may not be professionals, so I think you might need to adjust your standards down a bit from your previous roles.

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Hi Yeti, I appreciate your tone and the spirit of mutual respect in your message.

Let me respond to your comment about me being “too harsh” with some clarification — and a bit of context.


1. I’ve already been lenient in the past — and we’ve paid the price.

The truth is: I’ve already “lowered the bar” before, especially toward proposals from the English-speaking community.
For example:

  • I held back strong objections to William’s proposal: link
  • I also let Palmyra’s proposal pass without pushing too hard: link

I didn’t want to be seen as overly strict, so I turned a blind eye and let them go through.

And what happened?

The funds were approved, and then… nothing. No delivery. No clear updates. No responsibility.
Most people voted yes — and most were wrong.
What we saw was a textbook example of how “mob optimism” can become “mob failure.”
Blind faith isn’t decentralization. It’s just a softer form of centralized risk.

Professional governance requires structure, not just trust.


2. I already have lowered my standards — and got insulted for it.

In the case of Omiga, I simply asked for more details. It was an anonymous project — I wanted clarity to ensure the DAO wouldn’t lose funds again.
And what did I get for that?
I was publicly insulted in the Chinese community for “being too picky.”
But I ask: What’s wrong with verifying before funding?


3. Strict review is not “harsh” — it’s responsible.

Years of experience and actual data show that the more rigorous a review process is, the more serious the project team becomes during execution.
Loose approval processes don’t build trust — they destroy it.

Palmyra didn’t fail because I was too harsh.
Palmyra failed because we weren’t harsh enough.


4. You said some teams don’t come from a professional background — that’s exactly why we need standards.

That’s why I proposed clear, structured expectations — including:

  • Estimated man-months of work
  • Per-person-month pricing
  • Basic effort vs cost justification

This isn’t “corporate red tape.”
This is the minimum requirement in any serious engineering or procurement process.

Yet Jordan opposed even these suggestions, claiming that asking for lower cost structures is a form of discrimination.
That’s simply not true.
In every industry, cost-per-unit and scope estimation are the baseline for evaluating fair and effective proposals.


DAO funds are not symbolic — they’re real, limited, and worth defending.

I’m not here to make anyone uncomfortable.
But I won’t pretend that being “relaxed and nice” leads to better project execution — because it doesn’t.

If we want DAO governance to evolve, we can’t keep repeating the same leniency and hoping for different results.
Standards don’t block innovation — they protect it.

Thanks again for the dialogue.

你好 Yeti,感谢你以尊重与建设性的语气参与这场讨论。

关于你提到我“对提案团队太苛刻”的看法,我想做一些澄清,并补充一些背景。


1. 我其实已经对一些提案“睁一只眼闭一只眼”了,而我们为此付出了代价。

事实上,我已经对一些英文社区的提案选择了“降低标准”。
比如:

  • 对于 William 的提案,我原本有很多质疑,但没有坚持到底:链接
  • 对于 Palmyra 的提案,我也有保留意见,但选择了放手一试:链接

我当时并不想被贴上“过于严苛”的标签,所以选择了保守克制。

结果呢?

钱批了,项目没动,交付失踪,责任无人承担。
大多数人投了赞成票,但结果是错误的。
这就是典型的“群体乐观”演变成“群体失误”。

盲目信任不是去中心化,而是一种更温和的中心化风险
专业治理需要的是规则和结构,不只是“信任”。


2. 我已经降低标准了,但换来的却是谩骂。

Omiga 提案中,我只是出于审慎要求更多细节。
这是一个匿名项目,我希望确保 DAO 不会再次踩雷。

结果,我在中文社区被公开嘲讽,说我“管太多”“太挑剔”。
但我想问一句:资金还没发放前问清楚,有什么错?


3. 审核严格不是苛刻,而是对社区负责。

大量经验和事实证明:审核越严谨,项目团队在执行阶段就越认真。
宽松随意的审批流程,培养的不是信任,而是投机。

Palmyra 的问题不是我太严,
而是我们不够严。


4. 你说有些团队不具备专业背景,正因为如此我们才更需要“标准”。

所以我提出了非常基础的审核框架,例如:

  • 工作量预估(人月数)
  • 单人月价格
  • 简单的工作量与报价比对依据

这并不是“企业官僚主义”,
而是在任何严肃的工程或采购流程中最基本的申请依据

但 Jordan 却反对我这些建议,说我这是“歧视”。
这显然是误解。
任何行业中,基于成本/单位的估算和报价都是最基本的公平标准。


DAO 的资金不是象征性的——是有限且真实的资源,值得我们认真捍卫。

我并不是想让任何人难堪。
但我不能假装“放宽标准、友善一点”就能带来更好的项目结果——因为事实恰好相反。

如果我们真的希望 DAO 治理成熟,那就不能总在“出问题后”才想着修补。
真正的标准不是阻碍创新,而是保护创新。

再次感谢你愿意进行这场坦率而理性的讨论。

Hey @woodbury.bit, I’m reading too!! Some time ago I reviewed the RFC and I liked it, but it’s gonna take time to discuss together and incorporate this feedback.

Nervos Talk is nice cause it offers automatic translation for logged in users, but this thread is a bit difficult to follow cause you all are talking about many different things all interleaved together! :man_facepalming::rofl::rofl:

Some time ago I asked to @jm9k to create a repository with this RFC and now we finally have it, let’s make good use of it!!

Would it be cool for everyone involved in this discussion to move to Github and split it up by topics by using different issues? (For example, as I did when reviewing iCKB)

Alternatively, how about we split up this Nervos Talk thread into multiple ones? (For example, one for each sub-topic)

This way is both easier to follow and in the future it’s easier to re-examine the reasoning underpinning the final RFC and implementation.

Phroi

3 Likes

Yeah, I’ve always thought your opinions are necessary, because there definitely needs to be someone asking the hard questions.

I know I’m definitely on the loose side as far as just giving people a shot, as long as I think they have good intentions and are proposing something worthwhile.

And when I was talking about lowering your expectations, I just think taking the approach like you would in your professional environment could scare off people who may have a great idea but don’t even end up putting it forward, because they don’t even know how to structure a business plan and milestones etc.

But as long as you are aware that many devs and project teams aren’t from business backgrounds, then I think you could guide them on how to do this and work with them to make sure they stay on track.

1 Like

Thank you again for your understanding — I truly appreciate your openness and your willingness to give projects a fair chance.

Regarding your concern that stricter standards might “scare away” creative contributors, I’d like to offer a broader perspective:

It’s precisely because of that concern that I proposed a “separation between project planning and execution.”
This allows visionaries and idea-creators to focus on structuring and strategy — without being burdened by delivery management.
Execution can be handled by a separate team with clear milestone responsibilities.
This model encourages creativity while ensuring delivery and accountability.

In fact, I don’t believe thoughtful standards scare away serious builders. Let’s look at a positive example: the Omiga.io project, which you personally supported and observed.

They faced quite a bit of scrutiny during their funding process.
But instead of backing down, they turned that pressure into a motivation to improve, refining their proposal and ultimately delivering high-quality work.

Isn’t that exactly the kind of DAO success story we want?

By contrast, the proposals that usually withdraw are those with inflated budgets and vague plans — not the ones with substance.

That’s why I respectfully disagree with the view that “review scares off builders.”
If a team walks away simply because someone asked them to explain their numbers,
it likely means they were never ready to execute seriously in the first place.

Omiga proves the opposite: responsible teams don’t get scared by scrutiny — they grow stronger from it.

As for the concern that higher standards might reduce participation:
I believe that as CKB’s tech value continues to be recognized, and the token price rises, high-quality projects will naturally emerge.
Our job now is to protect the DAO’s integrity — to avoid turning it into a tragedy of the commons.

Everyone can play a role in guiding projects in the right direction.
For instance, I once suggested to a Spanish-speaking team that they translate high-quality English materials instead of recreating them, as a cost-efficient option.
But when I asked whether they might consider a smaller test phase or a reduced budget, the idea was flatly rejected.

I understand this is not a simple issue.
Each person brings their own experience, education, and professional lens to DAO governance — and full alignment is never easy.

But if we share a common goal of building a strong, resilient DAO,
then I believe we will always find a workable, dynamic balance.

谢谢你的理解和回应,我真的很欣赏你保持包容、支持项目尝试的态度。

关于你提到“标准可能吓退有想法的人”这点,我愿意从另一个角度分享一下我的看法:

其实我正是出于这样的考虑,才提出了“项目计划与执行分离”的方案。这样可以让有创意、能规划方向的人专注于构思和设计,而不用承担执行层面的管理压力;执行可以由另一个团队来完成,并接受清晰的里程碑控制。这种方式可以更公平地释放社区的创造力,同时保障 DAO 的资金使用效率。

从实际经验来看,我并不认为合理的标准会“吓退”真正想做事的人。我们可以看一个正面的例子 —— Omiga.io 项目,你也亲身参与和见证了这个项目的发展。

他们在申请 DAO 资金时,确实经历了不少质询和技术审核,但他们并没有退缩,而是把压力转化为改进动力,不断完善自己的提案,并最终交付了高质量的成果。

这不正是一个典型的、有良好反馈机制的 DAO 项目案例吗?

反而,那些真正被“劝退”的,往往是预算过高、内容空洞的项目。而我们希望 DAO 拒绝的,也正是这类提案。

所以我不认同“设定标准会打击积极性”这一观点。如果一个团队仅仅因为被问预算就选择放弃,那只能说明他们并不具备长期项目所需的心态和能力。

Omiga 的案例恰恰证明了,认真负责的团队不会被审核吓退,反而会因制度而变得更强大。

至于“项目是否因此变少”的担忧,我的观点是:只要 CKB 的技术价值持续被认可、币价逐步提升,真正优质的项目一定会源源不断地涌现。

我们现在最重要的任务,是守好 DAO 的制度底线,避免它滑向“公地悲剧”。

每个人都可以对项目方向给予引导。我曾经建议西班牙语社区,将优秀的英文资料翻译成本地语言,以更低成本申请预算。但我提出“能否适当降低预算,做部分测试”时,项目方是直接否定的。

我理解,不同背景的人对治理有不同认知。大家有不同的教育、职业和文化经验,所以要达成一致非常困难。

但我相信,只要目标是建设一个更强大的 CKB DAO,最终我们总能找到动态平衡点。

1 Like

This is definitely a great idea and should be encouraged.

I also totally agree with you about Omiga, without a doubt they have been our biggest success story and are a very professional team.

I’d love to see them take on another project for the DAO.

2 Likes

@woodbury.bit 爬楼看了这么多,相信你是出于好意和热爱说这些,很热心很好的总结和建议,大大的赞!

第二是想说你有些话真的有点… 比如说

你这么说不是在说参与讨论的人都是为了好处来的,只有你是真爱粉?这样对其他发言的人其实也不太尊重吧,尊重应该是相互的。如果有人说你是“臭炒币”的,那个人是这里发言的人吗?没说过这句话的人看了可能会觉得莫名其妙。

第三我的感觉是这个提案可能达不到你的标准,但从提案和回复都看得出来楼主也确实研究了v1的问题,有过认真思考,并不是像你说的没有总结反思,如果能落实肯定比放着一个死气沉沉的v1不管要好。我反而觉得v1存在时间太长了,一年就应该总结一次进化一次,现在都应该v3 v4 v5 了。反正无论怎么弄不可能完美的,不如进化快一点。

第四我觉得如果这个提案离你预期很远,不如整理下思路另外提一个提案,我看jordan也提到过这个点。如果这么多意见最后都吸收,这个提案实际上也就变成另一个提案了,感觉不太现实而且也会有类似A提案但想法都是B的代理提案的问题。还不如另外提一个,最终无论是从里面选一个也好还是两个一起上都挺好,不一定要在一个提案里面你死我活吧。

@jm9k 最后一个问题是,我不太清楚的是这个提案后续会怎么落实呢?这是一个 v1 的提案,需要 v1 投票吗?如果是这样需要申请多少ckb? 还是在呼吁成立另外一个 dao v2? 和 v1 平行?还是怎么说? 是否能回答一下?

(deepseek translation)

After reading through all the messages, I believe you said all this out of goodwill and passion. Such enthusiastic and great summaries and suggestions—big thumbs up!

Secondly, I want to say that some of your words are a bit… well, for example:

Aren’t you implying that everyone else joining the discussion is only here for personal gain, and you’re the only true believer? That’s actually quite disrespectful to others participating in the conversation. Respect should be mutual. If someone called you a “shitcoin trader,” was it someone who’s actively posting here? Those who never said such things might find this remark baffling.

Thirdly, my impression is that while this proposal might not meet your standards, both the proposal and the replies show that the OP has indeed studied the issues with v1 and put serious thought into it—it’s not as if they’ve failed to reflect, as you suggested. If implemented, it would definitely be better than leaving a stagnant v1 as it is. In fact, I think v1 has existed for too long—it should have been reviewed and evolved yearly. By now, we should already be at v3, v4, or v5. Anyway, nothing can ever be perfect, so why not iterate faster?

Fourthly, if this proposal falls far short of your expectations, why not organize your thoughts and submit a separate proposal? I noticed Jordan also mentioned this point. If too many differing opinions are absorbed into this proposal, it would essentially turn into a different one altogether—which seems unrealistic and could lead to issues like “Proposal A being a proxy for entirely different ideas from Proposal B.” It might be better to just propose a separate one. In the end, whether one is selected or both are implemented together, either approach would be fine. There’s no need for a life-or-death struggle within a single proposal.

@jm9k The last question is, I’m unclear about how this proposal will be implemented. Is this a v1 proposal that requires a v1 vote? If so, how much CKB needs to be requested? Or is it calling for the creation of a separate DAO v2, running in parallel with v1? How exactly would that work? Could you clarify?

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你可以仔细看看评论的人他们的背景,除了你我不知道,其他的人不是基金会拿工资的,就是从项目方拿钱的,要不是就是参与DAO拿资金的,内部资助旅游做宣传的。你看我的贴子链接有几个点击?有人关注么? 这些数据都是基础事实。正因为我曾经长期做项目的审核,对细节观察很多,所以导致我说的每一个观点都有事实依据。

我很多的观点在审核各个DAO提案的时候已经反复申明了,但是没有几个人用心去想,以至于到现在,我还得反复我的观点,我发现Palmyra提案有代理问题以后,我第一时间就发起了一个改进建议。有人看有人想么?都1年了。

还有我不是什么”真爱粉“,我只是想赚钱的”臭炒币“的。”臭炒币“的这个词是中文社区对散户当年的尊称,我们被社区踢了多少次?才通过努力去逐步纠正”臭炒币“的这个概念,直到黑子群解散。你是不是不了解这段历史?

尊重是相互的。拿了工资,干得不好,散户骂几句都不行,中文社区里面剩下现在看这个贴子的,发表评论的有几个?怎么都不说话呢?你看最近的DAO提案有几个中文社区的去参与,更别说规则整改意见了。我特别希望中文社区能有人好好去讨论,你看还有人么?当年黑子群里大家还在讨论Tunnr的百万教科书多么不靠谱,现在呢?Palmyra钱拿走一年了都不知道,”公地悲剧“不正在上演么?

没人关心也更没有人制衡内部利益集团,这和谢晗剑的Nervos Community DAO的目的一致么?我写的改进建议,关于工作量那部分怎么就成”歧视“了,项目建设费用低不是对DAO有利益么?怎么就成了”歧视“了。你看在提案中说了多少次对英文社区偏见,对英文社区不尊重了?

当好人谁不会?你看还在积极发言的有多少是为了混脸熟,谁的提案都说好,以便后续自己方便。与其这样,还真不如改成精英制的项目审核制度呢。这样出了事责权利最清晰。

拿了工资,去改进项目是他的工作。他的工作做的好么?这么多年,从22年我了解他到现在,做得好么?