Thanks for taking the time to review the proposal and chime in about it.
I share your viewpoint that short-term holders should be heard, but that the voice of a long-term holder is worth more consideration. The concern I have is that the 30-day lockup requirement of the DAO has shown that it is a much bigger deterrent than many anticipated. Some of the strongest long-term supporters in our community will not use the DAO because they are unwilling to sacrifice liquidity.
At the same time, we need to recognize that participation in governance is in itself time-consuming. As you have noted yourself, not everyone will be able to dedicate enough time to understanding every issue well enough to have a strong stance. However, it is much more likely that a representative will be a long-term supporter since they probably wouldn’t get much power delegated to them otherwise.
The section on Voting Power is in part an attempt to shield the system from short-term attacks while also offering an avenue for those who refuse to use the Nervos DAO an avenue to vote without the 30-day lockup but with a vote power penalty which is equivalent to the 30-day lockup.
Another avenue that has been mentioned several times is to give stronger voting power to those who have been holding longer. There is merit to this concept, but also things to consider. A whale could gain a disproportionate amount of power over time. Another thing to consider is that the interest paid in the Nervos DAO is inherently increasing their voting power already.
I would like to hear more thoughts on the topic from yourself and others. I’m not at all against the general concept as long as the implementation has a long enough successful track record to ensure it isn’t experimental, and that it doesn’t rely heavily on magic numbers.
Lastly, I want to point out that the treasury mechanism I suggested does not forbid multiple DAOs to co-exist simultaneously. CKB is designed to accommodate an ever-evolving landscape. There is no reason our DAO cannot do the same.