[DIS] Community Fund DAO v1.1 Web5 优化提案/ Community Fund DAO v1.1 Web5 Optimization Proposal

CKB Community Fund DAO
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Yeah, but not all meta-rules are created equal. Actually, maybe they are legally, I don’t know, but from a common sense approach, they obviously aren’t.

Anyway, I just think there’s a difference between completely changing the way proposals are funded and all the complexity that goes into how we do this VS just changing the 7 days + 30 likes to a general 30 day review period, which I think most people would agree is a better option.

But this is just classic CKB style to always play by the rules no matter what, even it if obviously hurts us and makes things harder.

Honestly, no one cares if we just break some ‘little rules’ every now and then and for the people that do care so much, then take a stand and vote against it.

But lets just get on with the job of fixing the DAO starting with V1.1 and then we can move onto V2, because it seems clear to me that this doesn’t hurt V2 at all, it actually helps it and makes it possible.

2 Likes
22

While I recognize this proposal as positive, without that kind of USD change I cannot justify 100k USD spent.

You are bending the rules. Bend them a little more, find a way to introduce as option USD values that does not require a Meta-Rule vote and I’ll personally vouch on the goodness this proposal.

Love & Peace, Phroi

5 Likes
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Yep, while I support this proposal as is, I’d be more than happy with some rule bending to bring on the USD payments.

3 Likes
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持续问答更新 Ongoing Q&A Updates (9.5)

持续问答更新（截止9月6日）

Hi，

今天的讨论非常精彩、严谨，这正是一个健康的 DAO 所需要的。为了帮助每一位成员都能跟上节奏，并让对话更有焦点，我们想在此对已经出现的核心议题做一个小结。

DAO 应该如何进化？

基于社区成员富有洞察力的反馈，目前浮现出两种主要的治理哲学：

  • 路径 A：原则性的整体变革。 这种观点认为，任何显著的变更，包括 v1.1 中的运营性变更，都已触及 DAO 的宪法。因此，最负责任的方式是直面这一点，启动一次元规则修改投票，并可能借此机会一并解决 USD 计价/ICKB整合等其他重大问题。这条路径的优先事项是程序的完整性和全面的改革，即使这意味着过程会更慢、更复杂。

  • 路径 B：务实的迭代演进。 这是我们 v1.1 提案所倡导的路径。它主张我们首先通过一个聚焦的、快速的、低风险的项目，来解决当前最紧迫的运营危机（工具、服务缺失）。这条路径优先考虑可见的进展和持续的迭代。

我们为何选择路径 B，以及我们需要您的智慧

我们团队已经阐明了我们选择路径 B 的初衷，在此我们想更深入地解释为什么我们认为“聚焦”是此刻更重要的事。

我们选择路径 B，是因为我们坚信，试图在一个提案中解决所有问题，是导致治理停滞的根源之一。像稳定币计价、iCKB 集成等议题，每一个都极其重要，但也极其复杂，都值得拥有它们自己的、专注的、高质量的辩论。

v1.1 提案的范围是刻意且狭窄的：只专注于修复 DAO 的运营框架和工具。我们希望社区能在一个个小的边界内做决策迭代。

即便最终社区认为v1.1提案需要通过元规则的门槛来投票，我们投票的内容，也仅仅是关于“是否要资助这个运营优化项目”，而不应包含其他可以解耦的议题。

我们认为，一个功能更完善的 DAO，未来将能更好地处理那些重大的宪法级辩论。

这是一个需要整个社区来做的决定。您更倾向于哪条路径？

您的观点至关重要，将直接影响我们下一步的方向。我们在这里倾听。

Ongoing Q&A Update (As of Sept 6)

Hi everyone,

Today’s discussion has been insightful and rigorous, exactly what a healthy DAO needs. To help every member keep up and to focus the conversation, we’d like to summarize the core themes that have emerged.

How Should the DAO Evolve?

Based on insightful feedback from community members, two main governance philosophies have emerged:

  • Path A: Principled, Comprehensive Reform. This view holds that any significant change, including the operational ones in v1.1, already touches the DAO’s constitution. Therefore, the most responsible path is to face this directly, initiate a meta-rule vote, and potentially use this opportunity to resolve other major issues like USD denomination/iCKB integration at the same time. The priority here is procedural integrity and comprehensive reform, even if it means a slower, more complex process.

  • Path B: Pragmatic, Iterative Evolution. This is the path our v1.1 proposal advocates for. It argues that we could first solve the most urgent operational crisis (the lack of tools and services) through a focused, fast, and low-risk project. This path prioritizes visible progress and continuous iteration.

Why We Chose Path B, and Why We Need Your Wisdom

Our team has explained our rationale for choosing Path B, and here we want to elaborate on why we believe focus is what matters most right now.

We chose Path B because we firmly believe that trying to solve every problem in a single proposal is one of the root causes of governance inertia. Issues like stablecoin denomination and iCKB integration are each incredibly important, but also incredibly complex, and they each deserve their own focused, high-quality debates.

The scope of the v1.1 proposal is intentionally narrow: to focus exclusively on fixing the DAO’s operational framework and tooling. We want the community to make decisions within small, defined boundaries, one iteration at a time.

Even if the community ultimately decides that the v1.1 proposal must pass the meta-rule threshold, the vote itself should still be exclusively about “whether to fund this operational upgrade project,” and should not be bundled with other, decouplable topics.

We believe a more functional DAO will be better equipped to handle those major constitutional debates in the future.

This should be a decision for the entire community. Which path do you favor?

Your perspective is crucial and will directly influence our next steps. We are here to listen.

2 Likes
25

很棒的提案，希望看到它通过！

3 Likes
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The issue with what you have presented here is that Path B is not viable because you are trying to change the meta-rules by calling them something different.

DAO v1.0 operates in a very simplistic manner which requires custodians to manually fulfill obligations. The only thing that separates this from a fully centralized process is the rules. If you try to sidestep the established rules you are weakening the entire framework for the ecosystem.

I will make a suggestion for Path C. Split the proposal into one just for the budget, and another just for the meta-rule changes (including anything operational).

The budget proposal should be strictly about the development of the new DAO platform and support to run it properly. Do not include anything that could be considered a meta-rule or procedural change. The DAO Stewards should be included as the last milestone just as before.

The meta-rule change proposal should be to provide a clear delineation between constitutional rules and operational rules. This framework needs to clearly define the differences so that the existing rules (and future rules) fall clearly into the appropriate category with minimal room for interpretation. Do not attempt to change any existing rules with this proposal. Fix the framework so we can move forward with future operational rule changes, such as those needed for DAO v1.1, as well as the other issues which have been mentioned.

I’m confident that the budget proposal will pass without issue. The meta-rule change will be more difficult. Assuming we come to agreement on the framework, I am confident that the community will give their support, and I will personally do everything I can to help spread awareness about the importance of passing this.

We know that meta-rule changes are very difficult to pass even with full support of the community. In the event that we are unable to change the meta-rules, there is still one more path forward. Launch an entirely new DAO using the new platform which has been successfully funded. Because it is a new DAO entirely, you have full control over all rules. We will then fund this DAO in small incremental chunks using budgetary proposals on DAO v1.0.

6 Likes
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Hi Jordan, thank you for this incredibly thoughtful and constructive proposal for a “Path C.” We sincerely appreciate the time you’ve taken to outline a detailed path forward.

We fully agree with the spirit of your approach, particularly the idea of formally distinguishing between constitutional and operational rules. This is the right long-term direction for the DAO.

However, we’ve identified a critical challenge in the proposed separation of the “budget proposal” from the “procedural changes” that we’d love to get your thoughts on.

The core features of the platform we are proposing, such as the milestone voting system and the Steward-managed Tier 2 wallet, are intrinsically linked to the new procedures. The software features and the governance processes are two sides of the same coin. They cannot function without each other.

For example, a platform with a milestone voting UI is not useful if the DAO has not adopted the procedure of milestone voting. Similarly, a Tier 2 wallet feature is not functional if the DAO hasn’t authorized Stewards to be on the multi-sig.

Your Path C suggests funding a platform first, under the strict condition that it includes no procedural changes. Our concern is that this would force us to build a platform stripped of its most essential features. It would be like funding the construction of a car but requiring a separate, difficult vote on whether to allow the use of its engine.

We believe an effective upgrade requires the tool and the process to be approved and implemented together.

Given our shared goal, we are very open to discussion and would love to find the best path forward together.

Hi Jordan，非常感谢您深思熟虑且富有建设性提出的 Plan C 方案。我们由衷地感谢您花时间勾勒出一条详细的前进道路。

我们完全同意您方案的精神，特别是正式划定“宪法规则 vs 运营规则”的想法。这对于 DAO 来说是正确的长期方向。

然而，在您提议的将“预算提案”与“程序性变更”分离开来的方案中，我们预见到了一个关键的挑战，非常希望能听听您的想法。

我们所提议的平台的核心功能，例如里程碑投票系统和由物业管理的二级钱包，与其所伴随的新程序是密不可分的。 软件功能和治理流程是同一枚硬币的两面，彼此缺一不可。

举个例子，如果 DAO 没有采纳里程碑投票的程序，那么一个带有里程碑投票界面的平台是毫无用处的。同样，如果 DAO 没有授权物业进入多签，那么二级钱包的功能也无法运作。

您的 Plan C 建议先为一个平台拨款，但严格限制其不包含任何程序性变更。我们担心，这将迫使我们去建造一个被剥离了最核心功能的平台。这就好比是，资助建造了一辆汽车，但却需要另一场困难的投票来决定是否允许使用它的引擎。

我们相信，一次有效的升级，需要将工具和流程作为一个整体，被一并批准和实施。鉴于我们拥有共同的目标，我们对讨论持完全开放的态度，并非常希望能与您共同找到前进的最佳路径。

4 Likes
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I think there is a misunderstanding here. I am not suggesting that the DAO software remove any of its features. My suggestion is that the budget proposal be strictly for funding development. The meta-rule changes can be pursued separately in a different proposal.

The problem that could occur is if the budget proposal passes but the meta-rule change proposal does not. In that case, you would still have the fallback option of launching an entirely new DAO with new rules. At least one of these two possible routes will be successful.

I don’t think the community will be concerned about which route is pursued, as long as the intent and possible directions are made clear. There is strong support in the community to improve the DAO, and there are also clear frustrations over the continued failed efforts to change the meta-rules.

Plan C allows you to get past the meta-rule debate entirely. As long as the community supports the v1.1 concept and budget, you have a path forward.

6 Likes
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Hi Jordan, thanks for your clarification and considerate suggestion
Let me have a discussion with our team, and hope to have the decision on how to adjust the current proposal in the following one or two days

5 Likes
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A Quick Housekeeping Note on “Likes” :heart:

Hello everyone, a quick housekeeping note to ensure our proposal proceeds correctly under the v1.0 rules.

Due to the length of the proposal, we had to post the Chinese and English versions in two separate replies (the first and second posts in this thread). However, for the “30 likes” count to be correctly recognized, all support needs to be registered on the very first post.

We have a small request for those who have supported us:

If you have already liked the second post (the English version), could you please also give a ‘like’ :heart: to the first post (the Chinese version at the top)?

We understand this means some of you will have liked both posts, but this is the only way to ensure all support is correctly consolidated for the official count. We apologize for any inconvenience caused by the forum’s limitations.

Thank you for your understanding and support!

关于点赞 :heart: 的一个小说明

各位社区成员好，这里有一个关于程序性事项的小说明，以确保我们的提案能严格按照 v1.0 规则顺利推进。

由于提案篇幅较长，我们不得不将中文和英文版本分开发布在了本主题帖的第一楼和第二楼。然而，为了让“30个赞”的计数能够被正确认可，所有的支持都需要被记录在帖子的第一楼上。

我们在此对已经支持我们的朋友有一个小小的请求：

如果您之前已经在第二楼（英文版）点了赞，能否恳请您也为第一楼（最顶部的中文版）点上一个“赞”:heart:？

我们理解，这意味着一些朋友会给两个帖子都点赞，但这是我们能确保所有支持都被正确地集中起来以便官方计数的唯一方法。对于因论坛技术限制带来的不便，我们深表歉意。

非常感谢大家的理解与支持！

3 Likes
31

I’ve been quietly observing for a while and noticed some debate in the community about the rules.
As a member of the CKB Community Fund DAO management committee and one of the rule designers, I’d like to offer some clarification.

Original Rules

Two types of governance:

  1. The DAO will decide whether or not to adopt a proposal from a team or an individual to request a budget (CKB) for CKB’s eco-building work.
  2. Decide whether to adopt changes to the DAO’s governance meta-rules, such as the calculation of voting weights, eligibility for voting, conditions for adoption, etc.

In short: the DAO can only do two things — funding proposals or rule-change proposals. After DAO was released, all rule adjustments should be understood as meta-rule proposals.

End of clarification as a committee member. The following is my personal opinion as an individual donor.

The CKB Community Fund DAO idea began at the end of 2022. The goal was simple:
to give the community a lighter way to apply for funding and start work quickly; and also to experiment — to see how funds would be used, what results would come, and to prepare for a larger-scale DAO in the future.

To reduce risk, the DAO’s scale was intentionally modest (276,000,000 CKBs), and the rules kept simple (funding proposals, rule changes). I was aware of potential loopholes at the time:

  1. Passing the Discussion Stage through fake upvotes.
  2. Proposal owners hoarding CKBs to flip the Voting Stage at the last moment.

Even so, we decided to launch quickly so the community could start experimenting.

I once said: even if the funds were gone in half a year with 70% “useless” results and 30% interesting ones, I’d still be happy. Even 10% would be worth it. We also discussed whether, if someone exploited the rules, the committee should strictly execute or intervene.

In reality, after more than two years, neither extreme happened. The DAO still has 246,415,103 CKBs left, spending less than 11% in almost three years.

How to interpret this?

  1. If the success standard is “preventing free-riding,” the DAO can be seen as successful.
  2. If the standard is “turning resources into outcomes quickly,” then efficiency is too low — the experiment feels like a failure.

Personally, I lean toward the latter, so I feel the DAO is somewhat stuck.

On the current proposal

When I saw @zz_tovarishch and @jm9k pushing improvements, my first reaction was support. Builders are scarce in any community, and we should value them. I was also surprised to see how much work had already been done before bringing it forward.

My suggestions:

  • Option 1: Pause the current process and resubmit as a meta-rule proposal

    • This follows the rules and takes the upgrade path.
    • But the proposal is too large, and community involvement came too late. It’s hard to gain consensus in a short time, and more discussion is needed.
    • If I could give one piece of advice in early stage: build in public earlier, so the community knows the direction sooner.

  • Option 2: Create a new DAO and request funds from the existing DAO for experimentation

    • No need to modify meta-rules.
    • If successful, gradually request more funds and build trust in community.
    • Different builders could even start different DAOs, exploring multiple paths.

Ultimately, the choice is up to the builders.

Final Thoughts

No matter the outcome, I hope this can spark broader discussions about the DAO’s next stage:

  • Stick with a single DAO?
  • Allow multiple DAOs in parallel?
  • Or even end Community DAO v1.0 and donate the remaining funds to other new DAOs?

I personally remain open to all possibilities, as long as they follow procedure.

安静观察了一段时间，看到社区对规则有一些争议。作为 CKB Community Fund DAO 管理委员会成员之一、也是规则的制定者之一，我想对规则做个说明。

规则原文

DAO 支持两种类型的治理：

  1. 决定是否通过团队或个人为 CKB 生态建设申请预算(CKB)的提案。
  2. 决定是否通过 DAO 元规则的修改，如投票权重、投票资格、通过条件等。

一句话总结：DAO 目前只能做两件事——申请资金，或修改规则。DAO 正式发布后，所有规则调整都应理解为“元规则修改提案”。

— 管委身份的澄清结束，以下是我作为个人和捐款者的看法 —

DAO 的想法起于 2022 年底。初衷很简单：给社区一个更轻便的资金申请和快速开展工作的渠道；同时也是一个试验——看看资金会被怎样使用，会产生哪些成果， 为更大规模的 DAO 做好准备。

为了降低风险，DAO 规模设定不大（276,000,000 CKBs），规则保持简单（资金提案、规则修改两条）。我当时甚至意识到一些潜在漏洞：

1.通过刷赞推进 Discussion Stage。
2.在 Voting Stage 中，提案人囤币最后时刻反转投票。
即便如此，我们还是选择尽快发布，让大家有基础可试验。

当时我说过：哪怕半年就花光资金，70% 无用、30% 有意思，我也会很开心，因为价值在于那 30%，甚至 10%。另外，还讨论到如果有人利用规则钻空子，管委该严格执行还是强行干预？

现实是，两年多过去，上述情况都没发生。而 DAO 里还剩 246,415,103 CKBs
，快三年花不到 11%。

如何解读？
1.如果成功标准是尽可能防止“薅羊毛”，DAO 还算成功的。
2.如果标准是“尽快把资源转化为成果”，效率就太低，可以说试验挺失败。

我个人更倾向后者，因此认为 DAO 目前有陷入泥潭之感。

因此，看到 @zz_tovarishch 和 @jm9k 愿意推动改进，我第一反应是支持。推动事情的 builder 在任何社区都稀缺，我们更应珍稀。而且没想到一拿出来都已经做了这么对多工作，让人很惊讶。

对于提案的建议：

  • 选项1: 暂停当前进程，改为元规则提案
    • 符合规则，走升级路线。
    • 但提案体量过大，社区接触太晚，短时间很难获得足够理解与共识。需要更多讨论时间。
    • 如果重来一次，我会建议更早的 build in public, 让社区更早的知道你们要推进的方向
  • 选项2: 成立新 DAO，从现有 DAO 申请一些资金试验
    • 无需修改元规则。
    • 成功后逐步申请更多资金，积累社区信任。
    • 不同社区成员甚至可成立不同的 DAO，多方向尝试。
      最终选择由 builder 们决定。

最后，无论结果如何，希望大家借此契机积极推动 DAO 进入下一阶段的讨论：
坚持一个DAO？多DAO并行？甚至把Community DAO v1.0结束把余下的资金捐给其他新的DAO?

10 Likes
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Hi Poshboytl,

Thank you so much for this incredibly valuable clarification and for sharing the historical context of DAO v1.0. Your perspective as a rule designer and committee member is exactly what this discussion needed, and we appreciate it immensely.

Your analysis of the DAO’s current state, stuck in a low-efficiency “gridlock”, is spot on and perfectly captures the problem we are trying to solve.

We would also like to inform you that we have taken the community’s feedback to heart. After an in-depth and productive discussion with Matt and Jordan yesterday and considering the community voice, we will be officially reclassifying our v1.1 proposal as a Meta-Rule Change Proposal today. We agree that this is the most principled way forward.

As you said, builders are scarce, and progress sometimes requires bold attempts. We are taking a chance and presenting our complete, focused v1.1 package to the community for a meta-rule vote, because we believe, like you, that a bold experiment is better than continued stagnation.

As Jan also put it, even if the proposal doesn’t pass, it’s not the end of the world; our perseverance in finding ways to improve the DAO is what matters.

We would be honored to have your support in rallying the community for this crucial vote. Let’s work together to turn our shared resources into tangible outcomes.

Hi Poshboytl,

非常感谢您为我们带来了极其宝贵的澄清，并分享了 DAO v1.0 的历史背景。您作为规则制定者和管委会成员的视角，正是这场讨论所需要的，我们对此感激不尽。

您对 DAO 当前陷入低效“僵局”的分析一针见血，完美地概括了我们正试图解决的问题。

我们还想告诉您，我们已经将社区的反馈铭记于心。在昨天与 Matt 和 Jordan 进行了深入且富有成效的讨论，并考虑到社区的声音后，我们将在今天正式将 v1.1 提案重新归类为“元规则修改提案”。我们同意这是最有原则的前进方式。

正如您所说，builder 是稀缺的，而进步有时需要勇敢的尝试。我们正选择“搏一把”，将我们完整的、聚焦的 v1.1 方案，交付给社区进行一次元规则投票。因为我们和您一样相信，一次勇敢的试验，远胜于持续的停滞。

正如 Jan 指出的那样：

如果能在接下来的关键投票中得到您的支持，我们将倍感荣幸。让我们一起努力，将我们共同的资源，转化为切实的成果。

5 Likes
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Glad that all parties agree that it’s a meta-rule change, happy to support this proposal!!

Next stop: CKB payments in USD denominated values :muscle:

Phroi

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谢谢你的建议。作为本提案的顾问，我个人意见如下。第一，按照目前DAO框架，这个提案确实应该算元规则修改提案。由于本提案设计和开发已经在进行，最好不要再大的变动，我建议这个提案直接按照元规则进行投票。第二，既然是元规则修改提案，如 @poshboytl 所说，这个提案最好延长一个月再进入投票期，可以发起两次公开AMA, 充分征集社区意见，再进行投票会比较好。第三，我注意 @phroi 以及更多西方社区成员一直在尝试想要推动提案预算资金以稳定币计价，我觉得这是可以接受的。因为我们现在有生态的稳定币USDI, 而且spark grants实践下来效果还可以。项目发起人想要避免币价波动给项目带来的财务不确定性，是可以理解的。可以设置成提案人自行选择固定数额的ckb，或者固定数额的usdi,或者固定美元总值，以ckb按期支付但 ckb数量是波动的，我觉得三种形式都能接受。spark实践下来，发现前两者比较容易操作。第三种，需要每次milestone重新在金库给项目多签钱包补ckb。第四，不管怎样，作为CKB Ecofund负责人，我很高兴社区各方对Community DAO如此关注，而且大家都在基于规则提建设性意见。我觉得这个提案是我们CKB 大社区走向 定位白皮书 设想的链上财政部治理的重要一步。第五，我作为本提案顾问，同时个人也在DAO治理实践有过经验，我盼望社区成员能够在接下来一个月帮助提案团队完善提案，以及更重要的是，在这次提案装修好议会大厦后，大家更积极地使用这个房子，比如写提案区分元规则和一般规则解决类似本次的分歧，比如商量物业团队如何换届，怎么构成等等.

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Update & Path Forward (As of Sept 11)

Hello everyone,

After several days of incredibly rigorous and constructive debate, we have reached a clear path forward for the DAO v1.1 proposal. Our team has listened intently to the community’s wisdom, and we are grateful to everyone who contributed to this foundational discussion.

Based on this deep engagement, we have made several major and decisive updates to the proposal to reflect the emerging community consensus. This post serves as the summary of these changes.

Key Updates to the Proposal:

  • Reclassification to Meta-Rule Change: To uphold the highest standard of procedural integrity, the proposal is now officially classified as a Meta-Rule Change Proposal. We are fully committed to meeting the more stringent voting conditions this requires.

  • Addition of Stablecoin (USDI) / USD Denomination: In response to strong community demand, the proposal now includes a formal option for projects to request funding denominated in USDI / USD, providing a crucial solution to CKB price volatility.

  • Extended Discussion Period: To ensure the broadest possible consensus for this important vote, we have committed to a one-month extended community discussion period (after if the initial 7-day/30-like threshold is met) before proceeding to the formal vote.

  • Clarification on Independence & Openness: We have updated the text to explicitly state that if approved, the DAO Stewards team will operate as an independent entity, accountable only to the DAO. The formation of the first DAO Stewards team will be guided by the proposal team. Meanwhile, we will open to the entire CKB community to find the best candidates for the core professional roles within the Stewards.

The Path Forward:

With these foundational changes made, the debate over procedure and scope has come to a productive conclusion. We now invite the entire community to focus on the substance of this refined proposal over the next month. We will be hosting public AMAs and continuing to gather feedback.

This proposal now represents a unified path to upgrade our DAO’s core infrastructure. Let’s move forward, together.

Changelog (Updated Sept 10, 2025):

  • Changed: Reclassified the proposal from a “Budget Request” to a “Meta-Rule Change” based on constructive feedback to ensure procedural integrity. (Section 1 Statement on the Nature of the Proposal)
  • Added: Incorporated the option for USD / USDI denominated funding based on community feedback, and detailed its operational flow within the two-tier treasury system. (Section 3.2 Budget Denomination and Payment Currency)

更新与前进路径（截至9月11日）

大家好，

经过几天极其严谨和富有建设性的辩论，关于 DAO v1.1 提案，我们已经有了一条清晰的前进道路。我们团队认真听取了社区的集体智慧，并非常感谢每一位参与者为这场根本性的讨论做出了巨大贡献。

基于这次深度的沟通，我们对提案做出了几项重大的、决定性的更新，以反映正在形成的社区共识。本帖将作为这些变更的最终摘要。

提案的核心更新：

  • 重新归类为“元规则修改”：为维护最高标准的程序完整性，本提案现已正式归类为“元规则修改提案”。我们完全致力于满足其所要求的、更严格的投票条件。

  • 增加稳定币 (USDI) / USD 计价选项：为回应强烈的社区需求，提案现已正式包含允许项目申请以 USDI / USD 计价的资金的选项，为 CKB 价格波动问题提供了关键的解决方案。

  • 延长社区讨论期：为确保这次重要的投票能获得最广泛的共识，我们承诺在满足“7天30赞”门槛后，将社区讨论期延长一个月，之后再进入正式投票环节。

  • 明确独立性与开放性：我们更新了文本，明确声明如果提案通过，DAO 物业团队将作为独立实体运作，仅对 DAO 负责。此外，初始物业团队组建由本提案团队主导，且将面向 CKB 社区为物业团队中的核心专业角色寻找最合适的人选。

前进的道路：

随着这些根本性变更的完成，关于程序和范围的辩论已经有了一个富有成效的结论。我们现在诚挚地邀请整个社区，在接下来的一个月里，专注于这个完善后提案的实质内容。我们将举办公开的 AMA 并持续收集反馈。

这个提案现在代表了一条团结一致的、旨在升级我们 DAO 核心基础设施的道路。让我们一起，向前迈进。

更新日志 (2025年9月10日):

  • 变更：基于来自社区的建设性反馈，为确保满足最高标准的程序完整性，已将提案性质从预算申请类提案重新归类为元规则修改类提案。（Section 1，关于提案性质的声明）
  • 新增：采纳社区建议，在提案中正式加入稳定币（USDI）计价和固定USD价值的支付选项，并详细阐述了其在两级金库体系下的运作流程。（Section 3.2 金库管理与资金政策）
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Hi Hongzhou,

While I was pushing for the bending/breaking of rules, this was through impatience and frustration with the current position of the DAO. But your decision and the opinions of Jordan and Terry etc are of course the best way forward in the long run. I just hope we can get there the right way and quickly, because we can’t afford a long drawn out process. I’m really confident though that you can get this done!

I’ve got a very strong opinion on this point and that is there should be no ‘option’.

Apart from funding that’s specifically needed to be in CKB, smart contracts, DOBs etc, all other milestones must be paid in USDI.

Giving proposers the option is just letting them gamble with their funding. If the price of CKB goes up substantially then they hit the jackpot and if the price of CKB goes down substantially then they just walk away with a great excuse that no one could blame them for.

There’s really no upside for the DAO here and I think if anyone should be gambling with the DAOs funds, then it should be the DAO.

Depending on the current price of CKB and the general market situation, then a decision could be made to either leave the full amount in CKB and convert at each milestone payment, convert the full proposal amount to USDI on approval, or convert a portion to USDI as a hedge.

I know this complicates things and it might not really be feasible, because who makes these decisions?

But I think at the very least the complete proposal amount should be converted to USDI on approval and then we just have to be prepared that we’ll win some and we’ll lose some, but at least every project will be fully funded with no excuses for non-completion due to ‘market conditions’.

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Hi Yeti,

Thanks for the support and for raising such a sharp point. You’re right, the risk of proposers “gambling” on CKB’s price is a concern we need to take seriously.

But as @Poshboytl pointed out when he shared the history of DAO v1.0, the DAO has spent less than 11% of its funds in almost three years and is somewhat stuck. So, v1.1’s main goal is to get the DAO moving again.

That’s why we’ve proposed flexible funding options. It’s about lowering the barrier for good builders to come here and build, not forcing a one-size-fits-all policy on them. Some teams are true CKB believers and prefer the native token; others have USD-based costs and need the stability of USDI.

And for those who are bullish on CKB but also need a safety net, we have the “Fixed USD Value (Paid in CKB)” option. This means the DAO will cover any shortfall if the price dips, ensuring projects get the full value they were promised and don’t fail simply due to market conditions. (You can find more details at 3.2 Treasury Management and Financial Policies) These options, combined with the new oversight from the Stewards team, are designed to manage risks while encouraging building.

You made a great point about the DAO itself managing the treasury risk, but that’s a huge step that involves turning the DAO into an active asset manager. That’s a massive conversation in itself, maybe it’s a fantastic idea for a v1.x proposal once we’ve fixed the current operational issues and have our new platform up and running.

Appreciate you pushing this conversation forward. It’s vital.

嗨，Yeti，

感谢您的支持以及提出如此关键的观点。您说得对，提案者“赌博” CKB 价格的风险是我们需要认真对待的问题。

但正如 Poshboytl 在分享 DAO v1.0 的历史时指出的那样，DAO 在近三年内仅动用了不到 11% 的资金，并且在某种程度上陷入了困境。因此，v1.1 的主要目标是让 DAO 再次运转起来。

这就是我们提出灵活融资方案的原因。这是为了降低优秀建设者来这里进行建设的门槛，而不是强迫他们采用一刀切的政策。有些团队是 CKB 的忠实信徒，更喜欢原生代币；而有些团队则以美元为基础支付费用，需要 USDI 的稳定性。

对于那些看好 CKB 但又需要安全网的人来说，我们提供“固定美元价值（以 CKB 支付）”选项。这意味着，如果价格下跌，DAO 将弥补任何资金缺口，确保项目获得承诺的全部价值，而不会仅仅因为市场状况而失败。（更多详情请参阅 3.2 金库管理和资金政策）这些方案，加上 物业团队的新监管，旨在管理风险的同时鼓励项目建设。

您关于 DAO 本身管理资金风险的观点非常正确，但这是一个巨大的进步，它关系到将 DAO 转变为一个积极的资产管理者。这需要一次大型的对话，或许当我们解决了当前的操作问题并启动运行新平台后，可以把这个很棒的想法作为一个 v1.x 的提案。

感谢您推动此次对话，这至关重要。

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Update & Path Forward (Sept 12): Community Review Month Begins!

Hello everyone,

Great news! Our proposal has successfully passed the first stage with 32 likes on the first post. A huge thank you to everyone who participated in the rigorous and constructive debates over the past week. It’s this level of engagement that makes our community strong.

As we promised, this isn’t a rush to the vote. First stage pass officially kicks off our one-month extended community review period. We want to ensure this meta-rule change has the broadest possible consensus.

To start this new phase, we’ve put together a short video to summarize the core problem and our proposed solution. We hope it makes the v1.1 vision clearer for everyone.

We encourage you to watch the video, continue to ask the tough questions in this thread, and help us refine this proposal. Over the next month, we will announce dates for community AMAs for our community.

Let’s use this time to build a rock-solid consensus and create a better DAO, together.

舟舟
On behalf of the v1.1 Proposal Team

Ongoing Q&A Update (As of Sept 12)

In the spirit of continued transparency, we’ll use this section to address key questions that come up during the review month.

Q1: Your proposal offers a choice between CKB and USDI/USD funding. Doesn’t allowing proposers to choose a fixed CKB amount let them “gamble” with DAO funds? If the CKB price rises they win big, and if it falls, the project might fail, leaving the DAO with the loss.

A1: The risk you’ve highlighted is real, which is precisely why we designed a multi-option system: to provide flexibility while mitigating that exact risk.

Our main goal is to lower barriers for builders. Here’s how the options address different needs and prevent “gambling”:

  • Fixed USDI/USD: This is for teams that need absolute budget stability for their operational costs.

  • Fixed CKB: This is for long-term CKB believers who are comfortable managing the volatility themselves.

  • Fixed USD Value (Paid in CKB): This is the crucial “safety net” option designed for the very scenario you described. A team can request a USD-denominated budget but receive payment in CKB. If the CKB price drops, the DAO tops up the payment to ensure the project receives the full USD value needed for that milestone. This protects the project from market risk without forcing them to abandon CKB.

This system empowers builders to choose the model that best fits their needs while ensuring they have the financial stability to deliver on their promises to the DAO.

更新与前进路径 (9月12日): 社区问询月正式开启!

大家好，

向大家报告一个好消息：我们的提案在第一个帖子中获得了 32 个赞，成功通过了第一阶段！非常感谢每一位在过去一周里参与了严谨且富有建设性辩论的朋友。正是这种深度的参与，让我们的社区充满力量。

正如我们所承诺的，我们不会急于进入投票。7填30赞的达成，也正式开启了我们为期一个月的社区深度问询期。我们希望确保这次的元规则修改，能够获得最广泛的社区共识。

为了更好地开启这个新阶段，我们制作了一个短视频，旨在总结我们面临的核心问题、v1.1 的解决方案，以及这次升级对我们每个人的意义。

我们鼓励大家观看视频，并在这个帖子下继续提出犀利的问题，帮助我们进一步完善提案。在接下来的一个月里，我们也会公布面向社区的多场 AMA 活动信息。

让我们利用这段时间，建立坚如磐石的共识，共同打造一个更好的 DAO。

舟舟
谨代表 v1.1 提案团队

持续问答更新 (截至9月12日)

本着持续透明的精神，我们将在为期一个月的审议期内，继续通过这个版块回应社区的关键问题。

问题一：提案提供了 CKB 和 USDI/USD 计价的选项。允许提案人选择固定 CKB 数额，是否会让他们用 DAO 的资金来“赌”CKB 价格？如果价格上涨，他们就大赚一笔；如果价格下跌，项目可能因此失败，最终风险由 DAO 承担。

回答一： 您指出的风险是真实存在的，而这也恰恰是我们设计多元化选项系统的原因：既提供灵活性，又精准地去管理您提到的这种风险。

我们目前的首要目标是降低建设者的门槛。以下是这些选项如何满足不同需求并规避“赌博”风险的：

  • 固定 USDI/USD 计价： 为那些需要绝对预算稳定性的团队准备，确保运营成本可控。

  • 固定 CKB 计价： 为那些 CKB 的长期信仰者准备，他们愿意并能够自己管理价格波动。

  • 固定 USD 价值 (以 CKB 支付)： 这是我们为应对您提到的场景而设计的关键 “安全网”。团队可以申请一个以 USD 计价的预算，但以 CKB 接收资金。如果 CKB 价格下跌，DAO 将会补足差额，确保项目方在每个里程碑都能收到足额的 USD 价值。这既保护了项目免受市场风险影响，也让他们不必完全放弃 CKB。

这个系统的设计初衷是为建设者赋能，确保他们有足够的财务稳定性来兑现对 DAO 的承诺。

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I like the images on the Web5 platform.

Since user interactions are essential for a DAO, this fundamental concept is geared toward the distant future and is desirable for participants and the underlying system. The importance of governance over the system is acknowledged here. Perhaps a type of quantum purse with fast synchronization could be used to manage CKB cells. Governance must continue in the post-quantum computer era without any associated concerns. We are working on a cryptography-neutral blockchain system and need post-quantum-ready governance for it. With good implementation, no more than a few hundred CKBs will certainly be necessary for user interactions. And past data can, where necessary, continue to exist through a hash.

It’s nice that not everything is spelled out in minute detail, but that there is obvious freedom. I see trust and self-determination in the users and in the stewards and those in positions of responsibility. Ultimately, we all come here and sit at our computers voluntarily. A fairly broad and open rule for deconstructive actions or inactions, such as constant unnecessary delays, should be considered.

Without a government, everything is nothing. Ultimately, users and stakeholders must bear responsibility. This is a very important part of the decentralized, permissionless system. It occurred to me to weight the time of DAO investments. Long-term investments could be given a value multiplier. Someone who has maintained their DAO investment for five years potentially has a greater interest in its continued existence and long-term survival than someone who sets up a DAO investment shortly before a vote, solely for the purpose of voting, and then dissolves it again after the vote.

I am delighted that this suggestion has received more than thirty likes.

BTC-CKB
BTC-CKB1024×1024 258 KB

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Hi knmo,

Thank you for this deep and insightful feedback. Seriously, this is exactly the kind of constructive thinking that will make our DAO stronger.

1. On “Deconstructive Inactions” (like project stalls):

You’ve identified a genuine blind spot in our current rules, thank you! You are absolutely right that if a team takes the initial funding and then simply stops delivering milestones, our current process doesn’t have a clear trigger to start a crisis intervention.

This is the perfect example of why this one-month review period is so crucial. We need to fix this. A potential solution could be:

to empower the DAO Stewards to initiate a “status check” vote if a project misses its planned milestone deadline by a certain period (e.g., 30 days). This check vote should belong to 3.3.2 Proposal Lifecycle - Phase 3: Execution Oversight - Crisis Management, which is paralleling the normal milestone quick vote.

What do you and the rest of the community think? We are very open to adding a clause to address this before the final vote.

2. On Time-Weighted Voting:

Your idea to weigh votes by the duration of DAO deposits is one of the best ways to reward long-term alignment. We appreciate the principle.

The reason we didn’t include it in v1.1 is due to its complexity and ecosystem-wide implications. It’s more than just a simple rule change; it could potentially interact with the core mechanics of Nervos DAO, future potential integrations like iCKB, and the balance between long-term stakers and liquidity providers.

Our goal with v1.1 is to build the foundational “parliament building” first. A robust topic like time-weighted voting deserves to be debated and decided upon in that new, more efficient venue. We encourage the community to think of it as a prime candidate for a v1.2 proposal.

3. On Post-Quantum Readiness and the Future:

Your long-term vision is inspiring. Similarly, the v1.1 proposal is about laying the first stone. Once this infrastructure is in place, it will empower community members like you to propose and lead these ambitious v1.x or even v2.x upgrades.

Thank you again for your invaluable contribution.

嗨，knmo，

感谢您提供的深刻而富有洞察力的反馈。说真的，这正是能够让我们的DAO更加强大的建设性想法。

1. 关于“解构性不作为”（例如项目停滞）：

您指出了我们现行规则中的一个真正盲点，谢谢！您说得完全正确，如果一个团队拿到了初始资金，然后就停止交付里程碑，那么我们目前的流程就缺乏启动危机干预的明确触发点。

这完美地诠释了为什么这个为期一个月的审查期如此重要。我们需要解决这个问题。一个潜在的解决方案可能是：

授权 DAO 物业在项目未能按计划完成里程碑期限（例如 30 天）时发起“状态检查”投票。此检查投票应属于 3.3.2 提案生命周期 - 第 3 阶段：执行监督 - 危机管理，与常规的里程碑快速投票并行。

您和社区其他成员有何看法？我们非常乐意在最终投票前添加一个条款来解决这个问题。

2. 关于时间加权投票：

您提出的根据 DAO 存款期限来衡量投票数的想法是奖励长期一致性的最佳方式之一。我们赞赏这一原则。

我们之所以没有将其纳入 v1.1 版本，是因为其复杂性及其对整个生态系统的影响。这不仅仅是一个简单的规则变更；它可能会与 Nervos DAO 的核心机制、未来可能集成的 iCKB 以及长期质押者和流动性提供者之间的平衡产生互动。

我们 v1.1 版本的目标是首先构建基础性的“议会大厦”。像时间加权投票这样重要的议题值得在这个新的、更高效的平台中进行讨论和决策。我们鼓励社区将其视为 v1.2 版本提案的主要候选方案。

3. 关于后量子时代的准备和未来：

您的长远愿景令人鼓舞。同样，v1.1 版本提案也奠定了基础。一旦这个基础设施到位，它将赋能像您这样的社区成员，让他们能够提出并领导这些雄心勃勃的 v1.x 甚至 v2.x 升级。

再次感谢您的宝贵贡献。

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