Hi Haoyang, appreciate you taking the time to prepare your thoughts like this and share with everyone.
What is a DAO?
I think first and foremost, we must set expectations: DAO = “Decentralized Autonomous Organization” While Ethereum may have popularized the concept, it is my belief that Bitcoin is the best example of what a decentralized autonomous organization can look like.
Bitcoin relies on “rough consensus and running code," meaning there is a rough idea shared across the community, of which there will always be disagreement, this is where “running code” comes in.
Code is opinionated and deterministic. It is a series of rules that is executed exactly the same by everyone running the same code. It is this lack of ambiguity that leads to the newfound ability (with Bitcoin) to scale coordination in a decentralized digital system. It is inherently a rules-based approach, not controlled by human judgement or “those in charge.”
Your sentiment “it’s about the leaders listening to all voices and then making a decision” is simply not a fit for a “decentralized autonomous organization,” but something else is.
What about the CKB Community Fund DAO?
DAO v1.1 made meta-rule changes regarding acceptance of a milestone, I’ve included them below. I do believe that they address most of the substance of your 3 questions.
Quick Confirmation Vote Description: To balance governance efficiency with community oversight and avoid voter fatigue and formalism, the quick vote uses an “optimistic governance” model of “default pass with a community veto right”:
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Voting Period: 3 days
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Voting Options: Confirm VS Veto (The specific meaning of “Confirm” depends on the report: for a delivered milestone, it means “Confirm Funding”; for a delayed milestone, it means “Accept New Plan”.)
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Minimum Turnout:
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No less than the requested budget for the project (for budget proposals).
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No less than 185,000,000 / 3 = 62,000,000 CKB (for meta-rule change proposals).
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This minimum turnout is 1/3 of the initial approval turnout, considering the objective fact that community attention naturally declines during project execution. This allows DAO members who remain engaged to act as “whistleblowers” to pause the process and draw community attention for further review.
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Decision Threshold and Outcome: Provided the minimum turnout is met, if Veto Funding votes are ≥ 51% (for budget proposals) or ≥ 67% (for meta-rule change proposals), the funding is vetoed. Otherwise, the funding is automatically approved.
The current situation with DAO v1.1
The DAO v1.1 proposal stated the following:
DAO v1.0 has a democratic decision-making mechanism but severely lacks the professional, continuous procedural services required to support the effective implementation of these decisions.
Based on the current implementation situation and these appeals from a DAO Steward to an unknown power structure to “do something,” I believe it is reasonable to question if this statement still holds true following the passage of DAO v1.1
I do believe that this procedural execution question is an entirely different topic to consider. It is likely more deserving of scrutiny than the technical questions being raised.
Governance is hard, your words are quite meaningful and your work is definitely appreciated and worthwhile, I just sincerely wish this situation was playing out differently.