(DIS) Meta-rule change: CKB in circulation can vote with a weight of 1%｜流通状态的CKB按1%权重投票

CKB Community Fund DAO
1

Background

Currently, only NervosDAO users can participate in community voting and governance. However, many NervosDAO users deposit their CKB and become disconnected from the community. This creates a situation where those with voting rights lack the time to engage in governance, while those with the time don’t have voting rights. To address this, promote decentralized governance in the CKB community, and involve more CKB holders in community discussions and decision-making, this proposal is presented.

Details

This proposal suggests that ordinary CKB holders (whose CKB is not stored in NervosDAO) should also be allowed to participate in the CKB Community Fund DAO voting. The voting weight will be 1% of the CKB amount held in their wallets. In other words, for any CKB address, the voting weight calculation formula will be:

P = CKB amount deposited in NervosDAO + circulating CKB balance * 1%.
(Previously, only the CKB amount deposited in NervosDAO was considered in the vote count for a specific address.)

Example:

  • User A has 1,000,000 CKB deposited in NervosDAO and a balance of 500,000 CKB in circulation. His vote count, Pa, would be 1,000,000 + 500,000 * 0.01 = 1,005,000.
  • User B holds 2,000,000 CKB, all in circulation. His vote count, Pb, would be 0 + 2,000,000 * 0.01 = 20,000.

Edge Cases

The following two scenarios need to be considered:

  • Circulating CKB can be freely transferred, and without control, individuals might continuously transfer their circulating CKB during the voting period to increase their vote count.
  • User Alice has her CKB deposited in NervosDAO with CKB address A1. She logins and binds her Metamask wallet address A to vote. Before the voting proposal is closed, her deposit might be withdrawn from NervosDAO and re-deposited, and she switches to a new Metamask wallet address B, binding it to a new NervosDAO address B1 for voting.

Therefore, during the voting period, we need a refresh mechanism to reflect any changes in the CKB balance associated with participating addresses, ensuring the validity of vote counts. The real-time requirement for this refresh mechanism is not high.

背景

当前，只有NervosDAO的用户才能参与社区的投票治理，然而很多NervosDAO的用户，他们把CKB放入钱包之后就消失在社区了，这就带来一种现状：有投票权的人没时间参与治理，有时间参与治理的人没有投票权。为了打破这种局面，推进CKB社区的去中心化治理，让更多CKB持币者参与到社区事务的讨论和抉择里来，特有此提案。

细则

本提案建议，CKB的普通持币者（其CKB未存入NervosDAO）也可以参与CKB Community Fund DAO的投票，投票权重为其钱包持有CKB数量的1%，也就是说，对任何一个CKB地址，投票票数计算公式为：存入NervosDAO的CKB数量 + 流通的CKB余额*1% ，而此前对某个地址的票数统计只计算了存入NervosDAO的CKB数量。

举例说明：
* 用户A 的pw钱包里，有1,000,000CKB存入NervosDAO，还剩500,000CKB处于流通状态，那么他的票数Pa = 1,000,000+500,0000.01 = 1,005,000；
* 用户 B的pw钱包里，有2,000,000CKB，全部处于流通状态，那么他的票数Pb = 0 + 2,000,0000.01 = 20,000；

边界情况

需考虑到以下两种情况：
* 流通的CKB可以灵活地转账，如果不加以控制，那么有人可能会在投票期间不停地转移其流通的CKB来投票以增加其票数。
* 用户Alice的CKB 存在NervosDAO中，CKB地址为A1，他使用Metamask 的钱包地址A 登录并绑定A1进行投票；在投票提案关闭前，他的存款可能会从 NervosDAO中提取出来，重新存入NervosDAO，之后他换了一个新的Metamask钱包地址B并绑定了新的NervosDAO地址B1进行投票。

因此，在投票期间，我们需要有刷新机制，如果参与投票的地址对应的CKB余额发生了变化，可以反馈到投票结果上，以确保票数的有效性。这个刷新机制对实时性的要求不高。

6 Likes
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You’re coming out with lots of really good and important discussions!

I also agree with this one, I think it would be very beneficial to the amount of participation in the DAO if all holders have a say.

1 Like
3

Yes, this is an important way to enhance community cohesion. As the community grows, more talented individuals will emerge to contribute and build.

2 Likes
4

This requires taking two snapshots of the voting address, at the time of voting and at the last moment of voting, and then comparing the number of votes in these two snapshots to select the lesser number of votes for a valid vote.

1 Like
5

Although I always like measures that encourage community participation, I would like to emphasize a few points:

  • A user in the DAO is assumed to be a SoV user, SoV and transactional users have different goals and incentives, sometimes even conflicting ones.

  • Although 1% does not represent a significant change a priori, the implications (and risks) that DeFi may have on governance must be taken into account.

  • For transactional users (those who are not currently in the DAO), ICKB (under development) could be an intermediate or compromise solution. Since it allows depositing in the DAO and participating in ecosystem applications such as DeFi.

I think this is important to take into account with the proposal. I would like to read other comments from the community about it.

3 Likes
6

  1. in my opinion handling the edge cases is quite problematic and the technical burden is enough to put implementation into question. If a user transfers their CKB during the voting period, is their vote nullified? If not, there are checks that must be put in place to ensure CKB isn’t used to vote twice.

  2. I agree with the points for consideration laid out by Alejandro, especially about the potential impact of DeFi.

  3. While I think this model is worthy of consideration, I can’t see it being viable in an on-chain environment (which is what we are working toward)

  4. There is something about locking up CKB that slows things down and seems to be beneficial to governance functions.

3 Likes