DAO Structures and the future of Ai agents (aspirational piece)

How can Nervos CKB Utilise AI agents?

My Personal Theory on how a CKB DAO should/could function in the future.

This is a disclaimer. This is not going to be implemented in anyway to any current DAO design.

AI agents are something I’ve been predicting for the last few years now for DAO usage. I’ve even enjoyed a debate or two with Jan Xie, the architect of Nervos CKB during a jaunt to Thailand about how AI agents could/should be used for DAO’s in the future. I’ve spoken of them to various people within the ecosystem at different times. They are needed, (in my opinion) to smooth out the whole process of regulating human interaction, social cohesion, and be conducive to efficient governance and financial settings regarding proposals within a CKB community DAO. They can also add less party political aspects that often are toxic in human competition.

After experiencing and seeing many problems in many current DAO’s (including the CKB community DAO), I’ve decided to explain why my interest has only heightened in the journey for DAO’s to be regulated by AI agents. This is all THEORETICAL rambling, but let’s call them CK Agents for now. (Common Knowledge Agents)

CK agents have the chance to significantly enhance the maintenance and operation of the CKB community DAO, whilst preserving mutual community governance as the ultimate authority.

That ultimate authority is the core value we must strive towards for CKB. The ability to trust parties seems like a basic thing to take for granted, but a POW blockchain is all about removing trust assumptions in general (or certainly lowering them) and personally I’m all for that process!

The CK agents will be tireless, programmable extensions of the community, handling repetitive, data-heavy and time-sensitive tasks that humans find burdensome, whilst preventing the seizing of control by the CK agents themselves.

This keeps the DAO truly “autonomous” (it puts the “A” in DAO) while making it more efficient, scalable, and resilient to outside influence or bad actors. Until this system is applied, I refuse to call it a DAO. It should just be called a ‘DO’ currently.

In practice, a CK agent is an autonomous software entity (powered by LLMs, reinforcement learning, or multi-CK agent systems) that interact directly with the CKB blockchain, smart contracts, oracles, and off-chain data.

They can be deployed, updated, or revoked through standard CKB DAO governance votes, to ensure alignment with the Nervos communities needs and will.

Computations might mainly be run off-chain (for cost/speed) with cryptographic proofs (like zero-knowledge proofs), verified on-chain for transparency for all to acknowledge.

Below are a few paradigms of how these agents could affect change for the Nervos CKB community.

Streamlining Governance

  • Proposal summarisation and analysis: CK agents could read long proposals, forum discussions and on-chain data. They could generate neutral summaries, simulate financial impacts of the treasury, could include market efficiency of payout periods, flag unseen risks, and could even respond with counter-proposals/refinements based on the CKB community guidelines.

The problem with smaller community DAO’s in my experience is voter apathy due to technical limitations of the voter. By making complex decisions easier to understand, CKB holders are often thrown into a minefield of complexity for the community, especially when timelines and technical details are lost upon them. (A current common occurrence) Not to be confused with a limited voting community. (A whole separate argument not solved by CK Agents)

  • Intelligent voting delegation: CKB holders could potentially create personalised “CK voting agents” encoded with their own preferences (e.g. risk tolerance, priorities via simple questionnaires). The CK agent then votes automatically on proposals that match those rules. Our token holders could also retain or override rights at any time. This restricts the forcing of constant human involvement. If the community members cannot create these agents, a proposal could be made for a CK Agent creator dApp that allows them to create their own, very easily at the push of a button. (perhaps this is a game changing dApp that could be utilised across the whole DAO space and not just CKB’s).

  • Outcome simulation and recommendations: Before a community vote, CK agents could potentially run a scenario model (e.g., “What if this treasury allocation passes?”) using historical CKB DAO data and market signals. They can provide interpretable reports to inform voters so they do not remain ill informed.

The CKB DAO voters can act on the agent’s core logic, boundaries, or model updates which of course will update by voting as the DAO matures in the legal framework. We will come to legal frameworks later.

The CKB Treasury Fund

  • Treasury optimisation: CK agents could potentially handle any foundation or projects payrolls, CKB grants, or disperse private proposal pay outs once approved. This reduces the need for a CKB human internal committee, it may reduce the need for human friction in decision making, reduce the need to pay any committee members, and become more sustainable long term. In fact it could reduce the bus factor for Nervos CKB or any projects looking to become long term, or even help out running a small team for a developer who is lacking in man power (What is the bus factor?).

  • Routine execution: CK Agents could trigger smart contract actions like CKB/iCKB token distributions, SPORE mints, or cross-chain bridges such as the Rosen Bridge. In the event CKB becomes DeFi-focused, they could potentially perform arbitrage, staking, or lending autonomously without human trust. CKB is modelled for decentralisation so it’s the perfect use case.

  • Administrative tasks: They could schedule community or dApp team meetings, manage CKB contributor bounties, or generate reports ensuring humans need not create high-level strategies. This reduces the risk of bad decision making and bases it on projected game theories.

Security, and Compliance

  • Real-time oversight: CK Agents could scan transactions for anomalies, hacks, or compliance issues (e.g. unusual outflows/Tx’s), automatically pause contracts or alert the community through on-chain notifications 24 hours a day through whatever social or device you prefer.

  • Risk mitigation: They could reconcile accounts, enforce rules ( e.g. multi-sig requirements), and provide predictive insights on potential vulnerabilities within the CKB DAO structure, and act as oracles to alert community members when they are venturing into bad faith actions, but not censorship. Transparency is still and will always be needed.

  • Dispute resolution support: In some setups, CK agents could analyse evidence neutrally for the community arbitration. A very valuable process to remove emotion from decision making, but not entirely, because ultimately DAO’s often create controversy as we currently see on Talk.Nervos.org from time to time with proposals being ill thought out or controversial to spending.

Community Engagement

  • Discussion facilitation: They could summarise social media, Discord and Talk.nervos forum threads, identify consensus, or moderate spam while surfacing diverse opinions/voices and bringing them to the forefront of the debate.

  • Idea generation: CK Agents could brainstorm CKB proposals based on community sentiment, external trends, or bring forth exciting new ideas made from communities historical inputs, then be refined with human scepticism. Most of the time LLM’s don’t invent things, but they’re great at aggregating information to help generate more informed ideas. A CK agent will write your proposal for you with the right prompts, allowing you to bridge the ‘basic member’ to the experts. (with ease)

  • Swarm intelligence DAO’s: AI agents from different DAOs could act as “liaisons,” enabling automated collaboration and joint ventures, without manual coordination. This could create a network of interconnected DAOs, either interoperable with other blockchains or multiple DAOs within the CKB ecosphere.

Experimental Usecases

  • CKB developers could create tokenised autonomous agents that operate as “CKB community DAO members” with their own Neuron wallet or with decision rights, bounded by governance. An interesting game changing prospect for Nervos CKB.

  • There could be Multi-CK agent systems for complex tasks where they work in unison together to perform tasks that all slot together like an overall process, much like a ‘Jigsaw’. Modular, but running in sync.

These CK agents should be open sourced, and in the era of quantum computing, they will no doubt have to adapt and evolve to be quantum resistant to remain future proof. A general ethos of CKB’s flexibility and tenacious personality.

They should be run on decentralised computer networks to avoid single points of failure and ideally they could be upgraded through governance proposals and voted on by the CKB community, whilst having on-chain logs of actions, verifiable outputs (e.g. using ZKP proofs) and work only within the boundaries of the communities decision making.

Regular reviews and audits would have to be applied so they align with ongoing updates to the Nervos CKB ethos.

The Legal aspect

In theory DAO’s could pose legal risks and problems. Whilst CK agents cannot remove all the grey areas in an ever evolving regulatory framework, they could meaningfully mitigate risks, reduce exposure to grey areas, and strengthen legal defence when deployed as community-governed tools.

They would act as regulatory technology layers, automation monitoring, analysis, and enforcement, while keeping the CKB community in ultimate control. Mandatory.

CK agents actions would be legally attributed to the community DAO, not the CK agents themselves. CK agents would have no legal personhood, but who knows in the future whether that will remain the case?

Adaptive Compliance

CK Agents could continuously scan global regulations, court rulings, and real time legislative updates.

They could flag potential impacts on the CKB DAO’s operations such as the treasury, CKB tokenomic emissions, cross-border Tx’s and vote adjustments*.*

The Nervos community could create a DAO proposal and vote for CKB developers to code “Compliance Monitoring Agents” that can track changes across global jurisdictions, reducing potential violations and reducing legal complications or friction.

Workflows, data privacy, and a country’s SEC rules, might also be encoded to the CK agents, with significant legal benefits that are auditable and can be proven in a court of law that members have acted in good faith within legal environments.

Pre Execution

  • Before any on-chain action (proposal execution, treasury transfer, or governance vote), CK agents could analyse it against known regulatory tests (e.g. The Howey test for securities, travel rule for virtual assets, or risk classifications).

  • They could simulate outcomes (“Would this look like an unregistered offering?”) and flag grey-area risks with transparent reason logs (provable via on-chain or ZKP-veri outputs).

  • CK agents could contain tools to check for compliance red flags, and prevent malicious or risky actions from reaching to the point of execution.

  • Legal benefit would shift from a reactive “battlefield” of defence, and switch to preventive guardrails. There could be human/community reviews required for high-stakes decisions, thus avoiding legal problems

Transparency and Audit Trails

Every AI decision, reasoning, and data source could be logged immutably on-chain or with verifiable off-chain storage, generating tamper-proof compliance reports, impact assessments, and decision rationale.

  • In a regulatory investigation, the Community DAO could demonstrate that actions followed encoded rules aligned with community consensus, and not arbitrary human discretion.

  • A legal benefit could strengthen defensibility in grey areas by proving transparency and process adherence, which is harder for regulators to challenge than opaque, human-led, decisions.

Autonomy and Human ‘Watchers’

  • CK agents might operate within strict, DAO-voted bounds (e.g. large sums having kill switches and revocation rights), combining the automation of the CK agents with human oversight.

  • Multi-CK agent systems (risk assessments, amongst others, for execution, reduce single-point failures.) AI is treated as a tool under agency law principles, deployers remain accountable and they could provide legal shields for any mis-programming.

Legal Wrappers and Insurance

  • CK agents might use DAO legal entity jargon. A type of ‘Legal wrapper’. The agent could operate on behalf of the CKB community DAO which would be its own registered entity.

  • CK agents might even help maintain compliance documentation like ‘fiduciary duty tracking’.

  • CK agents could be encoded with dedicated insurance for AI actions, and monitoring to trigger claims or pauses in a court of law.

Limitations Create New Grey Areas

But let’s not kid ourselves, CK agents (and indeed any AI agent) cannot give legal advice. They would only be recommendations that will not be legally binding due to the earlier point of CK agents not having a person-hood status. With new technology, comes lack of legislation. New risks could emerge such as ‘agent hallucinations’ (examples here), bias, or over-automation, which could create fresh liabilities. Human oversight is in fact non-negotiable to ensure these blips are correctable at code level.

Human rights may even come into play and have legal ramifications, which might be different in other countries and vary in legislation. AI agents are today transforming compliance in traditional finance and could be adapted to DAOs already. The CK agent will have a lot to navigate to mimic the growing trends in legalese, and may even have to be consorted by a lawyer before being programmed and installed.

A Final Food For Thought.

CK agents won’t erase the legal battlefield, they may carry the potential to equip the community DAO with better reconnaissance, automated defences, and verifiable records to navigate our communities decisions more safely. They could even maximise the potential for the legality to be ‘pro active’ as opposed to being ‘reactive’ in today’s modern world.

But we must remember, AI assists, it will not replace the legality of the CKB community DAO.

So let’s keep CKB decentralised and community-governed, because the key is to design agents to be the tools, and not the rulers of the Nervos DAO!!

CK agents might just supercharge the whole DAO process and make them as autonomous as they can be, without replacing our governance and decision making entirely. The future is for the community to make.

CK or AI agents are very much just a pipe dream currently in regards to DAO structures, but in the future I have no doubt they will have a part to play once more efficient.

Feel free to comment or take any ideas from this to debate.

The question is, how far do you think we are away from these things being effective?

Do you trust Ai even if its kept in human check?

Does it take the fun away and the social element?

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Nervos Talk Renewal & Governance 是一个临时特别的分类,专门用于讨论论坛最近的改版和重构。所以我暂时帮你移动到了现在的分区。感谢发帖。

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Hi,感谢发帖分享!

你提到的AI agent for DAO的很多用例,我觉得都和可以算是下图右上角的绿灯区域:AI有能力去做,人也有动力把对应工作交给AI去做,比如讨论促进、总结报告。而复杂任务的协同探索工具,可以对应左上角的橙色区域,是开发者值得去探索的部分。


出处:https://futureofwork.saltlab.stanford.edu/ 供参考


不过我有一点担忧的是: 智能投票委托。最近正在做一篇基于计量经济学方法论,对AI agent担任治理中的被委托者,会导致什么后果的工作。核心发现可以简单概述为,由于治理是一种需要内生的动机激励的行为,当AI agent被委托后,用户的内生动机可能被侵蚀,且这种侵蚀会外溢到被委托范围外。此外,这种侵蚀和committed-level正相关。

举例来说,用户在DAO中将治理投票委托给AI agent后,在其他没有被AI自动化Cover的公共任务中,越是之前积极参与的用户,越可能发生退出行为。

不过依然是早期结论,AI agent for DAO肯定是一个值得探索的领域,再次感谢您的分享

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I think your vision for CK Agents cuts right to what a DAO ought to be, not just a voting portal, but a machine, not simply stateful but also smart, for collective trust. Still I would like to push the premise one layer deeper, the governance fatigue you describe, voter apathy, opaque proposals, human friction, probably cannot truly be relieved by AI if the on-chain contracts themselves remain black boxes. As Leslie Lamport’s work on formal specification relentlessly drives home, a system’s trustworthiness cannot exceed the precision of its specification. If state transitions are not explicit, deterministic, and independently verifiable, then any AI agent tasked with summarising, simulating, or arbitrating them merely interpolates guesses across obscurity. An essential prerequisite for safe on-chain agents is therefore architectural transparency.

From where I stand , the Cell/UTXO model’s advantage is that it pushes state to the surface, making the ledger itself a readable specification. AI then ceases to be an oracle peering into a vault(as is does in most other models) and becomes instead a mechanical translator of already-public logic, thus reducing cognitive dimensionality without introducing epistemic risk.

This also loops back to your insistence on ultimate human authority. Like Hannah Arendt said, ’ Power is actualized only where word and deed have not been separated… it springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse’, maybe potential CK Agents should function as extensions of that space, they may automate treasury payouts, compliance scans, and dispute summaries, but only within DAO-voted bounds and by auditing a causal chain woven from transaction intents.

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