phroi
April 19, 2026, 4:24pm
22
That is an comparison example of how a simpler initial design could have avoided all this messy situation.
See: On-Chain Tally: DAO v1.1 Limits and a Deposit-Paired Voting Proposal
As a reference to Fellow Community members:
Voter whitelist (SMT-based, requiring Web5 DID registration + daily snapshot inclusion), it was not described in the governance rules voted on by the community. The proposal’s voting section states:
Voting power is based entirely on the user’s CKB deposits in the Nervos DAO, continuing the direct weighted voting model of v1.0.
The only mention of “whitelist” is a sub-item in the development cost table:
对提案投票 | 投票白名单收集、创建投票Cell、构造并发送投票交易、投票后的Cell处理、权重统计等 | 12000
(Voting on Proposals | Voting whitelist collection, create voting Cells, construct/send voting TXs, post-vote Cell processing, weight calculation, etc. | $12,000)
No description of what the whitelist is or how it restricts eligibility. This line was present unchanged since the original post on Sep 4, 2025 (verified across all 21 proposal revisions).
Under the DAO rules , changes to voting eligibility are meta-rule changes requiring 67% approval and 185M CKB quorum.
No such vote was held for this mechanism.
One use-case proving the change in voting eligibility:
In DAO v1.1 a user can be explicitly forbidden by design from participating in an existing vote. I can have a pre-existing deposit, but still being blocked from voting on a proposal: Didn’t create a DID in time? Excluded from whitelist, so not eligible to vote
Agreed, clarity on the matter from @zz_tovarishch (Transitional period coordinator), @terrytai , @janx & @Cipher (DAO v1.0 Committee) would be appreciated.
Love & Peace, Phroi